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SUMMARY
With the increased attention of different stakeholders on the environmental
performance of businesses, several firms are increasingly focusing on product recov-
ery and reuse activities which are not only profitable but may also help to reduce
the environmental impact of their operations. This dissertation focuses on manage-
rial challenges associated with such value-added recovery and reuse activities. The
first essay (Chapter 2) examines how a firm should bring a product to market, in
particular, whether to lease or sell products. Motivated by claims that leasing can
be an environmentally superior to selling, we analytically investigate if either leas-
ing or selling can be both more profitable for a monopolist and have a lower total
environmental impact. The second essay (Chapter 3) first experimentally examines
the effect of remanufactured products on the perceived value of new products. This
effect is then incorporated to analytically investigate an OEM’s strategy in the pres-
ence of competition from third-party remanufacturers. In the third essay (Chapter
4), motivated by a major IT company, we investigate the optimal product recovery
and remanufacturing strategy for a firm that can offer trade-in rebates to achieve
price discrimination. We also consider the effect of potential entry of third-party




The growth in industrial production and increased consumption by a growing pop-
ulation are increasing the strain on the environment. The resulting regulatory and
consumer attention on the environmental performance of businesses has led to an
increase in managerial focus on sustainability. This has led many firms to adopt or
explore the benefits of product recovery and reuse activities which could potentially
reduce the environmental impact of their businesses. A critical challenge for managers
in operationalizing these strategies is how to ensure that they not only reduce the
environmental impact of their operations but also do not have a detrimental effect on
their profitability. This dissertation focuses on managerial challenges associated with
such value-added recovery activities.
The first essay, presented in Chapter 2, investigates whether leasing can be greener
than a selling strategy. Based on the proposition that leasing is environmentally
superior to selling, some firms have adopted a leasing strategy and others promote
their existing leasing programs as environmentally superior in order to “green” their
image. The argument is that as a leasing firm retains ownership of the off-lease
units, it has an incentive to remarket the products, resulting in a lower production
and disposal volume. However, some argue that leasing might be environmentally
inferior due to the direct control the firm has over the off-lease products, which may
prompt their premature disposal to avoid cannibalizing the demand for new products.
Motivated by these issues, we adopt a life-cycle environmental impact perspective and
analytically investigate if either leasing or selling can be both more profitable for a
monopolist and have a lower total environmental impact. We identify conditions
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where each of these outcomes can occur, depending on the magnitude of the disposal
cost, the differential in disposal costs faced by the firm and consumers, and the
environmental impact profile of the product. These results provide insights for firms
who want to promote their strategy as the “greener” choice.
In the second essay, presented in Chapter 3, we experimentally investigate the ef-
fect of remanufactured products on the perceived value of new products. We find that
the perceived value of an OEM’s new product depends on who sells the remanufac-
tured product: in our experiment, the perceived value of new products decreases when
the OEM sells the remanufactured product, but it increases when the remanufactured
product is sold by a third-party remanufacturer. We incorporate this effect to analyt-
ically investigate an OEM’s strategy in the presence of competition from third-party
remanufacturers. Existing literature has argued that because the presence of third-
party competition is detrimental for the OEM, it should pursue remanufacturing or
collection of used products to preempt third-party remanufacturers. By incorporating
the effect of remanufacturing on the perceived value of new products, our research
shows that an OEM may not always benefit from preempting third-party remanufac-
turers. Instead, an OEM may find it more profitable to allow third-party competitors
to remanufacture its products.
The third essay, presented in Chapter 4, is motivated by the practices at a major
IT company. In this essay, we study the impact of trade-in rebates to practice price
discrimination, when the recovered products can be remanufactured and remarketed
to consumers. Although the magnitude of the customized rebate given by the firm is
supposedly based on the condition of the used product, we observed that there is very
low correlation between the rebate given and the physical condition of the returned
products. We find that even if disposal of returns is costly, it is optimal for the firm
to offer a trade-in program, due to the benefits of price discrimination. We also show
that the firm is less likely to remanufacture when it has the opportunity to practice
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price discrimination. This may potentially explain why some firms recover prod-
ucts through trade-ins but not choose to remanufacture in practice. Since the trend
is towards increasing competition from third-party remanufacturers and increasing
disposal costs, we consider the firm’s recovery and remanufacturing strategy in the
presence of threat of entry by a third-party competitor. We find that a firm may
choose to remanufacture to deter entry of such competitors, despite cannibalization
of new products and a reduced ability to practice price discrimination.
3
CHAPTER II
IS LEASING GREENER THAN SELLING?
2.1 Introduction
Leasing is a strategy prevalently used by durable goods manufacturers. Academic
research in economics and marketing has identified conditions for the profitability
of this strategy (Coase, 1972; Bulow, 1982; Hendel and Lizzeri, 1999b; Desai and
Purohit, 1998, 1999). Recently, there have been claims that leasing can be a greener
strategy, leading to a lower environmental burden than selling (Hawken et al., 1999;
Fishbein et al., 2000; Mont, 2002). The argument is the following: Since the firm
maintains ownership of the product under an operating lease, it has an incentive to
efficiently remarket the used product at the end of the lease duration1. Remarketing
the product as opposed to disposing of it2 decreases the demand for new products,
reducing the environmental impact of manufacturing and disposal.
Some firms seeking to “green” their image in response to growing consumer aware-
ness of environmental issues have embraced the “Leasing is Green” message. For ex-
ample, Interface Inc., a carpet manufacturer, introduced the Evergreen LeaseTMwith
the express purpose of reducing the environmental impact of its products and de-
scribed it as a “new workable business model for sustainable development” (Olivia
and Quinn, 2003). Interface chairman and founder Ray Anderson states “Leasing car-
pet rather than selling it, and being responsible for it cradle to cradle, is the future”
(Anderson, 1998). Others promote their leasing programs as being environmentally
friendly. According to IBM, “..leasing makes more and more sense for many clients.
1In this paper, the term “remarketing” refers to putting the used product on the market.
2In this study, the term “disposal” refers to taking the used product off the market via recycling,
incineration or landfilling.
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Clients enjoy the benefits of technology without having to dispose of equipment at
the end of its useful life...Combined with the simplicity of returning equipment to
IBM at end of lease, IBM essentially uses Best Practice in Asset Management to
keep equipment out of the waste stream” (IBM, 2007). Indeed, IBM’s Global Asset
Recovery Services, which is part of IBM Global Financing, remarkets 85% of off-lease
machines it receives worldwide (Johnson, 2007). HP’s environmental sustainability
report states “Product reuse programs extend the useful life of equipment, especially
at the end of leasing agreements when consumers return products ranging from PCs
to data center equipment” (Hewlett-Packard , 2009). Xerox named its line of refur-
bished off-lease products the “Green Line” to emphasize the environmental benefits of
their approach (Charter and Polonsky, 1999). Several environmental policy-making
groups such as the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the state of Minnesota
and the New York City Government (U.S. EPA, 2008a; Minnesota Pollution Con-
trol Agency , 2006; New York City Government, 2007) also recommend leasing as an
environmentally superior strategy.
In contrast, some argue that the environmental superiority of leasing is far from
clear (Ruth, 1998), and some even argue it is a “fallacy” (Lawn, 2001). The reason is
the direct control that the firm exerts on the off-lease units. To avoid cannibalizing
the demand for the firm’s new products, a leasing firm may remove the returned used
products from the market. For example, the majority of Pitney Bowes’ off-lease prod-
ucts are not remarketed (Fishbein et al., 2000), and a computer network equipment
manufacturer is known to have prematurely disposed of fully functional products
worth more than $700 million (Guide and Van Wassenhove, 2009). Such premature
disposal may result in a higher manufacturing and disposal volume than selling, caus-
ing leasing to underperform from a total life-cycle environmental impact perspective.
The life cycle of a product consists – at its most basic – of the production, use and
disposal phases. We define the total life-cycle environmental impact of a strategy
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as the volume of products in each phase multiplied with the per unit environmental
impact in that phase, summed over all life-cycle phases. Under leasing, the product
volumes in each life-cycle phase are determined by the production, remarketing and
disposal volumes. Under selling, they are determined by the production volume and
the size of the secondary market.
In this study, we rigorously analyze the impact of key drivers determining whether
leasing can be greener than selling. Our goal is to establish when a firm can justi-
fiably claim leasing to be environmentally superior to selling, which is valuable in
an environment where consumers are sensitive to “greenwashing” and the internet
makes information about offenders easy to publicize and access (e.g. through sites
such as www.greenwashingindex.com). We identify conditions under which leasing
dominates by being environmentally superior and profitable, but also those condi-
tions under which selling is better along both dimensions, providing new support for
a selling firm’s environmental positioning.
In comparing the two strategies, we add a new feature to the traditional leas-
ing model by jointly incorporating a disposal cost and allowing for the disposal of
off-lease products by the firm. Disposal costs have recently become an important
consideration due to increases in landfilling fees and a growing patchwork of legisla-
tion governing post-use products (Luther 2008), as well as firms choosing more costly
but environmentally preferred methods of disposal to avoid a negative environmental
image. The product disposal cost plays a critical role in the volume of products in
each life-cycle phase: Under leasing, the firm maintains ownership of the off-lease
units, so the remarketing and disposal decisions depend on the disposal cost faced
by the firm. Under selling, it is the consumer who disposes of the product. The
firm typically avoids direct disposal costs, but has to implicitly bear the consumer’s
disposal cost (if any) and the loss of control over the secondary market. Thus, the
presence of disposal costs affects the profitability and the environmental impact of
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leasing and selling differently and is important to capture in any model comparing
the two. Since there is often a differential in disposal costs faced by the firm and
consumers, we allow for asymmetry in the disposal costs in our analysis.
Our work builds on and contributes to the previous literature on durable goods,
closed-loop supply chains and industrial ecology. In the durable goods literature,
several issues associated with the lease versus sell decision faced by a firm have been
studied (for an excellent overview, see Waldman, 2003). Some of these issues in-
clude pricing power (Coase, 1972; Stokey, 1981; Bulow, 1982; Bagnoli et al., 1989;
Karp, 1996; Kühn, 1998; Hahn, 2006), the role of secondary markets and market
segmentation (Waldman, 1997; Hendel and Lizzeri, 1999b; Desai and Purohit, 1998;
Huang et al., 2001), competition (Desai and Purohit, 1999; Huang and Kuzyutin,
2002) and channel structure (Purohit, 1995, 1997; Desai et al., 2004; Bhaskaran and
Gilbert, 2009). The main focus of this stream of literature is to analyze the relative
profitability of leasing and selling, or to explain the coexistence of these strategies.
We make two distinct contributions to this literature. First, our work brings the
environmental impact dimension to the comparison of leasing and selling. Second, we
enrich the comparison of the two strategies by incorporating disposal costs faced by
both the firm and the consumers and endogenizing premature disposal in this setting.
We compare both the profitability and the environmental impact of leasing versus sell-
ing and find that all four combinations are possible (selling is more profitable and
environmentally superior, leasing is more profitable but selling is environmentally su-
perior, etc.), depending on the inherent durability of the product, the structure of the
disposal costs, and which phases of its life cycle contribute the most to the product’s
environmental impact. Several papers have identified settings where selling may be
more profitable: the presence of competition or the threat of entry (Bucovetsky and
Chilton, 1986; Desai and Purohit, 1999), lower durability under selling (Desai and
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Purohit, 1998), the presence of production lead-time and demand uncertainty (De-
sai et al., 2004), and the presence of complementary goods (Bhaskaran and Gilbert,
2005). We identify another setting by showing that selling may be more profitable
when a firm faces higher disposal cost than consumers.
In the closed-loop supply chain literature, a number of papers focus on the joint
pricing of new and remarketed products under the selling strategy in a variety of
competitive and regulatory environments (Debo et al., 2005; Heese et al., 2005; Ferrer
and Swaminathan, 2006; Ferguson and Toktay, 2006; Jin et al., 2007; Atasu et al.,
2008b; Esenduran et al., 2008). In these papers, however, there is an assumption
that the product has a useful life of only one period and has to be remanufactured or
refurbished before it can be used again. This characterization blurs the distinction
between leasing and selling, as no consumer-to-consumer trading occurs and the firm
has full control of used products even under selling. We complement this literature by
considering a firm’s disposal and remarketing decisions for a durable product having
a useful life of two periods, which makes the distinction between the two strategies
particularly salient. Debo et al. (2005) argue that adding a disposal cost would simply
increase the effective cost of production. We formalize this argument, and show that
a disposal cost differential leads to cases where selling a durable good can be more
profitable than leasing it.
In the industrial ecology literature, the environmental impact of products is eval-
uated by using conventional life-cycle analysis that focuses on the impact of one unit
throughout its life cycle (U.S. EPA, 2008c). Firms such as Nokia, Canon and Apple
use LCA results to aid decision-making and provide this information to consumers
(McLaren and Piukkula, 2004; Canon, 2009; Apple, 2009a). LCAs may also form the
basis for policy recommendations (European Environmental Agency, 1998; Tukker
et al., 2005; U.S. EPA, 2008c). However, as pointed out by Thomas (2008), focusing
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on per-unit impact ignores market effects such as demand and use duration that de-
termine total environmental impact. In this study, we formalize the market effects by
including sale, disposal and use volumes in the calculation of the total life-cycle envi-
ronmental impact of the firm’s chosen strategy. As we assume that the product’s per
unit environmental impact is the same whether it is sold or leased, all the conclusions
we draw about relative environmental impact are driven by the market effects.
The rest of the essay is organized as follows: In §2.2, we discuss our assumptions
and develop discrete-time, infinite horizon, dynamic sequential games for the leasing
and selling strategies. In §2.3, we solve for the optimal strategies of a monopolist.
In §2.4, we use the optimal decisions found in the previous section to compare the
relative profitability and total environmental impact of the two strategies. Finally,
in §2.5, we conclude by discussing the managerial insights derived from our analysis.
All proofs are included in the Appendix.
2.2 The Model
In this section, we outline our assumptions regarding the product, firm, consumer
and market characteristics, and end with the specification of a discrete-time dynamic
sequential game over an infinite time horizon. In the remainder of the essay, vectors
are arranged in rows and primes represent transposes. 1 denotes a vector of ones.
Superscripts are used to label time and subscripts are used to label other information.
f and c denote firm and consumer specific parameters, respectively.
Firm and Product Characteristics. We study a profit-maximizing monopo-
list that produces a single durable product. The firm has a constant returns to scale
production technology with the marginal cost of producing a new product denoted by
c. The product depreciates with use and has finite durability. To capture the inter-
temporal substitution effect due to product durability while maintaining tractability,
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we assume the product lasts for two periods. This assumption has been used exten-
sively in the durable goods literature (Bulow, 1982; Hendel and Lizzeri, 1999a; Desai
and Purohit, 1998, 1999; Hendel and Lizzeri, 1999b; Huang et al., 2001; Bhaskaran
and Gilbert, 2005) and does not restrict the generality of the insights obtained. We
refer to a product in its first period of useful life as new and in the second period
as used. Subscripts n and u denote new and used products respectively. Products
that have been used for two periods are called end-of-life products, and can only be
disposed of (via recycling, incineration or landfilling).
The firm uses either a pure leasing strategy or a pure selling strategy. If the firm
chooses the leasing strategy, it offers one-period operating leases, where products are
returned to the firm after the lease period. The firm may either lease or dispose of the
used product, and disposes of end-of-life products; the implications of the firm selling
the used products instead of leasing them are discussed in §2.4. If the firm chooses
the selling strategy, it sells new products only; used products are traded between
consumers on the secondary market at the market clearing price. Under selling, it is
the consumers who dispose of end-of-life products.
If the firm remarkets or the consumer sells the used product, they incur remar-
keting or transaction costs, βf ≥ 0 and βc ≥ 0, respectively. Similarly, if the firm
or the consumer disposes of products, they incur a unit cost, sf and sc, respectively.
We allow sf and sc to either be positive or negative, reflecting costly or profitable
disposal, but for brevity use the term “disposal cost” to refer to both cases.
There are several factors that determine how costly or profitable disposal is.
The product type is a primary factor, in particular, whether the product is mainly
composed of metal, plastic, glass, etc. and whether it has toxic material content
(Van Wassenhove et al., 2004). For example, cars can typically be sold to scrap yards,
but electronic waste is typically costly to dispose of. State and federal legislation is
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another factor. For example, some states ban landfilling and/or incineration of cer-
tain materials, requiring either costly processing or transportation over long distances
(Luther, 2008). In the absence of regulation, a firm may nevertheless undertake costly
recycling to avoid a negative environmental perception. For the consumer, disposal
can be either costly (paying a fee to remove and dispose a bulky product such as a
refrigerator), profitable (selling a product with high value to a recycler) or even free
(throwing it in the trash). The disposal cost for a given product need not be the
same for the firm and consumers, and can be either higher or lower. For example,
federal law on hazardous substances (U.S. EPA, 2008b) does not restrict households
from throwing their electronic waste in the trash (sc < sf ). On the other hand,
even if recycling is profitable, recyclers may only purchase from firms that generate
large volumes, and the recycling opportunity may not be available for consumers
(sf < 0 ≤ sc).
Consumer Characteristics. The consumer population remains constant over
time and is normalized to size 1. Consumers are heterogeneous in the utility they
derive from consumption, and are characterized by their type θ. We assume that θ
is uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. Consumer θ is characterized by the utility vector
u(θ)
.
= (un(θ), uu(θ), 0), where un(θ) and uu(θ) are the utilities derived from one
period use of the new and the used product, respectively, and zero is the utility
derived from remaining inactive. u(θ) is time independent and exogenous. Ceteris
paribus, every consumer (weakly) prefers a new product to a used product, and a used
product to remaining inactive; un(θ) ≥ uu(θ) ≥ 0 for all θ ∈ [0, 1]. It is reasonable
to expect that the consumer’s utility for a product is finite, i.e., ∃ M > 0 such that
un(1) < M . As in Desai and Purohit (1998), we assume that the drop in utility
between using a new and a used product is higher for consumers with a higher type
(d(un(θ)− uu(θ))/dθ > 0).
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The following assumption satisfying the conditions above is often made in the lit-
erature (Desai and Purohit, 1998; Desai et al., 2004; Desai and Purohit, 1999; Desai
et al., 2007):
ASSUMPTION A1. un(θ) = θ & uu(θ) = δθ, where δ ∈ (0, 1] is interpreted as prod-
uct durability.
Unless otherwise specified, our results are proven for the generic utility function. As-
sumption A1 is used to obtain closed-form solutions and enable a detailed comparison
of leasing and selling. Under Assumption A1, the condition c+ max(sc, sf ) + βc < 1
eliminates uninteresting cases where the business is not profitable for the firm.
Specification of the Game. We develop a dynamic game where the firm and
consumers move sequentially in each period. In every period, the firm first makes
her decisions, followed by the consumers. Under a leasing strategy, the firm chooses
the quantity of new and used products to lease. The remaining used products and
all end-of-life products are disposed. Under the selling strategy, the firm only decides
the quantity of new products to sell. Observing these decisions, the consumers play
the game strategically against the manufacturer. All players in the game are rational
and maximize their net present values with a common discount factor of 0 < ρ ≤ 1.
All information regarding the cost structures and preferences are common knowledge.
We model the problem as a discrete-time infinite-horizon problem, where periods
are indexed by t ≥ 0. The reasons for this are two-fold: First, at the start of the
game, t = 0, there are no existing used products, so there is an initial transient time
where the supply of used products builds up. Second, using a finite horizon requires
specifying artificial terminal conditions. Consequently, using a finite time horizon
would skew the life-cycle based comparison of the two strategies. Thus, we use an
infinite time horizon and focus on the steady-state firm and consumer strategies. Our
insights are still valid for problems with finite, but sufficiently long horizons.
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2.3 Analysis
In this section, we analyze the leasing and selling strategies. We solve the problem
using the common approach of only considering subgame perfect equilibria. Let
consumer actions Ln, Lu, Bn, Bu and I denote leasing a new product, leasing a
used product, buying a new product, buying a used product, and remaining inactive,

















t are indicator variables corresponding to strategies Ln, Lu, Bn, Bu and I,
respectively. Since remaining inactive is included in the consumer’s action set, we
have at(θ)1
′





denote the vectors of lease and sales prices for new and used products at time t.
2.3.1 Leasing Model
In this section, we focus on the steady-state equilibrium and solve for the optimal
decisions of the leasing firm. This assumption of restricting attention to steady-state
equilibria is commonly used in papers that consider an infinite-horizon leasing model
in the durable goods literature (Hendel and Lizzeri, 1999b; Huang et al., 2001) and
in the remanufacturing literature (Ferrer and Swaminathan, 2006). We begin by for-
mulating and solving the consumer’s utility maximization problem. The customer’s





t(θ)), with initial condi-
tion a0l (θ) = (0, 0, 1) for all θ ∈ [0, 1]. Since consumers enter each period without a
product, the periods decouple; the consumer’s action in the current period depends
only on the payoff in the current period, which is independent of the consumers’
previous actions and solely determined by the firm’s period-t decisions. Thus, con-
sumer θ’s optimal period-t decision atl(θ)
∗ is determined by maximizing his period-t
net utility Πθ[a
t(θ); rt] subject to atl(θ)1
′
= 1. Here, Πθ[(1, 0, 0); r
t] = un(θ) − rtn,
Πθ[(0, 1, 0); r
t] = uu(θ)− rtu and Πθ[(0, 0, 1); rt] = 0.
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Lemma 1 In period t, the equilibrium consumer strategies have the following struc-
ture: Consumers in θ ∈ (θ1, 1] always lease new products, consumers in θ ∈ (θ2, θ1]
always lease used products and consumers in θ ∈ (0, θ2] remain inactive, where
θ2 ≤ θ1 ∈ [0, 1] such that
uu(θ2)− rtu = 0 and un(θ1)− rtn = uu(θ1)− rtu. (1)
Turning now to the firm’s problem, let Ltn and L
t
u denote the quantity of new





firm’s profit in a given period depends on the current and previous period decisions:
Πl(L
t−1, Lt) = (rtn − c)Ltn + (rtu − βf )Ltu − sf (Lt−1n − Ltu) − sfLt−1u . and Lt ≥ 0,
Ltu ≤ Lt−1n ∀ t > 0.
Proposition 1 At the steady-state equilibrium, the optimal decisions are given as














sf ≤ sA(c, δ, βf ) 0 1−c−sf2





sB(c, δ, βf ) ≤ sf 1−c−sf−βf+δ2+6δ
1−c−sf−βf+δ
2+6δ
Note that under Assumption A1, the firm prematurely disposes a fraction of the
off-lease products (L∗u < L
∗
n) if and only if sf < sB(c, δ, βf ). This threshold decreases
in δ and c, and increases in βf : Premature disposal reduces the cannibalization of new
product leases and avoids remarketing cost, but at the expense of foregoing revenue
from off-lease products and generating a disposal cost. Thus, all else being equal, a
low disposal cost, a high remarketing cost, and a high margin on the new product
promote premature disposal. With respect to durability, the revenue effect dominates
the cannibalization effect and high durability inhibits premature disposal.
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2.3.2 Selling Model
In this section, we describe the model for the selling strategy and solve for its equi-
librium. The model and analysis is similar to Huang et al. (2001), except that we
incorporate disposal cost for customers and the firm, and focus on pure selling.
We start by formulating the consumer’s problem. Consumer θ’s action vector in





t(θ)), with initial condition a0s(θ) = (0, 0, 1)
for all θ ∈ [0, 1]. Under selling, since the consumer can keep his used product and the
product lasts for two periods, a consumer’s payoff in any given period depends on his
action in the previous period and the prices in the current period (see Table 1). Thus,
the dynamics are Markovian. As in the previous related literature, we restrict our
attention to Markov perfect equilibria, which assumes that strategies only depend on
the payoff-relevant history that is summarized by their current state (Fudenberg and
Tirole, 1991).









s (θ) Bn Bu I
Bn un(θ)− ptn + ptu − βc un(θ)− ptn un(θ)− ptn
Bu uu(θ)− sc uu(θ)− ptu − sc uu(θ)− ptu − sc
I ptu − βc 0 0
Consumer type θ has the following discounted net utility maximization problem given












Since the per period net utility is bounded and the strategy space is finite, the above
problem can be solved by deriving the Bellman equation for consumer θ by backward
induction (Blackwell, 1965; Stokey and Lucas Jr, 1989). The net present value func-
tions V tθ [a
t−1
s (θ), p
t] are a function of the consumer state at−1s (θ), which completely
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∗ is the solution to
(2). Aggregating over all θ yields the new and used product demand in period t, Stn
and Stu.
Recall pt = (ptn, p
t
u) is the price vector at time t, where p
t
n is determined by the
firm and ptu is the market clearing price for used goods, which is implicitly determined
by equating supply and demand for used products. The optimal prices ptn, t ≥ 0 for a
given customer demand path can be derived from the Bellman equation for the firm’s
problem. The equilibrium solution is therefore obtained by solving for the consumer
and firm reaction functions of these coupled Bellman equations, subject to the market
clearance conditions in every period. Huang et al. (2001) and Huang and Kuzyutin
(2002) note that there is no known general procedure to solve coupled asymmetric
Bellman equations, but that since a Markov-perfect equilibrium in the infinite time
horizon is one in which all explicit time dependence has dropped out, it is appropriate
to focus on an equilibrium in which all prices and aggregate consumer behaviors are
constant in time. The fixed point in the strategy space that is associated with this
equilibrium will be called the “focal point” following Huang et al. (2001). In order to
find such an equilibrium, we need to solve the time-independent Bellman equations.
The consumer’s time-independent Bellman equation is given by
Vθ[as(θ), p] = max
as(θ)|as(θ)1′=1
{Πθ[Rθ[as(θ), p]; as(θ), p] + ρVθ[Rθ[as(θ), p], p]} (3)
and the firm’s problem reduces to the static optimization problem
max
Sn≥0
Πs(Sn) = (pn(Sn)− c)Sn,
where Sn is the aggregate demand for new products.
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Lemma 2 There are at most four different consumer strategy patterns in equilibrium,
for a given constant price vector p = (pn, pu): Consumers in θ ∈ (Θ1, 1] always
buy new products (BnBn), consumers in θ ∈ (Θ2,Θ1] buy a new product if their
existing product has reached its end-of-life or continue to use their existing product
(BnBu), consumers in θ ∈ (Θ3,Θ2] buy used products from the secondary market in
every period (BuBu) and consumers in θ ∈ (0,Θ3] always remain inactive (II), where
Θ3 ≤ Θ2 ≤ Θ1 ∈ [0, 1] and satisfy the following set of equations
uu(Θ3)− pu − sc
1− ρ
= 0,
uu(Θ2)− sc + ρ(un(Θ2)− pn)
1− ρ2
=
uu(Θ2)− pu − sc
1− ρ
and
uu(Θ1)− sc + ρ(un(Θ1)− pn)
1− ρ2
=
un(Θ1)− pn + pu − βc
1− ρ
. (4)
For a given specification of consumer utility, the inverse demand functions can be
calculated using (4). The supply of used products on the secondary market is given
by 1−Θ1 and the demand for them is given by Θ2 −Θ3. The market-clearing price
is implicitly given by
1−Θ1 = Θ2 −Θ3. (5)
Since we are restricting our attention to a focal point where all firm and consumer
behavior remains constant over time, in any given period, half of the consumers whose
strategy is to play BnBu will use their existing product and the other half will have
to buy a new product. This implies that the aggregate demand for new products (Sn)
in any period at the focal point is




Proposition 2 Under Assumption A1, the equilibrium per-period quantity of new
products sold and the firm’s per-period profit are
S∗n =
ρ(2− 2c− βc − ρsc + ρδ)− sc − βc + δ





(sc + βc − δ − ρ(2− 2c− βc) + ρ2(sc − δ))2
16ρ(ρ+ δ(1 + ρ+ ρ2))
.
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2.4 Comparing Leasing and Selling
In this section, we investigate the relative profitability and environmental impact of
leasing and selling. For the remainder of the analysis, we assume that Assumption
A1 holds. We also assume no discounting (ρ = 1). Although comparisons with a
general value of ρ are not difficult, this assumption simplifies our expressions and
helps to isolate the effects of the disposal costs, product durability and remarketing
costs. The insights from our analysis remain valid for values of ρ close to 1, which
are realistic in practice.
Measuring Environmental Impact. The environmental impact of a strategy de-
pends on the volume of products in each phase of the life cycle (production, use and
disposal) and the per-unit impact of the product in each phase (White et al., 1999;
Thomas, 2008). The former depends on the firm’s production, remarketing and dis-
posal strategy under leasing and on the firm’s new production strategy in conjunction
with consumer trading on the secondary market under selling. The latter depends on
the product’s environmental impact profile and can be found using a conventional life
cycle analysis (U.S. EPA, 2008c). Products such as refrigerators, washers, televisions
and automobiles have the majority of their environmental impact in the use phase
(high use impact products for brevity), while products such as carpets, mattresses,
cellphones and computers have the majority of their environmental impact in the pro-
duction and disposal phases (high non-use impact products for brevity) (Bole, 2006;
Quariguasi Frota Neto et al., 2007; MacLean and Lave, 1998; Intlekofer et al., 2009;
Kuehr and Williams, 2003; Fishbein et al., 2000).
In steady-state, comparing the total life-cycle environmental impact of the two
strategies reduces to comparing their per-period environmental impact. Under leas-
ing, the per-period production and disposal volumes are both L∗n and the per-period
use volume is L∗n + L
∗
u. Under selling, the per-period production and disposal vol-
umes are both S∗n, and since products are only disposed of after two periods of use,
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the per-period use volume is given by 2S∗n. Similar to Thomas (2008), we assume
that environmental impact is independent of whether a product is leased or sold, or
whether it is used or new. We also assume that the environmental impact due to con-
sumer disposal is equal to that due to firm disposal. Under the above assumptions,











n under leasing and selling, respectively, where ip, iu and id
denote the environmental impact of one unit due to production, one period of use
and disposal, respectively.
Characterizing Relative Profitability and Environmental Impact. In order
to simplify the exposition and to focus on the differential effect of disposal costs, we
assume βf = βc = 0. The nature of our insights remain the same for non-negative
remarketing and transaction costs. We first present a special case, δ = 0, as a building
block in understanding the impact of different parameters.
Lemma 3 Let δ = 0. If sf = sc, leasing and selling are equivalent. If sf < sc,
leasing is strictly more profitable but has a higher environmental impact. Otherwise,
selling is more profitable but has a higher environmental impact.
When δ = 0, the product is non-durable. Thus, the selling firm does not face any
cannibalization from the secondary market. The only difference between leasing and
selling is who incurs the disposal cost. If disposal is cheaper for the firm (or if the
salvage value is higher) as compared to the consumer, leasing is more profitable. Since
δ = 0, there are no used products and the total environmental impact of leasing and
selling are (ip + iu + id)L
∗
n and (ip + iu + id)S
∗
n, respectively. When the disposal cost
is lower for the firm, the leasing firm produces a larger quantity of products and has
a higher environmental impact.
This proposition suggests that it is sufficient to focus on the effective cost c + s
to compare the relative profitability and the environmental impact of leasing and
selling. Let cl
.
= c + sf and cs
.
= c + sc denote the effective cost (borne by the
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firm explicitly or implicitly) in leasing and selling, respectively. We find that the
relative profitability and environmental impact of leasing and selling can indeed be
summarized as a function of cl and cs (Figure 1). The thresholds defined in this figure
are derived in Propositions 3 - 5.




(full remarketing is optimal). For cl = cs, leasing
and selling are equivalent; for cl < cs, leasing is more profitable but has higher envi-
ronmental impact; otherwise, selling is more profitable but has higher environmental
impact.
Recall we assume βf = βc = 0 in this subsection. Then the condition sf <





. For cl > x(δ), the leasing firm remarkets all off-lease products (full
remarketing). Since with selling, no product is disposed of by consumers before its
end of life, the only difference between the two strategies in this case is the difference
in disposal cost (or equivalently, effective cost), as in Lemma 3. Thus, profits and
environmental impact are equal if the disposal cost is the same for the firm and the
consumer. If sf < sc, then cl < cs, and leasing is strictly more profitable. In addition,
due to the lower effective cost, the firm produces (and disposes) a larger quantity of
products. With full remarketing, this leads to a higher volume of products in use as
well, and consequently, a higher total environmental impact. Similarly, if sc < sf ,
selling is more profitable and leads to a higher total environmental impact.
Proposition 4 Let cl < x(δ) (premature disposal is optimal). Selling and leasing are
equally profitable for cs = z(cl, δ)
.
= 1 + δ−
√
(1+3δ)((1−δ)(1−2cl)+c2l )
1−δ , where z(cl, δ) < cl.
Leasing is more profitable if cs > z(cl, δ). Otherwise, selling is more profitable.
Recall that with full remarketing, leasing is strictly more profitable if and only
if sc > sf or if cs is higher than the threshold cl. With premature disposal, this
20
 
Figure 1: Characterization of the relative profitability and environmental impact







1−δ − 2δ and z(cl, δ)
.
=
1 + δ −
√
(1+3δ)((1−δ)(1−2cl)+c2l )
1−δ . Dots represent the area where premature disposal





Ω2). The relative environmental impact in regions Ω0 through Ω3 is
as follows: In Ω0 and Ω1, selling has lower environmental impact due to production
and disposal, and leasing has lower environmental impact due to use. In Ω2, selling
has lower total environmental impact. In Ω3, leasing has lower total environmental
impact. but environmentally superior only for products with high production and
disposal impact in region Ω0. In region Ω1, leasing is more profitable and environ-
mentally superior only for products with high use impact. Leasing is more profitable
but environmentally inferior in region Ω2 and selling is more profitable but environ-
mentally inferior in region Ω3. In this figure, δ = 0.3. Point A moves towards (0.5, 0.5)
as durability decreases.
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threshold is lower (z(cl, δ) < cl); the control that the leasing firm has over used
products is exercised and reduces the impact of cannibalization, making leasing more
competitive.
The conventional result in the durable goods literature is that for a monopolist,
leasing is more profitable than selling, since under leasing a firm has control of the
used products and does not face reduced demand due to consumers owning a used
product (cf., Stokey, 1981; Bulow, 1982). Propositions 3 and 4 show that that if the
consumers face a sufficiently lower disposal cost than the firm, the firm is better off
not gaining control over the used products and selling is more profitable.




1−δ − 2δ, leasing is strictly environmentally superior. For y(cl, δ) ≤ cs ≤ x(δ),
the total environmental impact in the use phase is lower under leasing and the total
environmental impact in the non-use phases is lower under selling. For x(δ) < cs,
selling is strictly environmentally superior.
Consider the cs = cl case, which falls in the intermediate cost range y(cl, δ) < cs <
x(δ) when the premature disposal condition holds. Since the leasing firm finds it
optimal to prematurely dispose of used products, cannibalization is mitigated, and the
leasing firm produces (and disposes) a larger volume than the selling firm (S∗n < L
∗
n).
Nevertheless, since the selling firm has no control over used products, while the leasing
firm prematurely disposes of them, the volume of products in the use phase is higher




u). Therefore, under this condition, the total environmental
impact of leasing is lower for products with high enough impact in the use phase
(iu >> ip + id) and selling is environmentally superior for products with high enough
impact in the non-use phases (ip + id >> iu).
As the effective cost faced by the selling firm increases, the volume it produces (and
disposes) decreases. When this cost is high enough (cs > x(δ)), the production volume
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under selling is low enough such that the total volume in use is also lower (2S∗n <
L∗n + L
∗
u). Therefore, under the high cost range, selling is strictly environmentally
superior.
As the effective cost faced by the selling firm decreases, the volume it produces
(and disposes) increases. If this effective cost is low enough (cs < y(cl, δ)), the
production and disposal volume under selling is higher than that under leasing (S∗n >
L∗n). In addition, since under selling, this larger volume of products remains in use for





u). Therefore, in this low cost range, leasing is strictly environmentally
superior.
When is Leasing (or Selling) the Win-Win Choice? The environmental strat-
egy literature has posited that there are many win-win business opportunities in
practice that both increase profit and decrease environmental impact (Porter and
Van Der Linde, 1995). Thus, it is interesting to ask when either leasing or selling can
be a win-win choice. Combining Propositions 4 and 5, we see that leasing is both
more profitable and has less environmental impact than selling only for high use im-
pact products. This occurs when premature disposal is optimal and the effective cost
under selling is neither too high nor too low relative to that under leasing (Region
Ω1). Interestingly, selling can also be a win-win strategy, this time for high non-use
impact products. This occurs when premature disposal is optimal and the effective
cost under selling is low enough relative to that under leasing (Region Ω0). As the
product durability increases, the threshold x(δ) decreases. Thus, the area of regions
Ω0 and Ω1 in Figure 1 decreases, i.e. win-win scenarios take place at lower values of
disposal costs faced by the firm and the consumers for more durable products.
Consider products that have high use impact such as cars, washers, dryers, re-
frigerators and televisions (Bole, 2006; Quariguasi Frota Neto et al., 2007; MacLean
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and Lave, 1998). It is reasonable to expect that a firm has better access to recy-
clers and lower collection or processing costs compared to an individual consumer for
such bulky products. It is also reasonable to expect that for products that can be
profitably disposed, a firm can recover a higher value from salvaging a unit than an
individual consumer. In this case, the effective cost faced by a leasing firm will be
lower than that faced by a selling firm. Thus, the conditions defining Region Ω1 may
hold for such products, in which case a leasing strategy will be both more profitable
and environmentally superior.
Consider products such as computers, carpets or mattresses that have a high
non-use impact (Intlekofer et al., 2009; Kuehr and Williams, 2003; Fishbein et al.,
2000). For these products, consumers may face a lower disposal cost than a firm, due
to stricter legislation for firms as compared to individual consumers. For example,
federal law in the U.S. regarding hazardous electronic waste only applies for firms
generating more than 220 lbs of such waste (U.S. EPA, 2008b). A firm may also vol-
untarily choose to recycle recovered units due to pressure from environmental groups,
while consumers trash the product. For such products, the conditions defining Region
Ω0 may hold, in which case selling will be both more profitable and environmentally
superior.
Robustness of Insights to Assumptions. We discuss the implications of relaxing
some simplifying assumptions, focusing primarily on their effects on win-win scenar-
ios.
Effect of Remarketing Costs. If we relax the assumption of zero remarketing costs, the
structure of Figure 1 remains the same. Under leasing, the presence of a remarketing
cost promotes premature disposal of off-lease units, which leads to a higher production
and disposal volume and a lower use volume than the βf = 0 case. In contrast,
under selling, the presence of a remarketing cost inhibits the secondary-market trade,
prompting more consumers to hold onto their used product. This leads to a lower
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demand for new products and consequently, results in lower production, disposal and
use volumes than the βc = 0 case. Thus, introducing remarketing costs decreases
the threshold y(cl, δ) and has an indeterminate impact on x(δ). It is reasonable to
expect that a firm is more efficient at remarketing used products (βf < βc), since it
has economies of scale and is less likely to sufer from adverse selection as compared
to consumers (Huang et al. 2001). In this case, the relative profitability of leasing
increases (z(cl, δ) decreases) when there are remarketing costs.
Effect of Differential Disposal Impact. We assumed that the disposal impact is in-
dependent of who disposes the product. In practice, firms may have better access
to environmentally superior alternatives (e.g. recycling vs landfilling). All else being
equal, the only resulting change will be a reduction in the environmental impact due
to disposal under leasing. Therefore, the threshold y(cl, δ) will be higher and the area
where selling is a win-win strategy (Region Ω0) will shrink, or may not exist.
Effect of Remarketing Mechanism under Leasing. We restricted our attention to a
pure leasing strategy where off-lease products are again leased. If the leasing firm
endogenously chooses between leasing and selling off-lease units, the firm will choose
to sell them only if the consumers enjoy a lower disposal cost (cs < cl). This results
in a lower effective cost under leasing, which in turn increases both the profitability
and the total environmental impact of leasing (thresholds z(cl, δ) and y(cl, δ) are
lower). Therefore, the area of region Ω1 (where leasing is win-win) is larger, and
the area of Ω0 (where selling is win-win) is typically smaller. Finally, when cs < cl
and full remarketing is optimal, the profits and the total environmental impact are
equal under both strategies. Thus, allowing the firm to endogenously choose between
leasing or selling off-lease units makes leasing more profitable, but at the expense of
its total environmental impact.
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2.5 Conclusions
Is leasing greener than selling? Articles in industrial ecology and environmental strat-
egy have answered in the affirmative, and have influenced firms, public entities and
environmental groups. Whether leasing is greener and more profitable is not the con-
cern of the industrial ecology literature, while the environmental strategy literature
promotes the win-win argument - that many strategies that are environmentally supe-
rior are also more profitable. With this study, we aim to provide guidance to firms on
the viability of promoting leasing as the “greener” strategy. As profit-maximization
is the primary objective for firms, we also identify the locus of green and profitable
strategies.
To this end, we develop infinite-horizon, sequential dynamic models of pricing, re-
marketing and disposal for durable products put on the market via leasing or selling
by a profit-maximizing monopolist. We characterize the optimal quantity of new and
used products observed in equilibrium, and calculate the total volume of products in
each life cycle phase (production, use and disposal) under each strategy to compare
their total environmental impact. Based on our analysis, we find that the magnitude
of the disposal cost, the differential in the disposal costs faced by the firm and con-
sumers, and the environmental impact profile of the product (whether the majority
of the impact is in the use phase or the production and disposal phases) are the main
drivers of relative profitability and environmental impact (Figure 2). The insights
obtained from our analysis are of relevance to manufacturers, environmental groups,
and policy makers, and are discussed below.
The remarketing level is not a good proxy for environmental impact. Recall the
main argument for the environmental superiority of leasing is that since the firm
owns the off-lease units, it has an incentive to remarket them (Hawken et al., 1999;
Lifset and Lindhqvist, 2000; Fishbein et al., 2000; Mont, 2002; Robert et al., 2002).
In contrast, Ruth (1998) and Lawn (2001) argue that leasing may be worse for the
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Figure 2: When is a marketing strategy greener and more profitable? Profit-
maximizing and environmentally superior strategies are denoted by “P=” and “E=”,
respectively. Premature disposal and full marketing are options available to the leas-
ing firm and are driven by the magnitude of the firm’s disposal cost.
environment due to the firm’s ability to prematurely dispose recovered off-lease prod-
ucts. We find that leasing may be less green than selling despite full remarketing, and
greener despite premature disposal. Market effects (demand volume, use duration)
account for these results. When the firm’s disposal cost is high, but lower than the
consumer’s, the leasing firm fully remarkets, but leasing has higher environmental
impact: Full remarketing may reduce but does not eliminate the incentive for the
firm to produce a larger volume of products than with selling to exploit this cost
advantage. The larger sales volume in conjunction with full remarketing translates
into higher environmental impact. In contrast, when the disposal cost is low enough
to make premature disposal optimal, leasing can be greener for high use impact prod-
ucts despite premature disposal. The reason is that premature disposal reduces the
contribution of the use phase to the life-cycle environmental impact. We conclude
that the remarketing level is not a complete indicator of a firm’s total environmental
impact.
Selling may be more profitable. We identify asymmetry in disposal cost as the pri-
mary driver of the relative profitability of the two strategies. When the firm’s disposal
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cost is higher, selling is more profitable because it transfers disposal responsibility to
the consumer. This finding complements the recent literature that identifies settings
where selling may dominate leasing (Bucovetsky and Chilton, 1986; Desai and Puro-
hit, 1998, 1999; Desai et al., 2004; Bhaskaran and Gilbert, 2005). It is not unusual
for the firm’s disposal cost to be higher. Consider Interface’s Evergreen Lease. Com-
mercial carpeting, while durable, does not lend itself to reuse and only some of the
material can be recycled. Thus, by committing itself to collecting and (partially) re-
cycling the carpet, Interface effectively increased its disposal cost significantly relative
to local landfilling by its customers. As our results show, selling is more profitable in
this case, and a publicly traded firm such as Interface would find it difficult to devi-
ate from profit maximization as its primary objective. Thus, despite originally being
championed at the highest levels of the company, the leasing program was phased
out, although the recent spike in oil prices, which makes recycled nylon competitive
with virgin nylon, gave the company hope that it could be reintroduced (Ferguson
and Plambeck, 2008). Interestingly, selling can even be a win-win choice, but only
for high non-use impact products. This occurs when the volume put on the market is
higher with leasing despite a lower consumer disposal cost.
Leasing may be more profitable, but less green. The very reason leasing is more
profitable may be the reason why it is not greener. In our model, disposal cost
asymmetry in favor of the firm makes leasing more profitable, but also drives volume
up, resulting in higher total life-cycle environmental impact when full remarketing
is optimal. Therefore, skepticism vis-a-vis claims by firms who lease their products
that this is the environmentally superior strategy is warranted. We conclude that
to judge the environmental impact of a strategy, a comprehensive assessment, which
takes market effects throughout the product life cycle into account, is needed.
Leasing can be a win-win choice for high use-impact products. When premature
disposal is optimal, the volume of products in the use phase is reduced. Thus, even
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when leasing leads to a higher volume put on the market, the total environmental
impact of this strategy can be lower for those products that have a high impact during
the use phase. For example, leasing photocopiers for Xerox may well be a win-win
choice, since photocopiers have high use impact (McIntyre et al., 1998; Sundin et al.,
2000), Xerox remarkets only a portion of off-lease products, and enjoys a higher
salvage value than consumers, since it harvests spare parts and recyclable materials
from off-lease units that are not remarketed.
Motivated by the claims in the industrial ecology and environmental strategy liter-
ature, Interface adopted leasing as an environmentally superior business model. Since
Interface has access to technologies which can be used to recycle carpet profitably,
it faces a lower disposal cost. However, leasing may lead to a larger quantity of
products being produced compared to selling and be environmentally inferior. This
might not hold if a firm decides to dispose units using an alternative with much lower
impact as compared to the consumers (e.g. recycling versus landfilling). Therefore,
Interface can improve the environmental performance of their leasing strategy by at-
tempting to reduce the environmental impact of their recycling technologies. Thus,
a better understanding of the total environmental impact, and not just remarketing
and disposal efforts is required, before claiming to be greener to avoid being accused
of greenwashing.
Leasing is a hard sell. As discussed in §2.1, several policy-making groups such
as the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the state of Minnesota and the New
York City Government are actively promoting leasing as the greener alternative. In
this study, we provide two main insights for such policy-makers: First, leasing is
not always greener than selling, and care must be taken to avoid blanket statements
about one strategy being environmentally superior over the other. Second, even if
leasing is greener, firms may not have an incentive to adopt it as selling may be more
profitable precisely in this case. A better understanding of the drivers of the relative
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profitability of leasing and selling can enable the design of incentives to encourage
the adoption of the environmentally superior strategy.
To summarize, we offer new insights into a firm’s lease versus sell decision, and
provide an analytical comparison of the total environmental impact (based on total
volumes produced, used, and disposed) of each strategy. We show that our qualitative
insights are robust to a number of assumptions such as the existence of remarketing
costs, asymmetry in the environmental impact of disposal, and the choice of the
remarketing strategy. Thus, we add to the important knowledge base on product
leasing that will benefit not only managers, but also environmental groups and policy
makers. We hope that our study will promote more research exploring the impact of
marketing strategies on the environmental performance of the firm.
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CHAPTER III
THE EFFECT OF REMANUFACTURING ON THE
PERCEIVED VALUE OF NEW PRODUCTS
3.1 Introduction
Many firms, from industrial equipment manufacturers (e.g., Xerox, Caterpillar) to
consumer electronics manufacturers (e.g., HP, Apple, Bosch Tools), sell new and
remanufactured versions of their products. Used products (or cores) that can be
remanufactured are acquired by Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) from
several different sources: commercial returns, repair or warranty returns, flexible
return policies, trade-ins, or end-of-life take-back. The residual value in these cores
and the cost savings from remanufacturing may provide OEMs with an incentive to
remanufacture their products. Nevertheless, the decision to pursue remanufacturing is
not a simple one. Remanufactured products are generally sold at lower prices and they
may compete with the OEM’s new products. In fear of such cannibalization of new
product sales, some OEMs choose not to sell remanufactured products (e.g., Cisco,
Wall Street Journal, 2009). However, if an OEM chooses not to remanufacture, third-
party competitors may actively collect and remanufacture used products originally
sold by the OEM, creating competition for the OEM’s new products. For example,
HP does not remanufacture printer cartridges and faces competition from third-party
competitors who sell remanufactured HP printer cartridges (Hewlett-Packard , 2009).
Thus, for an OEM, remanufacturing may appear better than allowing a third-party
to remanufacture its products.
On the other hand, remanufactured products may negatively influence the per-
ceived value of new products, which in turn may affect an OEM’s remanufacturing
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decision. Consider the following quotes from Apple’s online discussion forum: “...Just
where are the refurbished iPhones coming from? Is Apple getting enough returns so
they can resell them...” (CNET, 2007), “...Apple is really ruining the reputation
that they built...” (Apple.com Online Forum, 2008b). These concerns may arise
from consumer perceptions that an OEM is remanufacturing because it is receiving
failure and warranty returns due to the low quality of new products. Consumers
may also value a remanufactured product sold by a third party lower than one sold
by the OEM. Consider the following quote: “...why would you buy a [remanufac-
tured] iPhone from an untrusted source or seller on ebay? Buy a refurbished iPhone
from Apple...” (Apple.com Online Forum, 2008a). These concerns may be driven by
consumer expectations that the OEM has a better reputation or superior remanu-
facturing technology. Motivated by these observations, our goal in this study is to
investigate whether remanufacturing by an OEM or a third-party remanufacturer af-
fects the perceived value of new products and how an OEM should consider this effect
before pursuing remanufacturing and other competitive strategies against third-party
remanufacturers.
To this end, we focus on consumer products and experimentally investigate the
effect of remanufactured products and the identity of the remanufacturer (i.e., OEM
or a third-party remanufacturer) on the perceived value of new products. In our
experiment, we find that the perceived value of the OEM’s new product decreases
when the OEM sells remanufactured products, which may be explained by consumers’
quality concerns regarding remanufactured products spilling over to the new products.
This result is also similar to the research on product-line extensions that studies the
effect of low-end products on the perceived value of the existing product (Randall
et al., 1998; Kim et al., 2001). Thus, our results suggest that although remanufactured
products sold by an OEM are physically and functionally the same as new products,
they may have the same effect on the perceived value of the new product as low-end
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products.
Interestingly, this effect reverses in our experiment; when the remanufactured
products are offered by third-parties, the perceived value of new products increases
in the presence of third-party remanufacturers. This reversal may be due to the
following reason: Since the products are remanufactured by the third party, quality
concerns about the remanufactured products may not be attributed to the OEM’s new
products. Moreover, consumers may perceive a third party establishing a business
based on remanufacturing the OEM’s new products as a signal of the new product’s
high quality.
Based on these experimental insights, we develop an analytical model to provide
a general framework for determining an OEM’s optimal strategy for different types
of consumer products for which the changes in perceived value of new products may
vary. Our model characterizes conditions under which it is profitable for an OEM to
let a third party remanufacture its products, or preempt a third-party remanufacturer
by pursuing remanufacturing or collection of used products. These strategic and com-
petitive decisions in the remanufacturing context have been investigated in the closed-
loop supply chain literature (see Atasu et al., 2008a and Guide and Van Wassenhove,
2009 for recent overviews). In particular, Majumder and Groenevelt (2001); Debo
et al. (2005); Ferrer and Swaminathan (2006); Ferguson and Toktay (2006); Jin et al.
(2007); Atasu et al. (2008b), and Agrawal et al. (2009) have studied the effect of can-
nibalization and external competition from a remanufactured product on an OEM’s
remanufacturing and competitive strategies. This stream of literature concludes that
the entry of a third-party remanufacturer is detrimental for an OEM and suggests
that it may be profitable for an OEM to remanufacture or collect cores to preempt
third-party remanufacturers (Ferguson and Toktay, 2006).
However, this entire stream of literature assumes that the presence of remanu-
factured products does not have an effect on the perceived value of new products.
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To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to investigate this effect and
find that the presence of remanufactured products may have an effect on the per-
ceived value of new products. We analytically show that this has a significant impact
on an OEM’s optimal remanufacturing strategy in the presence of competition from
a third-party remanufacturer. In particular, in contrast to the existing literature,
we show that preempting such competitors through remanufacturing or collecting
cores may be detrimental and an OEM may instead benefit from allowing them to
remanufacture its products. Our results also provide support to some strategies ob-
served in practice that may not be explained by existing literature. For example,
Cisco does not remanufacture or preempt third-party remanufacturers (Wall Street
Journal, 2009), Apple remanufactures but only sells remanufactured products online
(Apple, 2009b), and HP does not remanufacture printer cartridges and actively tries
to reduce the perceived value of the remanufactured cartridges sold by third-party
competitors through advertising (Hewlett-Packard, 2007; Hewlett-Packard , 2009).
Our work also contributes to the emerging stream of behavioral research in closed-
loop supply chains. Guide and Li (2009) conduct eBay experiments and find that on
average, remanufactured products are purchased at lower prices than new products.
Subramanian and Subramanyam (2009) use purchase data from eBay and find that
seller reputation and product categories play an important role in the price differences
between new and remanufactured products. Quariguasi Frota Neto (2008) explores
the effect of the new product price as a reference price in the remanufacturing context
and Ovchinnikov (2009) investigates the effect of the discount on remanufactured
products on the purchasing behavior of the consumers. However, all of these papers
only focus on how consumers value remanufactured products. In contrast to this
literature, we focus on investigating the effect of remanufacturing on the perceived
value of new products.
The remainder of the essay is structured as follows: In §3.2 we experimentally
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investigate the effect of remanufactured products on the perceived value of new prod-
ucts. We outline the development of our analytical model in §3.3. We model and
analyze an OEM’s competitive strategies in the presence of remanufacturing com-
petition in §3.4. In §3.5 we discuss the managerial insights from our results, and
conclude with a discussion of directions for future research. All proofs are provided
in the Appendix.
3.2 The Experiment
To investigate the effect of remanufactured products on the perceived value for new
products, we conducted an experiment consisting of two stages that took place three
weeks apart. In our experiment, we use willingness to pay as a proxy for perceived
value. In Stage 1, the willingness to pay for a new product in the absence of remanu-
factured products is established. In Stage 2, the willingness to pay for the same new
product in the presence of remanufactured products is established. A within-subject
comparison of the willingness to pay for the new product between Stages 1 and 2
helps us to investigate the effect of remanufactured products on the willingness to
pay for new products. We describe the experimental design and procedure in §3.2.1,
the measures and analyses in §3.2.2, and the key results in §3.2.3.
3.2.1 Design and Procedure
To examine the effect of remanufactured products on the willingness to pay for new
products, we conducted an experiment involving 123 student participants at a large
U.S. university who participated for partial course credit. Forty-one percent of the
participants were female and the average age of the participants was 21.2 years (19-
32 years). The experiment was conducted using Apple iPods. They were chosen as
an example of consumer products that are familiar to the study participants. The
experiment consisted of two stages as described below and outlined in Figure 3.


















Treatment Condition: Who Sells 
Remanufactured Products?
Figure 3: Process Flow Diagram for the Experiment, where Stage 1 and 2 were
conducted 3 weeks apart.
remanufactured products was established using a full-factorial judgment task (Green
and Srinivasan, 1990; Kivetz et al., 2004) involving three attributes: price, memory
size, and seller, which were selected as relevant attributes based on informal discus-
sions with subjects from the same subject pool. These discussions were also used
to collect information regarding the relevant range of attribute levels, which was
next benchmarked against actual market information from Apple’s website. Using
three price levels ($99, $149, $199), two memory sizes (8 GB, 16 GB), and two sell-
ers (Apple.com, MP3Playerstore.com), twelve iPod profiles (e.g., iPod, 8GB, $149,
Apple.com) were constructed (Hair et al., 2009).
Before asking the participants to judge the 12 iPod profiles, one profile at a time,
they were informed that they were about to be presented with 12 new iPods that
were described on price ($99, $149, $199), memory size (8 GB, 16 GB), and sell-
ers (Apple.com, MP3Playerstore.com). Participants were asked to focus on these
three characteristics and to assume that all 12 iPods are comparable on any of the
other characteristics they might normally take into consideration (Kivetz et al., 2004).
Participants were asked to consider the iPod profiles and indicate the likelihood that
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they would purchase each of them (0% - 100%) (Hair et al., 2009). The profiles were
randomized and no order effects were found. The average1 willingness to pay for
a new iPod under this stage is denoted by vn(x) (where x denotes the absence of
remanufactured products).
Stage 2. Three weeks after Stage 1, the second stage of the experiment was
conducted. A search for announcements in the major business wire services shows
that no new iPod campaign, major price change or generation was launched during
the time period between the Stages 1 and 2 (March 31, 2009 - April 23, 2009), Thus,
any changes in the willingness to pay for new products between the Stages 1 and 2
can be attributed to the presence of remanufactured products in Stage 2.
As before, a full-factorial judgment task was employed to assess the willingness
to pay for a new product in the presence of remanufactured products. To accomplish
this, in addition to the three price levels ($99, $149, $199), two memory sizes (8 GB,
16 GB), and two sellers (Apple.com, MP3Playerstore.com) used in Stage 1, a fourth
attribute, type of product, consisting of two levels (new, refurbished) was added.
Based on these attributes and levels, 24 iPod profiles were created: 12 new iPods
that were identical to those studied in Stage 1 and 12 remanufactured iPods.
In order to examine the effect of remanufactured products on the perceived value
of new products and investigate how this effect may depend on who sells the remanu-
factured product, we created three between-subject conditions. Every participant was
randomly assigned to one of the three conditions. Every participant was presented
with all 24 iPod profiles, one profile at a time. Based on their condition, participants
were asked to provide 18 (Conditions 1 and 2) or 24 (Condition 3) judgment scores.
Condition 1. This condition was designed to represent the case where remanufac-
tured products are only sold by the OEM. Participants in this condition were informed
1Since no interaction effects were observed, all experimental results hold at the individual levels
and we only report average values. Details at the individual level are available on request.
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that “As part of company policy, Apple sells refurbished2 electronics such as iPods.
Refurbished iPods are not available from third parties, such as MP3PlayerStore.com.”
Participants provided a judgment score for the twelve new iPods and the six remanu-
factured iPods sold through Apple. We denote the average willingness to pay for new
and remanufactured products under this condition by vn(o) and vr(o), respectively.
Condition 2. This condition was designed to represent the case where reman-
ufactured products are only sold by the third-party remanufacturer. Participants
were informed that “As part of company policy, Apple does not sell refurbished
electronics such as iPods. Refurbished iPods can be purchased from third par-
ties, such as MP3PlayerStore.com.” In this condition, participants provided a judg-
ment score for the twelve new iPods and the six remanufactured iPods sold through
MP3PlayerStore.com. We denote the average willingness to pay for new and reman-
ufactured products under this condition by vn(3p) and vr(3p), respectively.
Condition 3. The third condition was designed to check if the effects of remanufac-
tured products on the willingness to pay for new products observed from the previous
two conditions are systematic. Participants in Condition 3 were informed that both
Apple and MP3PlayerStore.com sell remanufactured products and they were asked
to provide judgment scores for the 12 new and 12 remanufactured products sold by
Apple and MP3PlayerStore.com. We denote the average willingness to pay for new
and remanufactured products under this condition by vn(b) and vr(b), respectively.
As in Stage 1, before asking participants to judge the iPod profiles, they were in-
formed that they were to be presented with 24 iPods that were described on price ($99,
$149, $199), memory size (8 GB, 16 GB), sellers (Apple.com, MP3Playerstore.com)
and type (new, refurbished). Using the description available on the Apple web site,
2Since Apple uses the term “refurbished” we use the same term in our experiment. For the rest of
the discussion, in line with the existing closed-loop supply chain literature, we use remanufacturing
and refurbishing interchangeably to denote any kind of activity that brings a used or returned item
to a like-new condition for resale purposes in the original product market.
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participants were explained that “Refurbished products are pre-owned products that
undergo a stringent refurbishment process prior to being offered for sale.” In each
condition, the remanufactured product was sold by the party that remanufactured
the product. Participants were further asked to focus on these four characteristics
and to assume that all iPods are comparable on any of the other characteristics they
might normally take into consideration. Participants were asked to consider the iPod
profiles and indicate the likelihood that they would purchase each one of them (0%
- 100%) (Hair et al., 2009). The profiles were randomized and no order effects were
found.
To match the responses of Stage 1 and Stage 2 at the individual level, participants
provided the last four digits of their social security number during both stages. Fur-
thermore, in order to gain a better understanding of consumer concerns or perceptions
of remanufactured products, the participants were also asked to answer open-ended
questions regarding remanufactured products after Stage 2. A representative sub-
sample of their responses is provided in the appendix §A4.
3.2.2 Experimental Analysis
To determine the willingness to pay for the new and remanufactured products, we
first confirmed that the product profiles in Stages 1 and 2 were at least weakly or-
dered and the valuation of a product profile was confirmed to be represented by an
additive combination of separate valuations for the individual attribute levels (i.e.,
no significant interaction effects were found). Next, the overall judgments in each
stage, for the new and refurbished iPods were decomposed into valuations for each
attribute level using dummy variable regressions. The analyses were conducted at the
individual level for the new and remanufactured products in each stage as follows:













dummy variable that is 1 if the price level of profile j is $149 and 0 otherwise, P $199ij
a dummy variable that is 1 if the price level of profile j is $199 and 0 otherwise,
M16GBij is a dummy variable that is 1 when profile j has a memory size of 16GB
and 0 otherwise, SOEMij is a dummy variable that is 1 when profile j is sold by the
OEM and 0 otherwise. β0 is the constant and represents the likelihood of purchasing
the baseline iPod ($99, 8GB, sold by the third party), β1 represents the change in
the likelihood when the price increases from $99 to $149, β2 reflects the change in
likelihood when the price increases from $99 to $199, β3 represents the change in
likelihood when the memory size increases from 8GB to 16GB, β4 reflects the change
in likelihood when the OEM sells the iPod instead of the third party. Based on these
estimates, the overall likelihood of each iPod can be predicted in an additive manner.
The correlation between the observed overall likelihood and this predicted likelihood
was found to be generally high (Pearson’s R > 0.96, p < .001, Kendall’s Tau > .93,
p < .001), suggesting that the additive model is an accurate representation of the
consumer evaluation process.
In order to estimate the willingness to pay for the new product in Stage 1, the
willingness to pay for the new product and the remanufactured products in Stage 2,
we determine the price point at which a consumer is indifferent between purchasing
a product or not, i.e. our willingness to pay estimates represents the maximum
willingness to pay (see details in Appendix §A3). Next, differences in willingness
to pay for new products between Stage 1 and Stage 2 and willingness to pay for
remanufactured products in Stage 2 are examined at the individual level–within-
subjects–using paired samples t-tests.
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Table 2: The effect of remanufactured products on the willingness to pay for the
new products.
Stage 1: New Stage 2: New & Remanufactured
Remanufactured None Condition 1 Condition 2 Condition 3
sold by (j = x) Apple only (j = o) 3P only (j = 3p) 3P & Apple (j = b)
vn(j)/vn(x) 100% 84.5% 132.4% 115.9%
t(40) = −1.72, p < .10 t(43) = 3.07, p < .01 t(34) = 2.10, p < 0.05
vr(j)/vn(j) 75.6% 66.3% 68.6%
t(40) = 3.58, p < .01 t(45) = 4.33, p < .01 t(34) = 4.28, p < .01
3.2.3 Experimental Results
The results from our experiment are summarized in Table 2 and Figure 4, and the
estimates of the regression coefficients at the aggregate level are provided in the Ap-
pendix §A5. To understand the effect of remanufactured products on the willingness
to pay for new products, we benchmark vn(o), vn(3p) and vn(b) against the willingness
to pay for new products in the absence of remanufactured products, vn(x). Similarly,
the willingness to pay for remanufactured products under each condition, vr(j) is
benchmarked against that for the new product in the same context, vn(j). Results
1-3 summarize the main findings from our experiment.
Result 1. Willingness to pay for a remanufactured product is significantly lower
than that for a new product, vr(j)/vn(j) < 1, in all three conditions, j = o, 3p, b.
Consistent with expectations, we find that the willingness to pay for a remanu-
factured product is lower than that for a new product, for each individual condition
(see Table 2), as well as across the three conditions (t(119) = 6.72, p < .01) in our
experiment. This result validates the modeling assumption in the existing analytical
literature (Debo et al., 2005; Ferguson and Toktay, 2006; Atasu et al., 2008b) and
complements recent research that also finds support for this result using different
experimental and empirical approaches (Guide and Li, 2009; Subramanian and Sub-
ramanyam, 2009). However, none of these papers differentiate between the willingness
to pay for a remanufactured product sold by the OEM and one sold by a third-party
remanufacturer. In contrast, in our next result, we find that the willingness to pay
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Figure 4: The effect of remanufactured products on the willingness to pay for new
products, where black markers denote vn(j)/vn(x), which is the relative change in will-
ingness to pay for new products due to the presence of remanufactured products and
gray markers denote vr(j)/vn(j), which is the willingness to pay for a remanufactured
product relative to a new product under the same condition, for all j = {o, 3p, b}.
it.
Result 2. Willingness to pay for a remanufactured product relative to a new prod-
uct, vr(j)/vn(j), is significantly higher when the remanufacturing is carried out by
the OEM as opposed to when it is carried out by a third-party remanufacturer, i.e.,
vr(o)/vn(o) > vr(3p)/vn(3p).
As in the existing literature (Debo et al., 2005; Ferguson and Toktay, 2006; Atasu
et al., 2008b), Result 2 considers the willingness to pay for a remanufactured prod-
uct relative to a new product and highlights the importance of consumer perceptions
in a remanufacturing context. Although the same neutral description of the reman-
ufacturing process was provided in both conditions, an independent samples t-test
shows that our subjects clearly had a lower relative willingness to pay for the third
party’s remanufactured product as compared to the OEM’s remanufactured product
(t(85) = 4.96, p < .01). The OEM in our experiment, Apple, has a good reputation
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for quality. This suggests that subjects are likely to associate the quality of remanu-
factured products with their seller, as observed by Subramanian and Subramanyam
(2009) in the context of remanufactured products sold on eBay. While this result
seems to suggest that remanufacturing may be more attractive for the OEM, our
next result demonstrates that remanufacturing can also be detrimental for the OEM.
Result 3. When the OEM sells the remanufactured products, the willingness to
pay for a new product is significantly lower than that in the absence of remanufac-
tured products, vn(o) < vn(x). In contrast, when the third-party remanufacturer sells
remanufactured products, willingness to pay for a new product is significantly higher
than that in the absence of remanufactured products, vn(x) < vn(3p).
The above result shows that the willingness to pay for new products changes in
the presence of remanufactured products in our experiment. Interestingly, although
subjects in all conditions were provided the same information regarding the remanu-
facturing process, we find that the direction of change in their willingness to pay for
new products is different based on who remanufactures and sells the remanufactured
products. While consumer willingness to pay for the OEM’s new product decreases
when the OEM remanufactures, it increases when a third party remanufactures (see
Table 2).
What may cause this difference? The negative effect of the OEM-remanufactured
products on the perceived value of new products in our experiment may be attributed
to the well-established “similarity hypothesis” which poses that a newly introduced
product affects the perceived value of existing similar products (Tversky, 1972). When
the OEM sells new and remanufactured products, both may be perceived as relatively
similar by the consumers: On one hand, consumer perceptions of the remanufactured
product may benefit from consumer perceptions of the OEM’s expertise with pro-
ducing the new product. As suggested by Result 2, the relative perceived value of
the OEM-remanufactured product as compared to a new product is indeed higher
43
than that of the third-party’s remanufactured product. On the other hand, quality
concerns about the remanufactured product may spillover to the new product (cf.,
Randall et al., 1998; Kim et al., 2001). Consumers may associate OEM remanufactur-
ing with failure and warranty returns (CNET, 2007) or other quality concerns in the
new products (also see subject responses in Appendix §A4). This may explain why
the perceived value of new products is degraded by the presence of remanufactured
products sold by the OEM in our experiment.
However, when the remanufactured product is sold by the third party, spillover
effects between remanufactured and new products are expected to be limited. Con-
sumers may think that it is difficult for the OEM to control what third-parties do
with its product and, consequently, quality concerns about remanufactured product
may not be attributed to the OEM’s new products. Consumers may also perceive
a third party establishing a business remanufacturing the OEM’s products as a sig-
nal of high quality of the OEM’s new products. In addition, Result 2 suggests that
the relative willingness to pay for a remanufactured product may be lower when it
is sold by the third party. In this setting, the third-party-remanufactured product
may represent an asymmetrically dominated product option, i.e. an option (buying
a remanufactured product) which is dominated by one option in the set (buying a
new product) but not by another (not buying a product). It has been shown in other
contexts that adding such an option increases the probability of choosing the option
that dominates it (buying a new product) (Huber et al., 1982). This may explain
why the perceived value of the new product increases in the presence of third-party
remanufactured products in our experiment.
Finally, an investigation of our third condition (j = b) shows that the effect of
remanufactured products on the perceived value of new products is systematic in our
experiment. This can be observed in Figure 4 (by comparing Condition j = b with the
Conditions j = o and j = 3p): the effect of remanufactured products on new products
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averaged across the cases where either the OEM (j = o) or third party (j = 3p) sell
remanufactured products, is similar to that found when both sell remanufactured
products (j = b). It is also interesting to note that when remanufactured products
are sold by both firms in our experiment, the positive effect of the remanufactured
products sold by the third party dominates the negative effect of the remanufactured
products sold by the OEM.
3.3 The Model
In this section, we outline the development of our analytical model which investigates
an OEM’s optimal remanufacturing and competitive strategies to preempt third-party
remanufacturers. The goal of our analytical model is to demonstrate the importance
of incorporating the effect of remanufactured products on the perceived value of new
products in determining an OEM’s optimal strategy. In our model, we assume that
the remanufactured products affect how consumers perceive new products and we
allow for any magnitude of this effect. This enables our model to provide insights
for different types of consumer products that may experience different magnitudes of
this effect.
We first specify the discrete-time, infinite-horizon, dynamic game and then outline
our assumptions regarding the product, firm, and market characteristics. We focus
on a profit-maximizing firm (hereafter referred to as the OEM) that manufactures
new products and may also choose to remanufacture its used products. The OEM
may face competition from a profit-maximizing third-party remanufacturer, who can
remanufacture used products originally produced by the OEM.
Notation. In the remainder of the essay, vectors are arranged in rows and primes
represent transposes. 1 denotes a vector of ones. ρ denotes the common discount
factor of all players. Superscripts are used to label time (indexed by t ≥ 0) and
subscripts o, 3p and c are used to denote OEM, third-party remanufacturer, and
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consumer-specific parameters. In addition, subscripts n and r denote parameters
associated with new and remanufactured products, respectively.
Specification of the Game. We develop a non-cooperative, discrete-time,
infinite-horizon game, where all information is common knowledge. The OEM and
the third-party remanufacturer (if present) move simultaneously in every period and
announce prices of new and/or remanufactured products and then the consumers
make their purchase decisions. Every period represents a period of use by the con-
sumer, after which the product can be remanufactured for reuse. Thus, the product’s
useful life (without remanufacturing) is one period.
In order to focus on incorporating the effect of remanufactured products on the
perceived value of the new products in determining an OEM’s optimal decisions,
we make the following two assumptions: First, similar to the existing literature, all
products can be recovered, but remanufactured only once (Majumder and Groenevelt,
2001; Debo et al., 2005; Ferguson and Toktay, 2006; Ferrer and Swaminathan, 2006;
Atasu et al., 2008b). This assumption allows us to account for the supply constraints
in a simple and tractable manner (see Geyer et al., 2007 for further discussion).
Second, collected cores cannot be inventoried and can only be sold in the next period.
Thus, in every period, the quantity of remanufactured products that can be sold is
constrained by the supply of cores, which is equal to the quantity of new products sold
in the previous period. The first period begins without a supply of remanufacturable
cores and there is an initial transient period where their supply builds up. In this
infinite-horizon setting, we restrict our attention to steady-state equilibria. This
assumption is common in several papers in the remanufacturing and durable goods
literature (Hendel and Lizzeri, 1999b; Huang et al., 2001; Ferrer and Swaminathan,
2006).
Cost Structures. The OEM has a constant returns to scale production technol-
ogy with the marginal cost of producing a new product denoted by c. The OEM and
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the third-party remanufacturer have constant returns to scale collection and reman-
ufacturing technologies, where the marginal costs are given by ho and h3p, respec-
tively. Since remanufacturing is typically cheaper than new production, we assume
0 ≤ ho, h3p ≤ c. Finally, we assume that there are no fixed costs associated with
remanufacturing (see discussion in the appendix §A2).
Consumer and Market Characteristics. The consumer population remains
constant over time and without loss of generality, we normalize its size to 1. We
assume that consumers are heterogeneous and characterized by their type θ, which
represents their willingness-to-pay for a new product in the absence of a remanufac-
tured product. θ is uniformly distributed on [0, 1].
Based on our experimental results, we assume that the consumer willingness to
pay, denoted by ui(θ, j), depends on the consumer’s type θ, whether the product is
new or remanufactured (i = {n, r}) and the identity of the firm(s) selling reman-
ufactured products (j = {o, 3p, b}); where j = o and j = 3p and j = b represent
remanufactured products are sold by only the OEM, only the third party and both
the OEM and the third party, respectively. Consumer θ is characterized by the
willingness-to-pay vector u(θ, j)
.
= (un(θ, j), ur(θ, j), 0), which is time independent.
Zero represents the value from remaining inactive, un(θ, j) <∞ is the willingness to
pay for a new product and ur(θ, j) <∞ is the willingness to pay for a remanufactured
product.
In order to incorporate the effect of remanufactured products on the perceived
value of new products, we only assume that the presence of the OEM’s remanufactured
products has a negative effect on the perceived value of new products and the presence
of third party’s remanufactured products has a positive effect on the perceived value
of new products. We do not make any assumptions regarding the magnitude of the
change in the perceived value of new products.
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Specification of the Consumer Model. For the rest of the study, we assume the follow-
ing functional forms for a consumer θ’s willingness to pay: un(θ, x) = θ, un(θ, o) = βθ,
un(θ, 3p) = αθ, ur(θ, o) = φoθ and ur(θ, 3p) = φ3pθ, where 0 < φo < β ≤ 1 ≤ α ≤ 2
and 0 ≤ φ3p ≤ 1.
In this consumer model, β ≤ 1 denotes the reduction in the perceived value of the
new product due to the presence of the OEM-remanufactured products, while α ≥ 1
denotes the increase in the perceived value of the new product due to the presence of
remanufactured products sold by a third-party remanufacturer. φo (φ3p) denotes the
ratio of perceived value of the OEM’s (third party’s) remanufactured product, ur(θ, j),
and the perceived value of the new product in the absence of the remanufactured
product, un(θ, x). As φo or φ3p increase, the perceived value of the remanufactured
product increases. As an example, the estimates for these parameters based on our
experiment are α = 1.32, β = 0.85, φo = 0.64, φ3p = 0.88. The willingness to pay for
a remanufactured product relative to a new product, when the OEM remanufactures
is δo = φo/β = 0.77 and when the third party remanufactures is δ3p = φ3p/α = 0.66.
The standard consumer model used in the literature (e.g., Ferguson and Toktay, 2006;
Ferrer and Swaminathan, 2006) is a special case (where α = β = 1, and δ3p = δo or
1 = δ0 ≥ δ3p) of our consumer model.
Under this consumer model, we assume c ≤ β, ho ≤ φo and h3p ≤ φ3p to rule out
uninteresting cases where no consumer purchases a product.
3.4 Analysis
In this section, we first characterize a consumer’s optimal strategies for a set of given
prices for new and remanufactured products in §3.4.1. Based on this, we next charac-
terize the OEM’s decisions. Recall that our experiment suggests that when the OEM
sells remanufactured products, the perceived value of new products may decrease,
which has a negative impact on the profitability of the OEM. Thus, in §3.4.2, we
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investigate an OEM’s optimal remanufacturing strategy in the absence of remanufac-
turing competition and identify conditions when an OEM should pursue remanufac-
turing. Our experiment also suggests that when the third party sells remanufactured
products, consumers may have a higher perceived value for the OEM’s new products,
which can enable the OEM to charge higher prices for its new products. However,
the third party’s remanufactured products still cannibalize the OEM’s new product
sales. So, could an OEM benefit from third-party competition? We provide insights
for this question in §3.4.3. Building on the analysis in §3.4.2 and in §3.4.3, we charac-
terize the OEM’s optimal competitive strategy against a third-party remanufacturer
in §3.4.4. In particular, we investigate if the presence of remanufacturing competition
can be beneficial, under which conditions should an OEM allow the third party to
remanufacture its used products? When is it better to remanufacture or collect cores
to preempt third-party remanufacturers?
3.4.1 Characterizing Consumers’ Optimal Decisions







n is the price of a new product and p
t
r is the price of a remanufactured
product when the remanufactured products are either sold by the OEM or the third-
party remanufacturer (see §3.5 for a discussion of the situation when the OEM and
the third party both sell remanufactured products). Recall that we are considering
an infinite-horizon game with discrete periods, where a product’s useful life is one









t(θ) are indicator variables corresponding to buying a new
product, a remanufactured product or remaining inactive. Since remaining inactive
is included in the consumer’s action set and each consumer has to make a decision in
each period t, we have at(θ)1
′
= 1 ∀ t, θ ∈ [0, 1]. The useful life of a product is only one
period, and consumers enter each period without a product. Thus, each consumer’s
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action in the current period depends only on the payoff in the current period, which
is independent of the consumers’ previous actions but depends on the OEM and
the third-party remanufacturer’s period-t decisions. Consumer θ’s optimal period-t




= 1, where Πθ[(1, 0, 0); p
t, j] = un(θ, j) − ptn, Πθ[(0, 1, 0); pt, j] =
ur(θ, j)− ptr, and Πθ[(0, 0, 1); pt, j] = 0.
Lemma 1 In period t, the equilibrium consumer strategies have the following struc-
ture: In the absence of remanufactured products, only consumers in θ ∈ (θ1, 1] buy
a new product, where θ1 ∈ [0, 1] such that un(θ1, x) − ptn = 0 and the demand
for new products is given by qtn(p
t
n) = 1 − θ1. In the presence of remanufactured
products (j = o or j = 3p), consumers in θ ∈ (Θ1, 1] always buy a new product,
consumers in θ ∈ (Θ2,Θ1] always buy a remanufactured product and consumers in
θ ∈ [0,Θ2] always remain inactive, where Θ2 ≤ Θ1 ∈ [0, 1] such that ur(Θ2, j)−ptr = 0,
un(Θ1, j)−ptn = ur(Θ1, j)−ptr, and the demand for new and remanufactured products




r) = 1−Θ1 and qtr(ptn, ptr) = Θ1 −Θ2, respectively.
Although a consumer’s strategy is independent across periods, it is important to
note that this is not true for an OEM’s (or a third-party remanufacturer’s) decisions.
Since the quantity of remanufactured products that can be sold is constrained by the
quantity of new products sold in the previous period, the OEM’s decisions in period
t depend on the decisions made in the previous period.
3.4.2 Should an OEM Remanufacture in the Absence of Competition?
Consider an OEM that does not face competition from a third-party remanufacturer.
Recall that in our experiment, the presence of the OEM’s remanufactured products
was associated with a reduction in the perceived value of its new products (see Result
3 in §3.2.3). However, remanufacturing may also be beneficial due to the additional
revenues and cost savings generated from selling remanufactured products. In this
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section, we characterize the condition under which the benefits from remanufacturing
outweigh the negative effect on the new products and it is profitable for an OEM to
pursue remanufacturing.
Let p̄tn and p̄
t
r denote the price of new and remanufactured products sold by the




r). The OEM’s per-period profit depends on the current
and previous period decisions: Π̄o(p̄
t−1, p̄t)
.
= (p̄tn − c)q̄tn(p̄tn, p̄tr) + (p̄tr − ho)q̄tr(p̄tn, p̄tr).
In each period t, we need 0 ≤ q̄tr(p̄tn, p̄tr) ≤ q̄t−1n (p̄t−1n , p̄t−1r ) ∀ t ≥ 0}, which captures
the supply constraint on cores for remanufacturing products and the non-negativity
constraints.
Proposition 1 In the absence of third-party competition, remanufacturing is prof-
itable only if ho ≤ h̄(β, φo, c)
.
= β− c+φo− (1− c)
√
β + 3φo. h̄(β, φo, c) is increasing
in β, φo and c.
According to Proposition 1, the OEM does not remanufacture if ho > h̄(β, φo, c),
i.e., when the cost of remanufacturing is sufficiently high. In this case, the OEM
only sells new products and the problem has a simple solution: The decisions in any
period t do not depend on the previous period, all the periods decouple, and there
is a unique and steady-state policy given by p̄∗n =
1+c
2








However, when the remanufacturing cost is sufficiently low, i.e., ho ≤ h̄(β, φo, c),
remanufacturing is profitable. The condition in Proposition 1 ensures that the cost
savings from remanufacturing and the benefits due to market segmentation outweigh
the cannibalization and the reduction in the perceived value of new products. A higher
β implies a smaller reduction in the perceived value of new products, a higher c is
associated with greater cost savings and a higher φo is associated with a higher margin
from remanufactured products. Thus, for higher values of β, c or φo, remanufacturing
is profitable for higher values of the remanufacturing cost h.
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The above result highlights the effect of remanufactured products on the perceived
value of new products which has been ignored in the existing literature. It is not
enough to just consider the trade-off between the benefits from remanufacturing and
cannibalization of new products. OEMs also need to consider the potential negative
impact of remanufactured products on the perceived value of new products. Ignoring
the effect of remanufactured products on the perceived value of new products might
lead an OEM to remanufacture when it is not profitable to do so.
This result has important managerial implications. If an OEM finds it profitable
to pursue remanufacturing, it should attempt to moderate the negative effect of re-
manufactured products on new products. For example, consumer concerns may be
alleviated by decoupling the sales of new and remanufactured products by selling
new and remanufactured products through separate channels. This is in support for
Apple’s strategy of only selling remanufactured products on the internet, Electrolux’s
strategy of using different sales force and channels for selling remanufactured prod-
ucts and HP’s strategy in Europe of selling remanufactured computers only through
exclusive, secondary channels (Guide et al., 2005).
3.4.3 Can an OEM Benefit from a Third Party Remanufacturing its
Products?
We now focus on the OEM’s decisions in the presence of competition from a third-
party remanufacturer. In this setting, our model is a infinite-horizon, ρ-discounted,
simultaneous, dynamic game with observable actions, which we know may have mul-
tiple equilibria from the Folk Theorem (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991). As in the
previous literature, we restrict our attention to pure-strategy Markov Perfect equilib-
ria, which assumes that strategies only depend on the payoff-relevant history that is
summarized by the current state (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991).
Let ptn denote the price charged by the OEM for a new product. In this section,
we assume that only the third-party remanufacturer sells remanufactured products.
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r). The per-period profit of both the OEM and the third party depend
on the current and previous period decisions: Πto(p
t−1, pt)
.




= (ptr − h3p)qtr(ptn, ptr). In each period t, we need qtn(ptn, ptr) ≥ 0 and
0 ≤ qtr(ptn, ptr) ≤ qt−1n (pt−1n , pt−1r ) which represent the non-negativity constraints and
the supply constraint on cores for remanufactured products.
Proposition 2 In the presence of third-party competition, there exists hb(α, φ3p, c),
such that if h3p < hb(α, φ3p, c), then the third-party remanufacturer finds it profitable
to compete with the OEM.
Proposition 2 shows that the third-party remanufacturer will choose to enter the
market only if i.e., h3p < hb(α, φ3p, c). If the third party’s remanufacturing cost is
high enough, h3p ≥ hb(α, φ3p, c), the competition from the OEM’s new product is
sufficient to deter the third party from remanufacturing products. Otherwise, the
remanufacturing cost is low enough for the third-party remanufacturer to charge low
enough prices to compete with the OEM and still remain profitable.
We next analyze the effect of third-party competition on the OEM’s profitability.
Proposition 3 shows that the presence of remanufacturing competition may not be
detrimental for the OEM.
Proposition 3 Assume that h3p < hb(α, φ3p, c) such that the third-party remanufac-
turer finds it profitable to remanufacture: there exists h1(α, φ3p, c) and c1(α, φ3p) such
that if h3p > h1(α, φ3p, c) or c > c1(α, φ3p), then the OEM’s profit is higher in the
presence of remanufacturing competition. h1(α, φ3p, c) and c1(α, φ3p) are increasing
in φ3p but decreasing in α.
Proposition 3 shows that if the third party has a high remanufacturing cost but
not high enough to deter entry or if the OEM has a high cost of new production, the
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h3 p = c





















Figure 5: OEM profitability in the presence of remanufacturing competition (h <
hb(α, φ3p, c)) as a function of remanufacturing cost h and production cost c with
φ3p = 0.88. The gray region is where OEM profitability is higher in the presence
of remanufacturing competition. For illustrative purposes, α = 1 represents the
assumption in the existing literature where there is no effect of the remanufactured
products on the perceived value of new products and α = 1.32 is based on our
experimental estimates.
presence of remanufacturing competition is beneficial for an OEM. The reason for
this is as follows: Although the presence of the third-party remanufacturer leads to
competition for an OEM, it may also increase the perceived value of the OEM’s new
products. If the third party has a high remanufacturing cost, it is less competitive
and the negative effect of competition is outweighed by the benefits from an increase
in the perceived value of new products. Similarly, if the OEM has a high cost of
new production, it is less competitive and the benefits from an increase in perceived
value of new products outweigh the negative impact of competition from a third-party
remanufacturer.
The result in Proposition 3 is in contrast with the remanufacturing literature that
shows the competition is detrimental for an OEM. For illustration, consider Figure
5a, where the perceived value of new products does not change in the presence of
remanufactured products, i.e. α = 1 (as in the standard consumer model used in
the existing literature). In this case, the only effect of the presence of the third-party
remanufacturer is to force the OEM to lower its prices. However, if there is an increase
in the perceived value of the new product (α ≥ 1) in the presence of the third-party’s
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remanufactured product (see Figure 5b), the benefits from being able to charge a
higher price for new products compensate for the negative effect of competition and
the OEM finds the presence of the third-party remanufacturer beneficial.
These results have important managerial implications. Competition from a third-
party remanufacturer may be beneficial for OEMs. In addition, OEMs may still ben-
efit from differentiating their new products from the remanufactured products sold by
the third-party. Similar approaches are also observed in practice. For example, HP
does not actively preempt third-party competition, but rather tries to increase the
perceived difference between their new printer cartridges and the third-party’s re-
manufactured printer cartridges by using marketing techniques to reinforce that new
cartridges are far superior than the remanufactured cartridges which have low quality
and reliability (Hewlett-Packard, 2007; Hewlett-Packard , 2009).
3.4.4 OEM’s Optimal Strategy against Remanufacturing Competition:
Preemptively Remanufacture, Preemptively Collect or Allow Third-
Party to Remanufacture?
Recall from the discussion in Proposition 2 that if the remanufacturing cost is suf-
ficiently high, h3p ≥ hb(α, φ3p, c), the third-party remanufacturer does not find it
profitable to remanufacture products originally sold by the OEM. However, if the
third party’s remanufacturing cost is lower, h3p < hb(α, φ3p, c), the third party com-
petes by remanufacturing products originally sold by the OEM and the presence of
such remanufactured products may also increase the perceived value of the OEM’s
new products. Thus, in the presence of such remanufacturing competition, the OEM
has to decide whether it should remanufacture its own products or let the third party
to do so. In this section, we build on the results in §3.4.2 and §3.4.3, and characterize
an OEM’s optimal competitive strategy against a third-party remanufacturer.
Based on the strategies observed in practice and discussed in literature, we con-
sider the following OEM strategies: preemptive remanufacturing, allowing the third
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party to remanufacture its products or preemptive collection. Each one of these strate-
gies has potential advantages and drawbacks, and the optimal competitive strategy
depends on the comparison of the associated trade-offs.
Preemptive Remanufacturing (R): An OEM typically has the first-mover advan-
tage in recovering used products for remanufacturing. This implies that if an OEM
pursues remanufacturing, it will be more difficult for a third-party remanufacturer to
recover cores. In order to model such a scenario, we assume that if the OEM pursues
remanufacturing, the third-party remanufacturer is completely preempted and does
not enter the market (see §3.5 for a discussion of the situation when remanufactured
products are sold by both the OEM and the third-party remanufacturer). Note that
this strategy can be beneficial due to the preemption of third-party competition and
due to the cost savings and market segmentation. However, remanufacturing may
also lead to the cannibalization of new product sales and a reduction in the perceived
value of the new products (see Proposition 1).
Allowing third-party competition (3P): If an OEM does not pursue remanu-
facturing, a third party may remanufacture its products. Under such a strategy, the
OEM forgoes the benefits from remanufacturing and faces competition from the third
party’s remanufactured products, but also enjoys an increase in the perceived value
of its new products (see Proposition 3).
Preemptive Collection (PC): An OEM can also use a preemptive collection strat-
egy, where it collects and disposes remanufacturable cores to preempt third-party
remanufacturers (Ferguson and Toktay, 2006). We model this strategy in a simple
manner, by assuming that under such a strategy, the OEM incurs an additional unit
cost s, such that 0 ≤ s ≤ c and the third-party remanufacturer is preempted. We
also assume that there is no fixed cost of collection (see §A2 for a discussion). Thus,
under this strategy, the OEM’s problem is similar to the no-remanufacturing case
discussed in §3.4.2, but with an effective cost of c+ s for each new product sold. The
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OEM’s per-period profit in this case is given by ΠPCo = (1− c− s)2/4. Note that al-
though we specifically refer to this strategy as a preemptive collection strategy, it can
be interpreted as any other preemptive strategy apart from OEM remanufacturing
that prevents third-party remanufacturers from competing, e.g., designing products
to prevent remanufacturing (similarly to Lexmark’s preemption strategy, PC World,
2003). Although the OEM can benefit from preventing competition, this strategy can
be costly and forgoes a potential increase in the perceived value of new products or
the potential benefits from remanufacturing.
We now compare these strategies to determine the OEM’s optimal strategy, which
is summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 4 Consider the situation when the third-party remanufacturer finds it
profitable to enter the market, h3p < hb(α, φ3p, c). There exist h
−(α, β, φo, φ3p, c, h3p, s),
h+(α, φ3p, c, s) and c
−(α, φ3p, s) such that the OEM’s optimal competitive strategy
against a third-party remanufacturer can be summarized as follows:
1. If ho ≤ h−(·), the OEM should pursue preemptive remanufacturing (R).
2. If ho > h
−(·), the optimal strategy depends on c and h3p: If c ≤ c−(·) and
h3p ≤ h+(·), the OEM should pursue preemptive collection (PC). Otherwise, the OEM
should let the third party remanufacture its products (3P).
Proposition 4 characterizes the OEM’s optimal competitive strategy against a
third-party remanufacturer. Figure 6 illustrates this result and shows the importance
of considering the effect of remanufacturing on the perceived value of new products
in determining the optimal remanufacturing and competitive strategy. A comparison
of panel (a) which is based on the standard consumer model used in the existing
literature and panel (b) which is based on our consumer model leads to the following
insight: Ignoring the effect of remanufacturing on the perceived value of new products
may lead an OEM to remanufacture its own products or collect cores to preempt


























Α=1.32, Β=0.85, Φ3 p=0.66
(b)
Figure 6: Importance of incorporating the effect of remanufactured products on
the perceived value of new products in determining the OEM’s optimal competitive
strategy against a third-party remanufacturer with φo = 0.76, h
.
= h3p = ho and
s = 0. Panel (a) is based on the standard consumer model used in the existing
literature (α = β = 1 and φo = φ3p). Panel (b) is based on our consumer model
(β ≤ 1 ≤ α and φ3p 6= φo) and the experimental estimates from Figure 4. PC, R, 3P
and X denote that the OEM’s optimal strategy is preemptive collection, preemptive
remanufacturing, letting the third party remanufacture its products or do nothing,
respectively.
It can be seen from the above proposition and Figure 6 that the OEM’s optimal
strategy depends not only on the OEM’s cost of new production and remanufac-
turing, but also on the third party’s remanufacturing cost. If the OEM has a low
remanufacturing cost, the cost savings from remanufacturing and the benefits from
preempting the third party outweigh the cannibalization and the negative impact of
OEM-remanufactured products on the perceived value of the new products. Thus,
the OEM should pursue preemptive remanufacturing in this setting (Region R).
If the OEM has a high remanufacturing cost, the cost savings from remanufac-
turing are not enough for preemptive remanufacturing to be profitable. Instead, the
OEM has to decide to either allow the third party to remanufacture its products,
which increases the perceived value of new products, or pursue preemptive collection.
This decision is driven by the competitiveness of the third party and the OEM. Re-
call from the discussion of Proposition 3 that a low remanufacturing cost represents














Figure 7: OEM’s optimal competitive strategy as a function of β (the reduction
in perceived value of new products in the presence of the OEM’s remanufactured
products) and α (the increase in the perceived value of new products in the presence
of the third party’s remanufactured products), with h3p = ho = 0.1 and c = 0.15.
PC, R, 3P and X denote that the OEM’s optimal strategy is preemptive collection,
preemptive remanufacturing, letting the third party remanufacture its products or do
nothing, respectively.
enjoys greater pricing power, the value from an increase in the willingness to pay of
new products is lower. Thus, if both the third party’s remanufacturing cost and the
OEM’s cost of new production are low enough, the benefits from preemptive collec-
tion outweigh the benefits from an increase in the perceived value of the new products
and the OEM should pursue preemptive collection (Region PC). Otherwise, the ben-
efits from an increase in the perceived value of new products outweigh the negative
effect of competition and an OEM should allow the third party to remanufacture its
products (Region 3P).
The thresholds in Proposition 4 also depend on the preemptive collection cost
s. As collection becomes more expensive, the profitability of preemptive collection
decreases and the regions where the OEM should remanufacture or allow the third
party to remanufacture (Regions R and 3P) increase at the expense of the region
where it should pursue preemptive collection (Region PC).
Figure 7 offers a different perspective and provides insights on how the OEM’s
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optimal competitive strategy should vary with the magnitude of the effect of reman-
ufactured products on the perceived value of new products. An OEM can conduct an
investigation of this effect for their specific product i.e., estimate the values of α, β,
φo and φ3p for their product and determine the optimal competitive strategy against
a third-party remanufacturer. If the reduction in the perceived value of new prod-
ucts in the presence of OEM-remanufactured products is lower, i.e., β is higher, the
profitability of OEM remanufacturing (R) increases. If the increase in the perceived
value of new products due to the presence of third party-remanufactured products
α is higher, the profitability of letting the third party remanufacture (3P) increases.
Similarly, the effect of change in the perceived value of the remanufactured prod-
ucts is as follows: an increase in the perceived value of an OEM’s (third party’s)
remanufactured products, φo (φ3p), increases the profitability of Strategy R (3P).
3.5 Conclusions, Limitations and Directions for Future Re-
search
In this study, we investigate the effect of remanufactured products on the perceived
value of new products and how this influences an OEM’s optimal competitive strategy
against a third-party remanufacturer. To this end, we conducted an experiment using
Apple iPods as an example of consumer products. In our experiment, we found that
the presence of remanufactured products and the identity of the remanufacturing firm
had a significant impact on the perceived value of new products. In particular, our
experiment suggested that the presence of OEM-remanufactured products may have
a negative impact on the perceived value of new products. This implies that the
effect of remanufactured products on the perceived value of new products may reduce
the profitability of remanufacturing for an OEM. However, an OEM can attempt
to increase the profitability of remanufacturing by moderating the negative effect of
remanufactured products. This could be achieved by targeting different markets and
selling remanufactured products through separate or exclusive channels.
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Interestingly, the presence of the third party’s remanufactured products increased
the perceived value of the OEM’s new products in our experiment. This implies that
an OEM may actually benefit from letting a third party remanufacture its products.
Since the entry of remanufacturing competition may be beneficial, an OEM may
even have an incentive to lower remanufacturing costs to encourage the entry of such
competitors. However, an OEM may still benefit from other competitive strategies
such as HP’s strategy of informing customers about the relative higher performance of
their new printer cartridges and trying to point out quality and reliability issues with
the third party’s remanufactured cartridges. While there might be other reasons
for why an OEM may prefer to allow a third party to remanufacture its products
and not pursue preemption (e.g., investment costs, lack of technology or strategic
consumers in the context of relicensing fees in the IT industry, see Oraiopoulos et al.,
2007), our analysis offers a compelling consumer-side rationale for not preempting
remanufacturing competition.
Based on these results, our analytical model shows that an OEM should carefully
balance the effect of consumer perceptions of remanufactured products, cannibaliza-
tion concerns and economics of remanufacturing to determine the optimal competitive
strategy. Our key managerial insight is that an OEM should first investigate the ef-
fect of remanufactured products on the new products, before embarking on costly and
potentially detrimental preemption. However, our results should be interpreted with
caution. The main insight from our experiment is that there may exist a significant
effect of remanufactured products on the perceived value of new products. However,
the magnitude of this effect may vary for different products. Our experiment was
carried out for one consumer product only, i.e., Apple iPods. However, the signifi-
cance of our research lies in demonstrating the effect of remanufactured products and
highlighting its impact on an OEM’s competitive strategies. A natural direction for
future research is to examine if the magnitude and the direction of the change in the
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perceived value of new products generalize to other categories of consumer products
and investigate the underlying mechanism causing this effect. Another future direc-
tion for research would be to investigate this effect in a business-to-business (B2B)
setting, where decisions are typically based on procedures rather than individual per-
ceptions. We conjecture that in this context, the effect of remanufactured products
on new products may be moderated.
Finally, we made some assumptions in order to develop a parsimonious analytical
model that nevertheless captures the key trade-offs associated with our research ques-
tion. We assumed that remanufactured products are either sold by the OEM or the
third-party remanufacturer and that when the OEM remanufactures, the third-party
remanufacturer is completely preempted. These assumptions do not restrict the gen-
erality of our results and if relaxed, would significantly increase the complexity of
the model, without offering any additional insights. In particular, if we extend our
model, to consider exogenous core allocations (Majumder and Groenevelt, 2001), our
main insights would still hold and there may be a region where the OEM will find
it profitable to both pursue remanufacturing and let the third party remanufacture.
Another important assumption in our model is that the OEM does not face compe-
tition from another OEM. Atasu et al. (2008b) has shown that OEMs can benefit
from remanufacturing in the presence of low-end competitors. A interesting direc-
tion for future research would be to study the effect of remanufactured of products




TRADE-IN REBATES: PRODUCT RECOVERY AND
PRICE DISCRIMINATION
4.1 Introduction
It is well documented in the literature that many companies use trade-in rebates to
entice customers to upgrade to a newer generation product (e.g., van Ackere and
Reynolds 1995). In some settings (e.g., cars), the used product recovered from cus-
tomers from a trade-in program has a residual value and can be re-sold again with
little or no rework. In other settings, the used product may not be sold “as-is” without
significant refurbishing, due to, perhaps, wearable parts (e.g., keyboard and batteries
in computer laptops), or technological obsolescence (e.g., IT equipment with a sec-
ond or third generation operating system). We consider the latter case and explore
how the ability to practice price discrimination through trade-in rebates affects the
OEM’s recovery and remanufacturing strategy. We begin by providing a short case
study to illustrate this practice. While our case study is based on our observations
from working with a particular company, we expect that similar practices are used at
many other companies with a large installed base and whose primary sales strategy
involves providing customized price quotes to each major customer.
4.1.1 Short Case Study: Alpha
Consider the case of Alpha1, a major OEM selling Internet hardware to mostly cor-
porate customers. The majority of Alpha’s sales are handled by a sales team where
each individual customer (typically a large business) is assigned a specific Alpha sales
1The company’s actual name has been disguised.
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agent. Because each sales agent is only responsible for a small number of accounts,
s/he is able to develop an intimate knowledge of the customers’ willingness-to-pay
for Alpha products. This may be done in different ways; the sales agent may have
a better understanding of the customer’s business and/or their valuation during ne-
gotiations or through market research. Alpha must offer a public list price (pn) for
its new products because some new customers will not have an assigned Alpha sales
agent and may want to purchase an Alpha product through another channel such as
Alpha’s web site. Thus, an Alpha sales agent can never charge an existing customer
a price above pn, else the customer would just purchase the product through an alter-
nate channel. Alpha commands a market share of over 75% for the majority of their
product line, so near a monopoly market. Charging a single price of pn means that
Alpha loses profitable sales to all the customers with willingness-to-pay between the
product’s marginal cost and the list price pn. Alpha would like to sell to these cus-
tomers but does not want to lower the list price. Consider a product with a marginal
cost of 0.5pn and a customer with a willingness-to-pay of 0.8pn. This customer does
not buy the product at the list price but if the Alpha sales agent offers a customized
private discount off the list price of 20% then the customer would buy the product and
Alpha would make an additional profit of 0.3pn. Such blatant price discrimination is
problematic, however, because other customers that pay the list price for Alpha prod-
ucts or receive lower discounts may hear about such discounts and demand similar
treatment. For example, a famous example is the customer backlash in response to
Amazon offering different prices to different customers on DVDs (J. Morneau, 2000).
Thus, Alpha uses a mechanism where it can practice perfect price discrimination in
a more subtle manner through their trade-in rebate program.
Alpha’s historical sales data shows little correlation between the physical condition
of the product traded in and the percentage discount off the list price awarded for
the trade-in rebates. Because there is no published external valuation of used Alpha
64
products, customers accepting trade-in rebates have no way of knowing what the
value of their used product is. Thus, they accept the estimate of the used product’s
value provided by the Alpha sales agent. Because Alpha does not remanufacture its
returned products, it places zero value on the returned units, regardless of the model,
condition, and age of the product. This allows the Alpha sales agent to offer the exact
discount necessary for the customer to buy the product (perfect price discrimination),
yet still be able to explain to the higher willingness-to-pay customers (who may hear
about other customers receiving larger discounts) that the difference in the size of the
discount is due to the characteristics of the used product that was traded in. This
practice creates a much more opaque pricing scheme and completely disconnects the
trade-in rebate discount from the true value of the unit being traded in. Some further
evidence that Alpha uses its trade-in program to price discriminate is found by the
fact that Alpha awards the discount with a simple oral promise: in over 50% of the
sale transactions involving a trade-in in 2005, the customer did not bother returning
the product to Alpha (Alpha leaves it up to the customer to return a used product
to Alpha’s centralized returns facility). Included in these cases were customers who
received discounts of up to 20% off the list price for a new product. Finally, over 99%
of all used products from trade-in rebates are scrapped at Alpha (at a possible cost),
indicating that trade-ins, regardless of condition, do not have an immediate value to
Alpha, and may actually incur a cost.
While the strategy described above has worked well for Alpha for many years,
management is concerned that current and pending environmental legislation will
make the disposal of returned units increasingly costly. Thus, there has been some
discussion on whether Alpha should start remanufacturing its returned units (instead
of recycling or disposal) and sell the remanufactured units at a discount off its new
product’s list price. Supporting reasons for this proposal are that some companies now
consider remanufactured IT products as (imperfect) substitutes for new products, and
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that there has been an increase in the number of remanufactured versions of Alpha’s
products being offered by third-party firms through outlets such as eBay Business.
To date, however, the sales division of Alpha has argued strongly against offering
remanufactured versions of Alpha’s products, presumably because of their fear of
losing the ability to perfectly price discriminate, in addition to the cannibalization
threat. Remanufactured products have only been offered in a limited pilot program.
Inspired by Alpha’s case study, we study in this essay the use of trade-in re-
bates to practice price discrimination by offering customized discounts in the pres-
ence of disposal costs for returned products, and a competing remanufactured prod-
uct. Although there is literature indicating the use of personalized rebates—through
negotiations—to achieve perfect price discrimination (e.g., Choudhary et al., 2005),
we are the first, to our knowledge, to examine their effect on a firm’s recovery and
remanufacturing strategy. Typically, the firm needs to dispose the recovered units
from the trade-in program, typically at a cost (e.g., materials recycling). We show
that irrespective of the disposal cost, the OEM can price discriminate by offering
such trade-in rebates and achieve higher profits. We extend the literature on price
discrimination, personalized pricing and trade-ins by considering the possible pres-
ence of a remanufactured product as an imperfect competitor for the new product.
We model both internal competition (when the OEM remanufactures the used units
she recovers from the trade-in program) and external competition (when the reman-
ufactured product is offered by a third-party entrant). We find that the monopolist
is less likely to offer a remanufactured product (with the used products recovered
from the trade-in program), because offering the remanufactured product diminishes
the ability of the firm to practice price discrimination. Interestingly, however, the
OEM is worse off if she allows instead the remanufactured product to be offered by
a third-party remanufacturer. Thus, our results shed some light on the secondary
market strategies of many firms that were previously not explained by the existing
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literature.
The rest of the essay is organized as follows: In the next section, we position
our research in the context of the relevant literature. Our key assumptions and
notation are outlined in §4.3. In §4.4.1, we investigate the case where a monopolist
can price discriminate by using trade-in rebates. In §4.4.2, the OEM decides to
offer a remanufactured version of the (older generation) product to take advantage of
the trade-ins. In §4.4.3, there is threat of entry by a third-party remanufacturer. We
conduct a numerical study in §4.5 to study the impact of the remanufactured product
on profit under various scenarios. In §4.6, we summarize our results and conclude
with managerial implications. All proofs are provided in the Appendix.
4.2 Literature Review
Our research draws on several streams of literature: durable goods and trade-ins,
price discrimination, as well as competition and cannibalization in remanufacturing.
We provide a brief overview of each with the goal of positioning our work in relation
to the previous literature.
For a review of durable goods theory in economics and its application to real world
markets, see Waldman (2003). We focus here on the subset of the literature that inves-
tigates the role of trade-in rebates. The basic argument, as stated in, e.g., Van Ackere
and Reyniers (1995), is that trade-in rebates offer an incentive for customers to replace
an existing product with a new one quicker than they would otherwise without the
rebate. The authors show that it is not optimal for the OEM to offer trade-in rebates
for products that depreciate quickly (that is, quasi-consumable goods) because cus-
tomers already have an incentive to replace their existing product frequently. Using a
two-period model, Levinthal and Purohit (1989) show that trade-in rebates allow the
firm to disable the second-hand market when it introduces a new and improved prod-
uct generation. Rao et al. (2009) model heterogeneity in used products to argue that
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trade-in rebates are a tool for the OEM to intervene in the second-hand market by
decreasing the number of “strategic holders” (i.e., remove “lemons” from the market).
Ray et al. (2005) also model heterogeneity in the used products’ condition (through
an age distribution) and suggest an optimal age-dependent trade-in rebate, assuming
the firm can derive revenues from the used product (possibly from remanufactur-
ing), and that these revenues are decreasing in age. They consider remanufactured
products as perfect substitutes and remanufacturing is cheaper than new production.
Thus, they find that for a monopolist firm, recovering products through a trade-in
rebate program and remarketing them is always profitable. In contrast, we show that
it may be optimal for the firm to recover products through a trade-in program and
scrap them. In addition, as our case study demonstrates, OEMs may face compe-
tition from (lower quality) remanufactured products (either internal or offered by a
third-party), so our model incorporates this feature as well.
Cui et al. (2007) discuss how trade promotions can be used to price discriminate
different retailers. Choudhary et al. (2005) study perfect price discrimination in a
duopoly with vertical differentiation, where a firm can offer a personalized price based
on complete knowledge of the willingness-to-pay of each consumer. In their setting,
each firm chooses a quality level for their product and offer a personalized price to
every consumer. In contrast, in our model quality is exogenous and there are new
and remanufactured products, where the remanufactured products are percieved to
be of lower quality than new products; this perception is outside of the firm’s control.
Also, the firm’s decision variable is the list price, with perfect price discrimination
occurring only for customers with willingness-to-pay below the list price and the firm
has to dispose of the traded-in products.
Another stream of literature focuses on the competition (both internal and exter-
nal) between new products and their remanufactured equivalents. Debo et al. (2005)
study an OEM who considers selling both new and remanufactured products to a
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customer base that demands a discount for the remanufactured product. They deter-
mine the OEM’s optimal market segmentation and remanufacturability level decisions
with and without third-party remanufacturers. Jin et al. (2007) extend this model
by generalizing the relative consumer utility for remanufactured products. Majumder
and Groenevelt (2001) model competition between and OEM and an entrant on the
availability of used products. Ferrer and Swaminathan (2006) study the optimal pric-
ing schemes for the OEM as well as for a third-party entrant in a multi-period setting
when the customer values the entrant’s product less. Ferguson and Toktay (2006)
analyze two common entry-deterrent strategies an OEM may use to deter external
competition: remanufacturing themselves and preemptive collection with disposal.
They find that an OEM may choose to remanufacture or preemptively collect her
used products to deter entry, even when she would not have chosen to do so under
a pure monopoly environment. Atasu et al. (2008b) provide a model that explicitly
incorporates specific demand-related issues, such as the existence of a green segment,
competition, and product life cycle effects. Finally, Oraiopoulos et al. (2007) study
an OEM’s incentives to control the secondary market in the IT industry through the
setting of relicensing fees. In their model, the future resale value of a used piece
of IT equipment is implicitly included in the customer’s original valuation of a new
product. They find that this impact on new product sales is large enough that the
OEM never eliminates the secondary market, even when it is within her means of
doing so.
Similar to the papers mentioned above, we also model the competition (both in-
ternal and external) between new and remanufactured products and explore why an
OEM may choose not to participate in the remanufactured product market. The
unique aspect of our model, compared to the previous research stream, is that we
explore an additional powerful reason that an OEM may choose not to offer reman-
ufactured versions of her product. By doing so, her ability to practice perfect price
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discrimination through trade-in rebates is limited, as some customers might derive
greater utility from purchasing a remanufactured product instead of obtaining a new
product through the trade-in rebate program. This leads to a greater loss of profits
when the OEM is able to price discriminate by using such a program. This added
incentive not to remanufacture (compared to the earlier cases where the ability to
practice perfect price discrimination was not modeled) may explain why some firms
do not remanufacture even though the previous models predict they should. We
also show however, that this hesitation to remanufacture is mitigated when there is
competition from a third-party entrant.
4.3 Key Model Assumptions
We consider an OEM who manufactures a product that undergoes some major re-
design every few years due to advances in the technology. For example, Alpha’s
products have a four to six-year life-cycle. At the end of the product’s life-cycle,
customers can replace the product with a newer generation model (the new product),
or with a remanufactured product (if available). The previous generation product has
to be remanufactured to extend its useful lifetime by updating the main software and
wearable parts, such that it is an imperfect substitute for the new product. Without
loss of generality, the market size is normalized to one. Our major assumptions are
as follows:
Assumption 1 Consumer willingness-to-pay is heterogeneous and uniformly dis-
tributed in the interval [0, 1].
We assume that the consumers’ willingness-to-pay for the new product are dis-
tributed uniformly in the interval [0, 1] and that in any period, each consumer uses
at most one unit. The market size is normalized to 1. In this model, a consumer of
type φ ∈ [0, 1] has a willingness-to-pay of φ for a new product and her net utility
from purchasing is φ− pn, where pn is the price paid for the new product.
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Assumption 2 There is a fraction α ∈ [0, 1] of the potential customer base, inde-
pendent of the customer’s willingness-to-pay, who would not consider purchasing a
remanufactured product.
An alternative way to write this assumption is that, with probability α, a customer
would not consider purchasing a remanufactured product, regardless of its price. This
assumption is based on the common observation that many customers demand top
performance, and therefore prefer to have the latest technology. In consumer goods,
we find evidence of this assumption in the high premiums paid by consumers for new
gadgets such as the iPhone, which at a $599 price tag (compared to other phones
offered by AT&T at less than $50), still attracts a significant number of buyers—
270,000 buyers in the first few days of sales.2 Based on our discussions with managers
from Alpha, we believe the existence of such a segment is true, although perhaps to
a less extent, in B2B markets. Our parameter α allows us to model this phenomenon
to any degree, including the most common case in the previous literature where all
customers consider buying the remanufactured product if available (α = 0).
Assumption 3 For customers who consider purchasing a remanufactured product
(1− α), their willingness-to-pay for a remanufactured product is a fraction δ of their
willingness-to pay for the new product.
Under this assumption, a consumer with a willingness-to-pay φ for a new unit
has a willingness-to-pay of δφ for the remanufactured unit. Thus, the nature of com-
petition between new and remanufactured products is that of vertical differentiation
(consumers prefer a new product to a remanufactured one for the same price). There
is considerable evidence that customers generally perceive remanufactured products
to be of “lower quality” than new products, even if they belong to the same technolog-
ical generation. This perspective is reflected in a number of articles in the practitioner
2http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2007/07/25results.html
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and academic literature (Lund and Skeels, 1983; Hauser and Lund, 2003; Debo et al.,
2005; Vorasayan and Ryan, 2006; Atasu et al., 2008b). In addition, an empirical study
using online auctions by Guide and Li (2009) indicates that customers’ willingness-
to-pay for remanufactured routers is about 15% lower than for new routers, with both
new and remanufactured routers from the same technological generation and carrying
identical warranties from the OEM. Note that if δ = 0, consumers are not willing to
pay anything for the refurbished product; this eliminates the option of maintaining a
secondary market. If δ = 1, consumers view the new and refurbished units as being
identical and are willing to pay the same amount for either product. Most products
fall between the two extremes; we assume 0 < δ < 1 .
Assumption 4 The OEM incurs a cost 0 ≤ s ≤ c for every unit disposed.
Depending on the nature of the materials that makes up a product, a firm may
incur a positive fee for disposing of a used product. We assume that only the OEM
incurs this cost. Thus, a customer that does not trade-in a used product can dispose
of the product at zero cost. This assumption is reflective of the current regula-
tory environment and social expectations. Since the quantity disposed by individual
consumers is small, landfill bans and fees typically do not apply or are lower. For
example, in U.S. only non-household entities generating more than 220 lbs. of haz-
ardous e-waste per month are regulated under the federal law (U.S. EPA, 2008b).
Where regulations apply to neither consumers nor firms, firms may nevertheless re-
cycle due to pressure from environmental groups to dispose the used product in an
environmentally responsible manner and incur a cost that individual consumers do
not. For example, there is considerable pressure by NGOS such as the Silicon Valley
Toxics Coalition (http://svtc.etoxics.org) on IT producers, as opposed to users. Note
that this assumption is equivalent to assuming consumers have a lower disposal cost
than the OEM and is normalized to zero.
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Table 3: Parameters and decision variables
Symbol Definition
c Unit production cost (new product)
cr Cost to remanufacture one product
s OEM’s unit disposal cost for the product traded in
φ Customer willingness-to-pay
α Fraction of market who only consider new products
δ Relative willingness-to-pay (remanufactured/new)
pn2 Second-Period Unit (list) price for new product
qn2 Second-Period Quantity of new products
pr Unit price for remanufactured product
qr Quantity of remanufactured products
p1 First-Period Unit (list) price for new product
We assume that the OEM can produce new products at a per-unit cost of c such
that 0 ≤ c < 1/3. Since, the maximum willingness-to-pay for a new product is 1,
the unit cost must satisfy c < 1 to ensure that the firm can profitably manufacture
the new product in the first place. In order to simplify the exposition throughout the
paper, we impose the constraint c < 1/3 which does not change any insights (The
results under 1/3 ≤ c can be found in the appendix). Finally, we consider a two-
period model, which is common in the durable goods and closed-loop supply chain
literature (see §4.2). The beginning of the first period can be thought of as the time
a new generation of the product is introduced in the market place and the end of it is
the time before the introduction of the following generation. The firm only produces
new products in the first period, which are then available for remanufacturing in
the second period (when there is the competition between new and remanufactured
products). Thus, using a two-period model helps us to capture the key problem
dynamics while still maintaining analytical tractability.
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4.4 Analysis
4.4.1 Monopoly: Perfect Price Discrimination and No Remanufacturing
We begin with the well-established case where the OEM does not remanufacture and
offers a single price for her product. With no trade-in program, the OEM’s objective
in both periods is given by
max
pni
ΠNNi = (pni − c)(1− pni), i ∈ {1, 2}
which is concave in pni (the superscript “NN” denotes no price discrimination and no












. i ∈ {1, 2} (8)
With this benchmark case in mind, we now show how the OEM can achieve a
higher profit than ΠNN∗ by practicing price discrimination with trade-in rebates. We
assume (in this section only) that there is no remanufactured product. This could
occur due to many reasons: the OEM is diligent in destroying all used units it recoups;
customers are not interested in remanufactured products (e.g., retreaded tires for
passenger cars in the U.S.) implying α = 1; remanufacturing is not economical (e.g.,
old and obsolete computers), among other reasons. In the first period, the firm offers
new products at a list price of p1 and the total quantity of products sold is q1 = 1−p1.
The firm offers new products in the second period at a list price of pn2 and customers
with willingness-to-pay higher than pn2 will buy the product at the list price. The
firm can offer a trade-in rebate which is a discount off the list price to customers
who own a previous generation product and cannot afford to buy the new product at
the list price. If the discounts are high enough, some of these customers will choose
to return their older product and purchase a new product. This enables the firm to
practice price discrimination in a subtle manner through the trade-in rebate program.
The firm’s optimal price for a new product in the second period should satisfy the
condition summarized in the following lemma:
74
Lemma 1 The OEM should always charge a higher list price for the new product in
the second period, i.e. p1 ≤ pn2.
The above lemma implies that the OEM should set the list price for the new product
such that there is a segment of consumers who own a used product and cannot afford
to purchase a new product at the list price. The OEM will price at each consumer’s
willingness-to-pay φ (upto pn2), and will sell to every customer who satisfies the fol-
lowing two conditions: first, the consumer must own a product to be able to take
advantage of the trade-in program (i.e. φ ≥ 1 − p1) and second, has a willingness-
to-pay above her per-unit production cost c plus her per-unit disposal cost s. Thus,
setting the optimal list price according to Lemma 1 ensures that the OEM will al-
ways be able to practice price discrimination in the second period. For consumers
with willingness-to-pay φ above pn2, however, the OEM does not offer a trade-in credit
because she cannot charge a higher price than the product’s list price pn2. Conse-
quently, all customers with willingness-to-pay above pn2 are not offered the trade-in
program, and as a result pay the list price pn2. The total quantity of new products in
the second period is qMNn2 = (1− pn2) + (pn2 − k) = 1− k, where k = max(p1, c+ s).








s.t. k = max(p1, c+ s)
After characterizing the OEM’s optimal second-period list price, we now solve for
the optimal first-period list price decision. We maximize the total two-period profit
ΠMN(p1) = (1− p1)(p1− c) + ΠMN∗2 (p1) to determine pMN∗1 and ΠMN∗=̇ΠMN(pMN∗1 ).
Proposition 1 If the OEM offers a trade-in rebate program for new products and
does not offer a remanufactured version of the product, then the optimal list prices
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are given by pMN∗1 =
1+2c+s
3








Note that the total profit under this case is strictly higher than under no price
discrimination, irrespective of the disposal cost, i.e. the OEM is never worse off
offering a trade-in program when she can selectively offer trade-ins. The intuition
for this is that the OEM has more price flexibility with the trade-in program. She
reaches customers with willingness-to-pay too low to buy the product at list price,
and since she never sells below total cost (c + s), she is better off, no matter how
high the disposal cost s. Thus, in a monopoly market with no competition from
remanufactured products, the OEM is no worse off offering a trade-in rebate program
even when disposal of traded in units is costly. This explains how and why the
OEM uses price discrimination only on the set of customers who already own the
OEM product. This practice however, leaves the OEM with a large quantity of used
products for which the OEM must pay a fee to dispose. It is reasonable to ask if
the OEM could be better off by remanufacturing and reselling the returned products
rather than paying the potentially costly disposal fee. For example, Alpha has been
studying this option due to the volume of returned products. We study this case in
the next section.
4.4.2 Perfect Price Discrimination in the Presence of a Remanufactured
Product Offered by the OEM
With the trade-in program, the OEM recovers a significant portion of used (older
generation) products. We now consider that the OEM also offers a remanufactured
version of the (older generation) product at a price pr < pn2. This induces some degree
of cannibalization on the new product. Recall that, a fraction α of all customers,
distributed uniformly over the customer base, do not consider the remanufactured
product as an option, as it belongs to an older technological generation. Thus, there
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are 1 − α customers who consider buying a remanufactured product if the “price pr
is right”.
Consider a customer of valuation φ. If φ < pn2, the customer obtains a negative
utility from the new product, but a δpr − φ net utility from the remanufactured
product, which is positive for φ > pr
δ
. On the other hand, if φ > pn2, both products
have positive net utilities, and for high enough values of φ (specifically, for φ > pn2−pr
1−δ ,
found by solving φ−pn2 > δφ−pr), the net utility for the new product is higher than
that of the remanufactured product. Summarizing, the 1−α segment customers with
valuation higher than pn2−pr




1−δ will buy the remanufactured product, and those with valuation less than
pr
δ
will not buy anything. The OEM can offer the trade-in rebate program to the small
segment of consumers with valuations below pr
δ
and who own a product to trade-in
their older product and buy a remanufactured product. However, we assume that
the OEM does not offer trade-in rebates to this segment for buying remanufactured
products. Relaxing this assumption increases the analytical complexity of the model,
without offering any additional insights. This assumption also reflects the current
industrial practice where the sales force has stronger incentives to push new products
to customers (as they typically command premium profit margins) and will prefer
to focus on consumers considering new products for marketing the trade-in rebate
program. The quantities of new products sold to the α segment (αqn2), new and
remanufactured products sold to the 1− α segment (1−αqn2 & qr) are given by
αqn2(pn2, pr) = α [(1− pn2) + (pn2 − k)] = α(1− k), (9)








The OEM’s second-period objective (where the superscript “MR” means “monopoly,
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1− pn2 − pr
1− δ
)
(pn2 − c) +
(δpn2 − pr)
δ(1− δ)








The terms in the left-hand side of (12) represent respectively: sales of new prod-
ucts to α customers at list price, sales of new products to α customers using the
trade-in rebate program, sales of new products to 1− α customers at list price, sales
of remanufactured products and avoided disposal cost for products which were re-
manufactured and offered to consumers. In addition, there are constraints. The first
constraint is that the number of new units sold to the 1−α customers who also con-
sider buying a remanufactured product should be non-negative. That implies, from
(10), pn2 − pr ≤ 1 − δ. (Clearly, the number of new units sold to the α customers
who do not consider buying a remanufactured product is non-negative, as seen from
(9)). The second constraint is qr ≥ 0, which implies, from (11), δpn2 − pr ≥ 0.
The number of remanufactured products offered, i.e., (1 − α) (δpn2−pr)
δ(1−δ) is limited by
the number of used units recovered by the OEM through the trade-in program, i.e.
q̂(pn2, k)=̇α(pn2−k). Finally, trade-in rebates can be only offered to consumers in the
segment α who own a used product and have a willingness-to-pay higher than above
the per-unit production cost c plus the per-unit disposal cost s. Thus, the firm solves
the optimization problem comprised of the objective function (12) and the following
constraints:
pn2 − pr ≤ 1− δ (13)
δpn2 − pr ≥ 0 (14)
(1− α)(δpn2 − pr)
δ(1− δ)
≤ α(pn2 − k) (15)
k=̇ max(p1, c+ s) ≤ pn2 (16)
Note that k ≤ pn2 also implies that c + s < 1 is always required to hold. After
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characterizing the OEM’s optimal second-period list price, we solve for the optimal
first-period list price decision. We maximize the total two-period profit Π(p1)
MR =
(1− p1)(p1 − c) + ΠMR∗2 (p1) to determine pMR∗1 and ΠMR∗=̇ΠMR(pMR∗1 ). The OEM’s
optimal strategy is given by Proposition 2 below.
Proposition 2 If the monopolist markets a trade-in rebate program for new products
along with a remanufactured version of the product, then the monopolist’s optimal
strategy is dependent on its per-unit production cost c relative to other parameters as
follows:






2−α . In this case, the monopolist does not market remanufactured
products (qMR∗r = 0), and consumers in both segments buy the new product (q
MR∗
n2,1−α >
0, qMR∗n2,α > 0).
Condition 2 : If c1 < c < c2, then the optimal prices are given by the table below. In
this case, the monopolist sells remanufactured products (qMR∗r > 0), and consumers




















cb ≤ c p21 p2n2 p2r
Condition 3 : If c2 ≤ c, then the optimal prices are given by the table below. In this
case, the monopolist sells remanufactured products (qMR∗r > 0), and the new product















cc ≤ c < cd p31 1− δ + δp31 δp31





The optimal solution in Proposition 2 can be described as follows: If c ≤ c1,
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the new product’s manufacturing cost is low enough (relative to the remanufacturing
cost) that it is optimal for the OEM to only produce the new product. If c1 < c <
min(ca, cb), the OEM should remanufacture a small fraction of the recovered products,
however, she should still set the list price for the new products in a similar manner
as under no remanufactured products. Under both of the conditions discussed above,
simple algebra yields pMR∗n2 ≤ pMN∗n2 & pMR∗1 ≤ pMN∗1 which hold with equality if
α = 1. Thus, relative to the MN case where there is price discrimination without
remanufactured products, the OEM has to lower the list prices for the new products,
when it markets remanufactured products. Thus, the OEM should charge a lower list
price for the new product and market them to both segments.
If ca ≤ c < cb, the per-unit production cost is higher (as compared to the reman-
ufacturing cost) and since remanufacturing becomes more attractive, the firm should
remanufacture a higher fraction of the products recovered from trade-ins. In addi-
tion, the OEM should charge a different list price for new products compared to the
two cases discussed above. Thus, the OEM still finds it profitable to pay the fee for
disposal of the remaining recovered products, which were not remanufactured. If the
production cost is higher i.e. cb ≤ c < c2, the optimal quantity of remanufactured
products is constrained by the availability of older units recovered from the trade-ins
and she remanufactures all of the units recovered from the trade-in program.
If the production cost is lies between c2 and cd, the high list price for the new
product prevents the customers in the 1−α segment to purchase a new product and
they only buy remanufactured products. The higher list price for the new product
enables the firm to market trade-in rebates to a larger segment of consumers and
practice price discrimination. However, the OEM should only remanufacture a frac-
tion of the recovered products and pay for the disposal of the remaining units. If
the cost to produce a new product is extremely high cd ≤ c, it is more profitable
to remanufacture all of the available units. Thus, under this setting (c2 ≤ c) the
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firm should market new products to the α segment, charge a high list price and price
discriminate by marketing trade-in discounts to the rest.
Recall that if c < min(ca, cb), the OEM has to charge lower list price for the
new products. As a result profits decrease, as shown by our numerical study over
realistic range of parameters, later in §4.5, where we find that profits decrease in
81.69% of the scenarios and it is not optimal for the OEM to market remanufactured
products under those scenarios. The primary reason for the profit decrease is that the
remanufactured products do not expand the size of the market, and typically have a
lower profit margin, due to lower consumer valuation. However, if c2 ≤ c, the OEM
can profitably segment the market as follows; it can maintain a higher list price for the
new product and thus offer the trade-in program to a larger segment of consumers,
leading to higher profits. The recovered units can be sold to the 1−α segment which
will not purchase the new product and only purchase the remanufactured products.
In addition, this helps the OEM to avoid disposal costs for the recovered products
and thus, in 18.31% of the scenarios in our numerical study, the profits of the OEM
increase (or remain the same) as compared to the MN case and it is optimal for
the OEM to market remanufactured products. Section §4.5 provides the details of
the numerical study and also identifies the product and market characteristics which
determine whether marketing remanufactured products is an optimal strategy for the
OEM.
Consider the most common case in the existing literature where all consumers
consider purchasing a remanufactured product if available (α = 0). If the firm does
not market a remanufactured product and if it can only charge a single price for the
new product, the total profit is given by ΠNN∗ = (1−c)
2
2
. In this case, the profit from
marketing new and remanufactured products has to exceed ΠNN∗, in order for the
OEM to find remanufacturing profitable. In contrast, if the firm can price discriminate
by offering trade-in rebates and chooses not to remanufacture, the total profit is given
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which is strictly greater than ΠNN∗. In this case, the
potential profits from jointly marketing new and remanufactured products has to be
much higher (as compared to the case where the OEM cannot price discriminate) to
find remanufacturing profitable. Thus, for any given parameter value set, the OEM
is more likely to not remanufacture when she has the opportunity to practice price
discrimination through a trade-in program. This is an important finding as it helps
explain why some firms do not remanufacture even though it appears they should do
so based on the existing literature. We emphasize this point through the following
observation.
Observation 1 In a market with no external competition, an OEM is more likely
to not remanufacture when she has the opportunity to price discriminate through a
trade-in rebate program than when she must charge a single list price for her new
product.
So what would be another incentive for the OEM to market a remanufactured
product? One possibility is the threat of a third-party remanufacturer entering the
market; we explore this case in the next section.
4.4.3 Perfect Price Discrimination in the Presence of a Remanufactured
Product Offered by a Third-Party
We now assume that a third party enters the market in the second period and provides
remanufacturing for consumers who own an older product. This may happen because
many OEMs (including Alpha) believe (correctly under some scenarios, as seen in
the previous section) that remanufactured products offer a cannibalization threat,
and thus they refuse to market their own remanufactured product. If a consumer
in the 1 − α segment cannot afford to purchase a new product at the list price and
owns an old product, they may choose to get use the third party to get their product
remanufactured.
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From a modeling perspective, this case differs from the case where the OEM
markets the remanufactured product in that the last two terms of (12) (where the
superscript “DR” means “duopoly, remanufacturing”) are no longer part of the OEM’s
objective function. Supply constraint (15) for availability of recovered units is no
longer required as the OEM does not offer remanufactured products. In addition, we
have a new constraint (22), i.e. only consumers who own a used product from the first-
period can use the remanufacturing service offered by the third-party, i.e. p1 ≤ prδ .
The second-period objectives of the OEM and the third-party remanufacturer are
given by:


















s.t. pn2 − pr ≤ 1− δ (18)
k=̇ max(p1, c+ s) ≤ pn2 (19)
The third-party remanufacturer’s second-period problem is:
max
pr
ΠDRR = (1− α)
(δpn2 − pr)
δ(1− δ)
(pr − cr) (20)





After characterizing the OEM’s and the third-party’s optimal second-period de-
cisions pDR∗n2 (p1) and p
DR∗
r (p1) respectively, we solve for the optimal first-period de-
cisions. In the first-period, the OEM strategically determines the first-period list
price in anticipation of the second-period competition from the third-party reman-
ufacturer. Thus, we maximize the total two-period profit of the OEM Π(p1)
DR =
(1− p1)(p1 − c) + ΠDR∗2 (p1) to determine pDR∗1 . The sub-game perfect equilibrium in
this game is described in Proposition 3.
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Proposition 3 If the OEM offers a trade-in rebate program for new products and faces
competition from a third-party remanufacturer, the OEM should always offer new products
and appropriate trade-in discounts to the α segment. The optimal strategy for the 1 − α
segment is defined by the following three conditions on the per-unit production cost c:
Condition 1 : If c ≤ c3, the OEM should offer new products and the third party does not
enter the market (qDR∗r = 0,








Condition 2 : If c3 < c < c4, the OEM should offer new products and some consumers
will choose to use the third party remanufacturer (qDR∗r > 0,
1−αqDR∗n2 > 0). The optimal























Condition 3 : If c4 ≤ c, the OEM does not offer any new products and is driven out of the
1 − α segment by the third-party remanufacturer (qDR∗r > 0, 1−αqDR∗n2 = 0). The optimal




















The optimal solution in Proposition 3 is similar in structure to that of Proposition 2. If
c ≤ c3, the new product’s manufacturing cost is low enough (relative to the remanufacturing
cost) and the entrant will not enter the market (qDR∗r = 0). In this case, simple algebra
yields pDR∗n2 ≤ pMR∗n2 which implies that the OEM has to further lower the list price for the
new product (as compared to the MR case) to deter entry by the third party. This leads
to a decrease in OEM’s profit as compared to that under the MR case. If c3 < c < ce (or
ce ≤ c & ∆a > 0) the production cost is higher (relative to the remanufacturing cost) and
the third party enters and cannibalizes the OEM’s new products sales in the 1−α segment.
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In this case, only a fraction of the consumers in the 1 − α segment purchase a new or
remanufacture their old product. However, when ce ≤ c & ∆b ≤ 0, all consumers who own
an older product purchase a new product or choose to get their product remanufactured by
the third party.
Finally, if c4 ≤ c, then the OEM optimal list price for the new product is too high for
consumers in 1− α segment to purchase a new product and the OEM is driven out of this
segment. Consumers in this segment choose to get their product remanufactured by the
third party. Under the threat of entry by a third party, the OEM’s profit is lower than in
the MR case because the OEM is giving up a portion of the market to an entrant. Although
intuitive, we do not offer a formal analytical proof of this statement due to its algebraic
difficulty (the profit equation is complex and has multiple regions), but we show through
a numerical study in §4.5.2 which spans a realistic range of values observed in practice for
the parameters in our model. As expected, the OEM’s profits never increase in the DR
case (relative to the MR case) and decrease on an average by 16.59%. This implies that
although the OEM marketing remanufactured products might be a suboptimal strategy in
the absence of threat of entry, it might be optimal for the OEM to market remanufactured
products strategically in order to deter the entry of a third party remanufacturer. In the
next section, we discuss the numerical study and identify market and product characteristics
where the loss in profits for the OEM due to the third party entering the market is higher.
4.5 Numerical Study
We perform a numerical study to analyze whether the OEM’s profits decrease (or increase)
with the presence of a remanufactured product, by the OEM or entrant, relative to the
monopoly case with no remanufactured product. In this section, we conduct the study for
a limited but realistic range of values for the parameters. The insights obtained from this
study continue to hold over the entire theoretical range of the parameters, which is shown
by an extensive study, the details of which can be found in the appendix.
For the parameter α we choose a full-factorial experimental design and vary it over
the entire theoretical range [0,1] with values at 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7 and 0.9. Hauser and
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Lund (2003) report average values of discounts of 35-55% for a remanufactured product
relative to new and this number differs considerably across industries (i.e. δ lies between
0.45 and 0.65). Guide and Li (2007) empirically find δ for power tools and Internet routers
using online auctions for both remanufactured and new products of same generation and
find that δ ∼ 0.85. Subramanian and Subramanyam (2007) compare prices of new and
remanufactured products (including very similar or identical warranties) and find that δ
varies from 0.60 (for video game consoles) to 0.85 (some consumer electronics). Thus, we
choose to vary δ between 0.45 and 0.95 with values at 0.45, 0.55, 0.65, 0.75, 0.85 and 0.95.
Ferguson et al. (2009) develop a remanufacturing cost function based on the observation
that remanufacturing costs for very good quality returns range between 20% and 28% for
five different products at Pitney-Bowes. Thus, we choose to vary the remanufacturing cost
as a fraction of the production cost cr/c between 0.05 and 0.8 with values at 0.05, 0.2, 0.35,
0.5, 0.65 and 0.8.
We vary the disposal cost as a fraction of the production cost s/c between 0 and 0.3
which represents range of disposal costs commonly observed in practice, with values at 0,
0.05, 0.1, 0.15, 0.2, 0.25 and 0.3. For example, in 2005, the state of California charged
a recycling cost-recovery fee between $ 6-$ 10 for electronic products such as televisions
and computer monitors (California Integrated Waste Management Board, 2008). From the
model formulation, we also need the following conditions to hold; c + s < 1, cr < c and
s < c. Based on these conditions, we vary c over its feasible range with values at 0.1, 0.2,
0.3 and 0.4. Thus, there are a total of 5 · 62 · 4 · 7 = 5,040 experimental cells. For each
experimental cell, we compute the prices, quantities and profits for the OEM for each of
the three scenarios studied: the OEM has a monopoly with only the new product (MN),
the OEM has a monopoly but offers new and remanufactured products (MR), a third party
enters and offers remanufacturing service to consumers who own a product. We compare
the OEM’s profit for cases MR and DR, relative to MN. For the MN case, the OEM’s profit
ranges between 0.19 and 0.50, with a median value of 0.34; for the MR case, the OEM’s
profit ranges between 0.03 and 0.51, with a median value of 0.30; finally, for the DR case,
the OEM’s profit ranges between 0.09 and 0.36, with a median value of 0.20. We offer a
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more detailed comparison between these cases below.
4.5.1 Case MR: OEM Offers Remanufactured Product
When the OEM offers a remanufactured product, her profit increases (relative to the case




) in these cells of 1.73%. Profits decrease in 4,117 cells (81.69% of the
cells), with an average profit decrease of 5.17%. Overall, her average profit across all cells
decreases by 10.71%, with a maximum decrease of 84.72% and a maximum increase of
42.91%. Thus, the OEM may be worse off by offering a remanufactured product. Con-
sequently, as discussed in §4.4.2, the OEM typically prefers not to offer a remanufactured
product unless there is a threat from an entrant. To analyze which model parameters most
contribute to this profit decrease, we averaged, for each factor level, the profit decrease



























Figure 8: Average Profit Decrease when OEM Offers Remanufactured Product
Figure 4.5.1 clearly shows that the parameters that most influence profit decrease are
α, c and s/c. To provide a clearer picture, we performed individual regressions, one for
each experimental factor. For each regression, the dependent variable is the percent profit
decrease, the independent variable is the corresponding experimental factor, and there are
5,040 observations. The magnitude of R2 for each regression provides a metric for the
impact of the factor on profit decrease (Wagner, 1995), which are listed in Table 4.
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The factors that most impact the decrease in the OEM’s profit are, in order: α (-), s/c (-
), c (-), and to a less extent δ and cr/c, with R2 values of 0.448, 0.049, 0.03, 0.012, and 0.001,
respectively. In particular, the factors α and s account for 44.8% and 4.9%, respectively, of
the variation in profit decrease. As the size of the customer segment which only considers a
new product increases, it increases the ability of the OEM to practice price discrimination
by offering trade-in rebates. For high values of α the OEM is less hurt by the presence of a
remanufactured product because many customers do not view the remanufactured product
as a substitute for the new. If the fee required for disposal of a product is high, the potential
loss due to cannibalization of new product sales by the remanufactured product is offset by
the avoided disposal cost. Thus, for high disposal costs, the OEM has a greater incentive
to market remanufactured products. The following observation captures the above results.
Observation 2 When the OEM has the ability to price discriminate using a trade-in rebate
program, she is more likely to not market remanufactured products if the size of the consumer
segment which only considers a new product is small or if the disposal fee is low.
4.5.2 Case DR: Entrant Offers Remanufactured Product
When a third party remanufacturer enters the market, the OEM’s profit decreases (relative
to the case MN) in all 5,040 experimental cells, as one would expect. Overall, the average
profit decrease is 29.78%, with a maximum decrease of 58.94% and a minimum decrease
of 0%. Thus, third party entry significantly worsens the OEM’s profits. Again, to analyze
which model parameters most contribute to this profit decrease, we have averaged, for each
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Figure 9: Average Profit Decrease when Entrant Offers Remanufactured Product
Figure 9 clearly shows that the parameters that most influence profit decrease are now
α and δ. Again, we performed individual regressions, one for each experimental factor.
For each regression, the dependent variable is the percent profit decrease, the independent
variable is the corresponding experimental factor, and there are 5,040 observations. The
results are listed in Table 5. Thus, the factors that most impact the profit decrease are, in
order: α (-), δ (+), s/c (-) and to a lesser extent c (-) and cr/c (-) with R2 values of 0.608,
0.223, 0.008, 0.003 and 0.003 respectively. In particular, the factors α and δ account for
60.8% and 22.3%, respectively, of the variation in the profit decrease.
Similar to the MR case, if the size of the consumer segment which only considers a new
product is large, an OEM can offer trade-in program to more consumers. For large values
of α the OEM is less hurt by the presence of a third-party remanufacturer because many
customers do not view the remanufactured product as a substitute for the new. Intuitively,
for large values of δ, the OEM is worse off with competition, because customers have a
higher willingness-to-pay for remanufactured products, and therefore the OEM has to lower
its price for a new product. Thus, when there is a threat of third-party entry, the profits of
the OEM significantly decrease.
We now compare the DR case relative to MR case. That is, how much worse off is the
OEM if she does not offer a remanufactured product but the third-party remanufacturer
enters the market (DR), compared to the case where the OEM can preempt the entrant by
offering her own version of the remanufactured product (MR). While we do not model this
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preemption explicitly, it is reasonable to assume the OEM may be able to do so (see the
discussion in Ferguson and Toktay, 2006). Because of the OEM’s established reputation
and brand image, customers may strongly prefer a remanufactured product from the OEM
rather than an unknown entrant.




herself versus allowing an entrant to remanufacture is 16.59% on average, with a minimum
decrease of 0% (in 7.5% of cells), a maximum decrease of 31.53%, and a median decrease
of 17.78%. Thus, when there is the threat of a third-party entry, the OEM should consider
marketing her own version of a remanufactured product. Although adopting such a strategy
(typically) cannibalizes sales for the new product (and consequently decreases profit by an
average of 10.71%), it is still optimal as the OEM is still better off than in the case where a
third-party entrant offers the remanufactured product (where the average profit decrease is
29.78%). While this finding—that the OEM is better off offering a remanufactured product
than letting an entrant do so- is also revealed in Ferguson and Toktay, 2006, we extend
it to the case where there are trade-in rebates, perfect price discrimination, and linear
remanufacturing cost; and are also the first to quantify the difference in profits resulting
from the two strategies over a broad parameter set. We summarize this finding in the
following observation.
Observation 3 An OEM is better off offering her own remanufactured products than al-
lowing a third-party remanufacturer to do so. Such a strategy is optimal for the OEM
even under cases where it is not profitable for the OEM to remanufacture in the absence of
third-party competition.
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4.6 Managerial Implications and Conclusions
In this paper, we model a product that undergoes a significant redesign every few years,
and study the OEM’s optimal pricing strategy, along with the possibility of using trade-in
rebates to provide incentives for customers to switch to a newer version of the product.
We have argued, through a case study, that trade-in rebates are used to practice perfect
price discrimination on customers who own a previous version of the product by offering
customers customized discounts off the list price. We have shown analytically how this
practice is indeed attractive to a monopolist. When the OEM faces competition from a
remanufactured product (offered either by the OEM or by a third-party entrant), in addition
to the cannibalization effect, the ability of the OEM to practice such price discrimination
is limited. Under this scenario, we offer the following managerial insights:
1. In a monopoly market with no competition from remanufactured products, the OEM
should always offer a trade-in rebate program.
2. In a market with no external competition, if all customers consider buying a reman-
ufactured product, an OEM is more likely to not remanufacture when she has the
opportunity to practice such price discrimination than when she can only charge a
single list price for her new product.
3. When the OEM has the ability to price discriminate using a trade-in rebate program,
she is more likely to not market remanufactured products if the size of the consumer
segment which only considers a new product is small or if the disposal fee is low.
4. An OEM is better off marketing her own remanufactured products than allowing a
third-party remanufacturer to do so. Such a strategy is optimal for the OEM even
under cases where it is sub-optimal for the OEM to remanufacture in the absence of
third-party competition.
As mentioned in the introduction, our case company Alpha has historically chosen not
to remanufacture her old product, despite the abundance of used cores obtained through the
trade-in rebate program. The reasons summarized in Observations 1 and 2 may partially
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explain this practice. Recently, however, Alpha has observed a significant increase in the
entry of third-party remanufacturers. This competitive entrance into Alpha’s previously
monopolistic market is a concern for two reasons: 1) the normal loss of profits because of
the cannibalization of their new product sales and 2) availability of remanufactured products
limits Alpha’s ability to price discriminate by offering trade-in rebates to customers who
cannot afford to purchase a new product at the list price. Our paper demonstrates the
value to Alpha of offering her own remanufactured product to preempt third-party entrants,
despite the clear cannibalization effect studied and the reduction in ability to practice price
discrimination by offering customized discounts.
One limitation of this paper is that we assume that the fraction of customers who only
consider buying a new product is independent of their willingness-to-pay. In practice, of
course, we might expect to see a higher fraction of such customers at higher willingness-
to-pay than at lower willingness-to-pay. However, we expect that extending the analysis
to include such heterogeneity will only reinforce our results. Another limitation is that we
assumed that the firm has perfect knowledge of the consumers willingness-to-pay for the
product. It is obvious that in reality, firms can only observe this information with noise and
consequently the OEM’s profits from the trade-in program will be lower. Thus, similar to
Choudhary et. al (2005) our results are to be interpreted as solutions to the limiting case
(i.e. with perfect information). However, its an important case to consider as the insights
we obtain from our analysis will also continue to hold in a general case.
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Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1. Since d(un(θ)− uu(θ))/dθ > 0, we have that Πθ[Ln, rt]− Πθ[Lu, rt]
and Πθ[Lu, rt]−Πθ[I, rt] are increasing in θ. Thus, in equilibrium, consumers playing Ln will
have higher θ than ones playing Lu, who will have higher θ than ones playing I. The values
of θ1 and θ2 can be found by solving Πθ[Ln, rt] = Πθ[Lu, rt] and Πθ[Lu, rt] = Πθ[I, rt],
respectively. 




whose leading coefficient is negative and the determinant 4δ(1 − δ) is positive. Thus, the
hessian is negative definite and the per-period profit function is jointly strictly concave in
Ln and Lu.
Now assume that Assumption A1 holds. The inverse demand functions for the new and
used product leases can be found by substituting un(θ) = θ and uu(θ) = δθ and solving
(1), Ln = 1− θ1 and Lu = θ1− θ2 simultaneously. The firm’s per-period problem at steady
state is given by
max
Ln,Lu
(rn − c)Ln + (ru − βf )Lu − sfLn = (1− Ln − δLu − c)Ln
+ (δ(1− Ln − Lu)− βf )Lu − sfLn
s.t. Lu ≤ Ln and Ln, Lu ≥ 0.
The Lagrangean is given by
L(Ln, Lu) =(1− Ln − δLu − c)Ln + (δ(1− Ln − Lu)− βf )Lu − sfLn − λ(Lu − Ln)
+µ1Ln + µ2Lu,
with first-order conditions




=1 + λ+ µ1 − c− 2Ln − sf − 2δLu = 0 and




=δ + µ2 − βf − 2δ(Ln + Lu)− λ = 0.
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Since the per-period profit function is strictly concave in Ln and Lu, the necessary and suffi-
cient conditions for optimality (Kuhn-Tucker conditions) are that the first order conditions
(FOC) are satisfied and λ(Lu − Ln) = 0, µ1Ln = 0, µ2Lu = 0, λ ≥ 0, µ1 ≥ 0 and µ2 ≥ 0.
There are four candidate solutions to the optimization problem defined as cases 1-4 below.
Case 1. Ln > 0 and 0 < Lu = Ln. Then µ1 = 0 and µ2 = 0. Solving σ1(Ln, Ln, λ, 0) = 0
and σ2(Ln, Ln, λ, 0) = 0 gives Ln =
1−c−sf−βf+δ
2+6δ and λ =
2δsf−βf (1+δ)−δ(1−2c−δ)
1+3δ . λ ≥ 0 and
Ln > 0 hold for
βf (1+δ)+δ(1−2c−δ)
2δ ≤ sf and c+sf +βf < 1+δ, respectively. Since according
to our assumption, c + max(sc, sf ) + βf < 1 and δ > 0, c + sf + βf < 1 + δ clearly holds.
Thus, the required condition for this case to apply is βf (1+δ)+δ(1−2c−δ)2δ ≤ sf .
Case 2. Ln > 0 and 0 < Lu < Ln. Then µ1 = 0, µ2 = 0 and λ = 0. Solving
σ1(Ln, Ln, 0, 0) = 0 and σ2(Ln, Ln, 0, 0) = 0 gives Ln =
1−c−sf+βf−δ
2(1−δ) and Lu =
δ(c+sf )−βf
2δ(1−δ) .
Ln > 0, Lu > 0 and Lu < Ln hold for sf < 1 − c + βf − δ,
βf−δc
δ < sf and sf <
βf (1+δ)+δ(1−2c−δ)
2δ , respectively. Since
βf (1+δ)+δ(1−2c−δ)
2δ −(1−c+βf−δ) < 0 for c+s+βf < 1,
if sf <
βf (1+δ)+δ(1−2c−δ)
2δ holds, then sf < 1 − c + βf − δ also holds. Thus, the required
condition for this case to apply is βf−δcδ < sf <
βf (1+δ)+δ(1−2c−δ)
2δ .
Case 3. Ln > 0 and Lu = 0. Then µ1 = 0 and λ = 0. Solving σ1(Ln, 0, 0, 0) = 0
and σ2(Ln, 0, 0, µ2) = 0 gives Ln =
1−c−sf
2 and µ2 = βf − δ(c + sf ). µ2 ≥ 0 and Ln > 0
hold for sf ≤
βf−δc
δ and c + sf < 1, respectively. Since according to our assumption,
c+ max(sc, sf ) +βf < 1, c+ sf < 1 clearly holds. Thus, the required condition for this case
to apply is sf ≤
βf−δc
δ .
Case 4. Ln = 0 and Lu = 0. Solving σ1(0, 0, λ, µ1) = 0 and σ2(0, 0, λ, µ2) = 0 gives
µ1 = −1 + c+ sf − λ and µ2 = βf − δ + λ. µ1 ≥ 0 holds for λ ≤ −(1− c− sf ). However,
according to our assumption, c+ max(sc, sf ) + βf < 1, (1− c− sf ) > 0. This implies that
µ1 ≥ 0 and λ ≥ 0 cannot hold together and this case is ruled out.
The three remaining candidate solutions and the required conditions for each of them
can be summarized as follows: If sf ≤
βf−δc






, if βf−δcδ < sf <
βf (1+δ)+δ(1−2c−δ)

















Proof of Lemma 2. We suppress the selling-specific notation for this proof. There are
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nine potential two-period consumer strategies as shown in Table 1. At the focal point, the
consumer’s Bellman equation can be written as
Vθ[a(θ), p] = max
a(θ)
{Πθ[Rθ[a(θ), p]; a(θ), p] + ρVθ[Rθ[a(θ), p], p]} (23)
Since a product lasts two periods, a rational consumer who has a state of Bu or I, will
choose the same action in the current period as they enter the period with no product.
This implies that at the focal point,
Rθ[Bu, p] = Rθ[I, p] and Vθ[Bu, p] = Vθ[I, p]. (24)
Due to the periodicity of two for all consumer strategies at the focal point, permutations
of same pattern are not distinct. There are only 6 distinct strategies (BnBn, BnBu, BnI,
BuBu, BuI and II). From (24), Vθ[Bu, p] = Vθ[I, p] and examining (23), it is easy to see that
if a consumer chose Bu or I in the previous period, it will still find it optimal to choose the
same strategy in the current period. This implies that BuI cannot happen in equilibrium.
Thus, there are only 5 possible strategies left. We next prove that at the focal point, BnI
cannot happen.
Recall that the reaction function Rθ[a(θ), p] is chosen to maximize
Uθ[s; a, p] ≡ Πθ[s; a, p] + ρVθ[s, p]. (25)
Let us assume that BnI is a credible strategy, which implies that Rθ[Bn, p] = I and
Rθ[I, p] = Bn for some θ ∈ [0, 1]. Note that Rθ[Bn, p] = I implies that
pu − βc + ρVθ[I, p] > un(θ)− pn + pu − βc + ρVθ[Bn, p]
or ρVθ[I, p] > un(θ)− pn + ρVθ[Bn, p].
However, the above equation implies that Uθ[I; I, p] > Uθ[Bn; I, p] ⇒ Rθ[I, p] = I. Thus,
if a consumer plays I when he is in state Bn, then it will be optimal for him to always play
I thereafter. This violates our assumptions and thus, BnI cannot take place. Thus, there
are four possible strategies at the focal point. Consumers who play BnBn will have higher
θ than those who play BnBu, who have higher θ than those who play BuBu. Consumers
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playing II will have the lowest willingness-to-pay. The net present values for each of the four
consumption strategies BnBn, BnBu, BuBu and II at the focal point are given as follows:
Vθ[Bn, p] =
un(θ)− pn + pu − βc
1− ρ
when θ ∈ (θ5, 1] or θ ∈ BnBn, (26)
Vθ[Bn, p] =
uu(θ)− sc + ρ(un(θ)− pn)
1− ρ2
when θ ∈ (θ6, θ5] or θ ∈ BnBu, (27)
Vθ[Bu, p] =
un(θ)− pn + ρ(uu(θ)− sc)
1− ρ2
when θ ∈ (θ6, θ5] or θ ∈ BnBu, (28)
Vθ[Bu, p] =
uu(θ)− pu − sc
1− ρ
when θ ∈ (θ7, θ6] or θ ∈ BuBu, (29)
Vθ[I, p] = 0 when θ ∈ (0, θ7] or θ ∈ II. (30)
The value of Θ3 can be found by equating (29) and (30), the value of Θ2 can be found by
equating (27) and (29) and finally, the value of Θ1 can be found by equating (26) and (27).

Proof of Proposition 2. Under Assumption A1, it is easy to show using (5) and (6) that
the per-period profit function is strictly concave in Sn. Solving for the first-order conditions
yields S∗n.
Proofs of Lemma 3 and Propositions 3-5. These follow directly by comparing the




Proof of Lemma 1. It is easy to see that under our consumer model, Πθ[(1, 0, 0); pt, j],
Πθ[(0, 1, 0); pt, j] and Πθ[(o, 0, 1); pt, j] are linear, monotonic and increasing functions of θ.
Moreover, Πθ[(1, 0, 0); pt, j] − Πθ[(0, 1, 0); pt, j] and Πθ[(0, 1, 0); pt, j] − Πθ[(0, 0, 1); pt, j] are
increasing in θ. Thus, in equilibrium, customers buying a new product will have higher θ
than ones buying a remanufactured product, who will have higher θ than ones remaining
inactive. In the absence of remanufactured products, θ1 can be found by solving un(θ1, x)−




n) = 1 − θ1. In the presence of
remanufactured products (j = o or j = 3p), Θ1 and Θ2 can be found by solving ur(Θ2, j)−
ptr = 0 and un(Θ1, j) − ptn = ur(Θ1, j) − ptr simultaneously and the demand for new and




r) = 1−Θ1 and qtr(ptn, ptr) = Θ1 −Θ2. 
Proof of Proposition 1. This proof is structured as follows: First, we characterize the
OEM’s optimal steady-state policy when it only sells new products and when it chooses to
remanufacture its own products. We finally compare the profitability of these two cases to
determine when the OEM will find it profitable to remanufacture.
Characterizing the optimal decisions under no remanufacturing (X) and remanufactur-
ing (R): If the OEM only sells new products, the demand function for the new products
can be found by substituting j = x, un(θ, x) = θ, solving equation un(θ1, x) − ptn = 0 and
q̄n = 1 − θ1 simultaneously and is given by q̄n = 1 − p̄n. The per-period profit is given by









If the OEM decides to remanufacture, the demand functions can be found by substitut-
ing j = o, un(θ, o) = βθ and ur(θ, o) = φoθ, solving the system of equations ur(Θ2, j)−ptr =
0 and un(Θ1, j) − ptn = ur(Θ1, j) − ptr, q̄n(p̄n, p̄r) = 1 − Θ1 and q̄r(p̄n, p̄r) = Θ1 − Θ2 si-
multaneously and are given by q̄n(p̄n, p̄r) = β−p̄n−φo+p̄rβ−φo and q̄r(p̄n, p̄r) =
φop̄n−βp̄r
φo(β−φo) . The
hessian of the per-period profit is given by
 −2/(β − φo) −2β/φo(β − φo)
−2β/φo(β − φo) −2β/φo(β − φo)
, whose
leading coefficient is negative and the determinant 4/φo(β − φo) is positive (since φo < β
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in our consumer model). Thus, the hessian is negative definite and the per-period profit
function is jointly strictly concave in q̄n and q̄r. The OEM’s steady-state problem under
remanufacturing (q̄r(p̄n, p̄r) > 0), is given by maxp̄n,p̄r(p̄n−c)q̄n(p̄n, p̄r)+(p̄r−ho)q̄r(p̄n, p̄r),
s.t. 0 < q̄r(p̄n, p̄r) ≤ q̄n(p̄n, p̄r) and q̄n(p̄n, p̄r) ≥ 0. Since q̄r(p̄n, p̄r) > 0 and q̄r(p̄n, p̄r) ≤
q̄n(p̄n, p̄r), there are only two candidate solutions:
Case 1. 0 < q̄r(p̄n, p̄r) = q̄n(p̄n, p̄r). It is easy to show that this case applies only
















Case 2. 0 < q̄r(p̄n, p̄r) < q̄n(p̄n, p̄r). It is easy to show that this case applies only if
h̄a(β, φo, c) < ho < h̄b(β, φo, c)
.= cφoβ and under this case, p̄n =
β+c






Step 3: When is Remanufacturing Profitable? Let ΠX and ΠR denote the per-period profit
under no remanufacturing and remanufacturing, respectively. Since Π̄∗X − Π̄∗R evaluated at
ho = h̄b(β, φo, c) is given by
(β−c2)(1−β)
4β which is positive under our consumer model, Π̄
∗
X
is independent of ho and Π̄∗R is decreasing in ho, we have that there exists a unique value
of ho such that Π̄∗X = Π̄
∗
R and is given by h̄(β, φo, c)
.= β − c + φo − (1 − c)
√
β + 3φo.
If ho ≤ h̄(β, φo, c), Π̄∗R ≥ Π̄∗X , remanufacturing is profitable for the OEM, and otherwise,
Π̄∗R < Π̄
∗
X , only selling new products is profitable. Under h̄(β, φo, c) ≥ 0, β ∈ [φo, 1]
φo ∈ [0, β] and c ∈ [0, β] (under our consumer model), it is easy to show that dh̄(·)/dβ ≥ 0,
dh̄(·)/dφo ≥ 0, and dh̄(·)/dc ≥ 0, which implies that h̄(β, φo, c) is increasing in β, φo and c.

Proof of Proposition 2. The demand functions can be found by substituting j = 3p,
un(θ, 3p) = αθ and ur(θ, 3p) = φ3pθ, solving equations ur(Θ2, j)− ptr = 0, un(Θ1, j)− ptn =
ur(Θ1, j)− ptr, qn(pn, pr) = 1−Θ1 and qr(pn, pr) = Θ1 −Θ2 simultaneously and are given
by qn(pn, pr) =
α−pn−φ3p+pr
α−φ3p and qr(pn, pr) =
φ3ppn−αpr
φ3p(α−φ3p) . The per-period profit of the OEM
is Πo(pn|pr) = (pn− c)qn(pn, pr) and since Π
′′
o = −2/(α−φ3p) < 0 (since α > φ3p under our
consumer model), Πo(pn|pr) is strictly concave in pn. The per-period profit of the third-
party remanufacturer is Π3p(pr|pn) = (pr − h3p)qr(pn, pr) and since Π
′′
3p = −2α/φ3p(α −
φ3p) < 0 (since α > φ3p under our consumer model), Π3p(pr|pn) is strictly concave in pr.
98
The OEM’s problem at the steady state is: maxpn Πo(pn|pr) s.t. qn(pn, pr) ≥ 0 and the
third-party remanufacturer’s steady-state problem is maxpr Π3p(pr|pn) s.t. 0 ≤ qr(pn, pr) ≤
qn(pn, pr). Since we assumed that c ≤ β, ho ≤ φo and h3p ≤ φ3p, it is easy to see that the
case qn(pn, pr) = qr(pn, pr) = 0 is ruled out. Since we are interested in when the third party
enters (qr(pn, pr) > 0), there are two candidate solutions:
Case 1. 0 < qr(pn, pr) = qn(pn, pr). It is easy to show that this case applies only
















Case 2. 0 < qr(pn, pr) < qn(pn, pr). It is easy to show that this case applies only if
ha(α, φ3p, c) < h3p < hb(α, φ3p, c)





4α−φ3p , Πo =
(α(2α−2φ3p+h3p)−c(2α−φ3p))2
(α−φ3p)(4α−φ3p)2 and Π3p =
α(φ3p(α+c−φ3p)−h3p(2α−φ3p))2
φ3p(α−φ3p)(4α−φ3p) .
Based on Case 2, it is easy to see that qr > 0 only holds if h3p < hb(α, φ3p, c). Thus,
the third-party remanufacturer will only compete with the OEM if h3p < hb(α, φ3p, c). 
Proof of Proposition 3. Let h3p < hb(α, φ3p, c) (third-party remanufacturer finds it
profitable to compete) and assume that the OEM is restricted to only sell new products.
The OEM’s profit under no remanufacturing is given by ΠX =
(1−c)2
4 and we know from
Proposition 2, that in the presence of remanufacturing by the third party (denoted by 3P) is
given by Π3P =
(α−c)2(α−φ3p)
4α2
, if h3p ≤ ha(α, φ3p, c) and Π3P = (α(2α−2φ3p+h3p)−c(2α−φ3p))
2
(α−φ3p)(4α−φ3p)2 ,
if ha(α, φ3p, c) ≤ h3p < hb(α, φ3p, c). We are interested in comparing ΠX and Π3P and we
will do it in two stages: h3p ≤ ha(α, φ3p, c) and ha(α, φ3p, c) ≤ h3p < hb(α, φ3p, c).
Consider h3p ≤ ha(α, φ3p, c). Let x1(c)





< 0. Under our consumer model and the assumption c ≤ β ≤ 1, x1(c) switches
from negative to positive only once over c ∈ [0, 1] because x1(c) = 0 has two roots c1(α, φ3p)




Π3P ≥ ΠX). Therefore, there exists a unique c1(α, φ3p) ≤ 1 such that if c ≤ c1(α, φ3p), the
presence of manufacturing competition lowers OEM’s profitability. Otherwise, the presence
of remanufacturing competition leads to higher OEM profitability. Under our consumer
model (α ∈ [1, 2] and φ3p ∈ [0, 1]), it is easy to show dc1(·)/dα ≤ 0 and dc1(·)/dφ3p ≥ 0
which implies that c1(α, φ3p) is decreasing in α but increasing in φ3p.
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α which is positive for h3p >
2cα−2α2−cφ3p+2αφ3p
α . Since this con-
dition always holds for ha(α, φ3p, c) < h3p, we have that x2(h3p) is increasing in h3p. The






2(c + φ3p) − 2α
2+cφ3p
α . Thus, if ha(α, φ3p, c) < h3p ≤ min(h0(α, φ3p, c), hb(α, φ3p, c)), then
Π3P ≤ ΠX . Otherwise, if h0(α, φ3p, c) < h3p < hb(α, φ3p, c), remanufacturing competition
leads to higher OEM profitability. Under our consumer model (α ∈ [1, 2], φ3p ∈ [0, 1] and
c ∈ [0, 1]), it is easy to show that dh0(·)/dφ3p ≥ 0 and dh0(·)/dα ≤ 0 which imply that
h0(α, φ3p, c) is increasing in φ3p but decreasing in α.
Let h1(α, φ3p, c)
.= max(h0(α, φ3p, c), ha(α, φ3p, c)). Summarizing the above results, if
c > c1(α, φ3p) or h3p > h1(α, φ3p, c), then OEM’s profitability is higher in the presence of
remanufacturing competition. 
Proof of Proposition 4. Consider the situation when the third party finds it profitable
to compete with the OEM, i.e., h3p < hb(α, φ3p, c). We will first compare the profitability
of different strategies pairwise and then summarize for the OEM’s optimal strategy. Let
ΠR, Π3P and ΠPC denote the per-period profit under preemptive remanufacturing, letting
the third party remanufacture and preemptive collection, respectively.
Step 1: Comparing profitability of R and PC Strategies. The analysis for this comparison





4 . This is because under preemptive collection, the OEM does not
remanufacture and has to collect and dispose at a cost of s per unit. Thus, it follows
that there exists h̄s(β, φo, c, s) > h̄(β, φo, c) s.t. remanufacturing is more profitable, only if
ho ≤ h̄s(β, φo, c, s).
Step 2: Comparing profitability of PC and 3P Strategies. The analysis for this comparison





4 . Thus, it follows that there exists c1s(α, φ3p, s) and h1s(α, φ3p, c, s), if c >
c1s(α, φ3p, s) or h3p > h1s(α, φ3p, c, s) (where c1(α, φ3p) > c1s(α, φ3p, s) and h1(α, φ3p, c) >
h1s(α, φ3p, s)) letting the third party remanufacture is more profitable than preemptive
collection.
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Step 3: Comparing profitability of R and 3P Strategies. Without loss of generality, let
h3p = γho, where γ ≥ 0. Recall that the OEM’s profit under a remanufacturing strat-
egy, ΠR is given by
(β+φo−ho−c)2
4(β+3φo)
if ho ≤ h̄a and by βh
2
o−2choφo+φo((β−c)2+φo(2c−β))
4φo(β−φo) if h̄a <
ho < h̄b. It is easy to see that ΠR is weakly decreasing in ho. The OEM’s profit when
the third party remanufactures, Π3P , is given by
(α−c)2(α−φ3p)
4α2
, if γho ≤ ha(α, φ3p, c) and
(α(2α−2φ3p+γho)−c(2α−φ3p))2
(α−φ3p)(4α−φ3p)2 , if ha(α, φ3p, c) ≤ γho. It is easy to see that Π3P is weakly
increasing in ho. Thus, there exists a h2s(α, φo, φ3p, c, γ) such that Π3P = ΠR. If ho ≤
h2s(α, φo, φ3p, c, γ), then ΠR ≥ Π3P and if h2s(α, φo, φ3p, c, γ) < ho, then ΠR < Π3P . Since
h3p = γho, we can redefine this threshold such that if ho ≤ h2(α, φ0, φ3p, c, h3p), then it is
profitable for the OEM to remanufacture and if h2(α, φ0, φ3p, c, h3p) < ho, then the OEM
should let the third party remanufacture.
Step 4: Summarizing OEM’s optimal strategy. Combining the results from Steps 1-3 above,
we have that preemptive remanufacturing is optimal if ho ≤ h−(α, β, φo, φ3p, c, h3p, s)
.=
min(h̄s(β, φo, c, s), h2(α, φo, φ3p, c, h3p)). If h−(α, β, φo, φ3p, c, h3p, s) < ho: Now if h3p ≤
h+(α, φ3p, c, s)
.= h1s(α, φ3p, c, s) and c ≤ c−(α, φ3p, s)
.= c1s(α, φ3p, s), then preemptive
collection is optimal. Otherwise, letting the third party remanufacture is optimal. 
B2. Effect of Positive Fixed Costs of Collection or Remanufacturing. If the
remanufacturable cores cannot be inventoried and there exist fixed costs for collection Fc or
remanufacturing Fr for the OEM: Proposition 1 would remain the same unless ΠR−ΠX <
Fr, when remanufacturing will never be profitable. The structure of Proposition 4 and
Figure 6 would change only if ΠPC − max(Π3p,ΠR) < Fc or ΠR − max(Π3p,ΠPC) < Fr,
where collection or remanufacturing would never be profitable, respectively. 
B3. Calculation of Maximum Willingness to Pay. Recall that in the Stage 1, the
subjects only consider new products and in Stage 2, they consider both new and remanufac-
tured products. The steps to calculate the willingness to pay are similar for each case, but
for an example, we outline the steps to calculate the willingness to pay for a new product
in Stage 2 for a consumer i and iPod size 16 GB and sold by the OEM. First, regression is
carried out to estimate the value of coefficients in equation 7. A piecewise linear function
b(p) is constructed based on the likelihood estimates for an individual evaluated at the
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three different price points of $99, $149 and $199. The maximum willingness to pay for the
individual is given by p such that p = b−1(β0 + β3 + β4)3. 
B4. Subsample of Responses to Post-experiment Survey.
Please share in your own words what you think about the fact that you can buy refurbished
Apple electronics?
a. “I personally do not buy refurbished productrs [sic] because if they broke once, they will
break again.
b. “I think that refurbished products are not as high quality and more likely to break than
new ones.”
c. “I think there are a lot of potential risks involved such as greater potential for getting a
flawed iPod or having a shorter iPod lifetime.”
d. “I think that it’s a wonderful idea because it is a green product but I don’t prefer
refurbished products because they always have a glitch.”
Why do you think you can buy refurbished Apple electronics (such as iPods)?
a. “ People return products because they do not work.”
b. “There are a high number of returns due to unsatisfied customers.”
c. “In general electronics break or malfunction so instead of throwing them out, why not
fix and resell them.”
d. “They probably design them so that they break so that theu [sic] can make money off
of the same product twice.”
e. “Because they break and Apple fixes them and resells them.”
f. “Refurbs are a great way to turn unused goods into extra profit.”
g. “So that Apple can appear green.”
h. “It costs Apple less to refurbish them than manufacture new products.”
i. “It allows Apple to fix and resell electronics that would otherwise be waste.” 
3If we define the willingness to pay as the price point where the likelihood of purchase is 50% or





Proof of Lemma 1. We will prove this lemma using a proof by contradiction. Suppose
the OEM only offers new products in the second period at a list price of pn2 and pn2 < pn1.
Thus, there is no difference between the two consumer segments and the OEM’s second-
period objective function which is concave in pn2 is given by
max
pn2
Π2 = (pn2 − c)(1− pn2)
s.t. pn2 < pn1
First-order conditions under pn2 < pn1 give us that p∗n2 =
1+c
2 and Π2 =
(1−c)2
4 . We now
maximize the OEM’s total two-period profit by choosing the list price in the first period
pn1 which is given by
max
pn1
Π = (pn1 − c)(1− pn1) +
(1− c)2
4
Solving the first-order conditions gives us p∗n1 =
1+c
2 . However, this contradicts pn2 < pn1
as p∗n1 = p
∗
n2. Thus, if only new products are offered in the second period, the OEM should
always charge a higher list price for the new product in the second period, i.e. pn1 ≤ pn2.
Proof of Proposition 1 We will first begin with the second-period analysis.
Second Period Analysis: The OEM’s second-period objective function is given by
max
pn2




s.t. k = max(pn1, c+ s)
The objective function is concave in pn2 and the feasible set is convex because pn2 is
constrained in [0,1]. In addition, we can see from the constraints that c+ s < 1. There are
two main scenarios to be analyzed, based on whether max(pn1, c+ s) = pn1 or max(pn1, c+
s) = c+ s.
Scenario I. c + s ≤ pn1. Under this case, we have k = pn1 and solving the first-order




Scenario II. pn1 < c + s. Under this case, we have k = c + s and solving the first-order
condition, we get p∗n2 = 1− s and ΠMN∗2 =
(1−c)2−s(1−c)+s2
2 .
First Period Analysis: After characterizing the OEM’s optimal second-period list price, we
now solve for the optimal first-period list price decision. We maximize the total two-period
profit ΠMN (pn1) = (1−pn1)(pn1−c)+ΠMN2 (pn1) to determine pMN∗n1 and ΠMN∗=̇ΠMN (pMN∗n1 ).
First, we need to check that ΠMN∗2 (pn1) is continuous at the boundary pn1 = p̄=̇c+s. Since,
(1−s)2+2pn1s−2c(1−pn1)−pn1
2 evaluated at p̄=̇c+s is
(1−c)2−s(1−c)+s2
2 , this is true. If c+s ≤ pn1,
the optimal list price in the first period is given by 1+2c+s3 and if pn1 < c+ s, it is given by
1+c
2 . At the boundary pn1 = p̄, the derivative of the two-period profit is given by 1− c− 2s.
If this is positive [c < 1 − 2s], the optimum is reached at c + s ≤ p∗n1; if it is negative
[1− 2s ≤ c], it is reached at p∗n1 < c+ s.
We know that the disposal cost is lower than the production cost, i.e. s ≤ c, which
implies 1 − 2s ≥ 1 − 2c. We can now express the conditions c < 1 − 2s and 1 − 2s ≤ c
















Recall that the OEM’s profit without price discrimination and when only new products
are offered is given by (1−c)
2
2 . If c < 1/3, Π
MN∗ − ΠNN∗ = (1−c−2s)
2
6 ≥ 0; and if 1/3 ≤ c,
we have ΠMN∗ −ΠNN∗ = (1−c−2s)
2
4 ≥ 0. Thus, in a monopoly market with no competition
from remanufactured products, the OEM is no worse off offering a trade-in rebate program
even when disposal of traded in units is costly.
Proof of Proposition 2. Recall that the set of constraints for the case MR when the OEM
offers new and remanufactured products simultaneously and chooses to price discriminate
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by offering trade-ins to the α segment, is given by




≥ 0 ⇒ δpr ≤ pn2 (32)
(1− α)(δpn2 − pr)
δ(1− δ)
≤ α(pn2 − k) (33)
k=̇ max(pn1, c+ s) ≤ pn2 (34)
Lemma 2 In the optimal solution, δp1 ≤ pr always holds true.
We will show this by using a proof by contradiction. Suppose that pr < δpn1 and since we
have pr ≤ δpn2, we get δpn2 < δpn1 which can be simplified to pn2 < pn1. This contradicts
the constraint pn1 ≤ pn2 and thus, we should always have δpn1 ≤ pr.












1− pn2 − pr
1− δ
)
(pn2 − c) +
(δpn2 − pr)
δ(1− δ)








δpn1 ≤ pr (36)
pr ≤ δpn2 (37)
k=̇ max(pn1, c+ s) ≤ pn2 (38)
pn2 ≤ 1− δ + pr (39)
(1− α)(δpn2 − pr)
δ(1− δ)
≤ α(pn2 − k) (40)
It is easy to show that ∂
2ΠMR
∂p2n2
= −2−α−αδ1−δ < 0 and
∂2ΠMR
∂p2r


















δ(1−δ) > 0. Thus, the objective function is jointly concave in pn2 and pr. The
set of constraints is convex because both variables pn2 and pr are constrained to be in
[0, 1], and all the constraints of the problem are linear combinations in the variables. If
105
λi ≥ 0 ∀ i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, the Lagrangian function is given by
L(pn2, pr, λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4, λ5) = α
[







1− pn2 − pr
1− δ
)
(pn2 − c) +
(δpn2 − pr)
δ(1− δ)








− λ2(pr − δpn2)− λ3(pn1 − pn2)− λ4(pn2 − 1 + δ − pr)
− λ5
(
(1− α)(δpn2 − pr)
δ(1− δ)
− α(pn2 − k)
)
(41)
Since the profit function is jointly concave in the decision variables and the feasible re-
gion is convex, the KKT conditions are necessary and sufficient for optimality which are
given by ∂L∂pn2 = 0,
∂L
∂pr
= 0, λ1(δpn1 − pr) = 0, λ2(pr − δpn2) = 0, λ3(pn1 − pn2) = 0,
λ4(pn2 − 1 + δ − pr) = 0, λ5
(
(1− α) (δpn2−pr)δ(1−δ) − α(pn2 − k)
)
= 0 and λi ≥ 0 ∀ i ∈
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5}.
Solving ∂L∂pn2 = 0 and
∂L
∂pr
= 0, we get
pn2(λ1, λ3, λ4, λ5) =
(1− αs+ λ3 − λ4)(1− α) + c(1− α)2 + λ5α+ δ(λ1 + λ5)(1− α)
(2− α)(1− α)
pr(λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4, λ5) =











αqn2(pn2, pr) = α [(1− pn2) + (pn2 − k)] = α(1− k),




qr(pn2, pr) = (1− α)
δpn2 − pr
δ(1− δ)
Denote the number of recovered units through the trade-in program by q̂(pn2, k) = α(pn2−
k). There are two main scenarios to be analyzed based on whether max(pn1, c + s) = pn1
(Scenario I ) or max(pn1, c+ s) = c+ s (Scenario II ).
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Scenario I. If c+ s ≤ pn1, then we have k = pn1 and there are four main groups of cases to
be analyzed based on whether the constraints pr ≤ δpn2 and pn2 ≤ 1 − δ + pr are binding
or slack.
Group A: pr = δpn2 and pn2 = 1− δ + pr, i.e. qn2,1−α = 0 and qr = 0.
In this group we have qr = 0 and (40) is not binding, which implies that qr(pn2, pr) <
q̂(pn2, pn1) and λ5 = 0. We have two candidate cases; if δpn1 < pr = δpn2, then pn1 < pn2
has to hold true and if δpn1 = pr = δpn2, then only pn1 = pn2 is feasible.
Case 1 δpn1 < pr = δpn2 and pn1 < pn2 = 1−δ+pr: In this case, (37) & (39) are binding
and (36) & (38) are not binding, so we have λ1 = λ3 = 0 and λ2, λ4 ≥ 0. Solving pr = δpn2
and pn2 = 1− δ + pr, we get pn2 = 1 and pr = δ. We can now solve pn2(0, 0, λ4, 0) = 1 and
pr(0, λ2, 0, λ4, 0) = δ and we get λ2 = − (1−c)(1−α)+αs1−δ < 0 and λ4 =
(cr−s)(1−α)+δ(3−3α−αs)
δ(1−δ) .
However, this contradicts λ2 ≥ 0 and this case is ruled out.
Case 2 δpn1 = pr = δpn2 and pn1 = pn2 = 1 − δ + pr: In this case, (36), (37), (38)
& (39) are binding, so we have λ1 = λ2 = λ3 = λ4 = 0. Solving pn1 = pr = δpn2 and
pn1 = pn2 = 1 − δ + pr, we get pn2 = 1, pr = δ and pn1 = 1. However, this contradicts
pn1 < 1 and this case is ruled out.
Group B: pr = δpn2 and pn2 < 1− δ + pr, i.e. qn2,1−α > 0 and qr = 0.
In this group we have qr = 0 and (40) is not binding, which implies that qr(pn2, pr) <
q̂(pn2, pn1) and λ5 = 0. We have two candidate solutions; if δpn1 < pr = δpn2, then
pn1 < pn2 has to hold true and if δpn1 = pr = δpn2, then pn1 = pn2.
Case 3 δpn1 < pr = δpn2 and pn1 < pn2 < 1− δ+ pr: In this case, (36), (38) & (39) are
not binding and (37) is binding, so we have λ1 = λ3 = λ4 = 0 and λ2 ≥ 0. The optimal value
of list price is given by pn2 =
(1−αs)+c(1−α)
2−α and by solving pr(0, λ2, 0, 0, 0) = δpn2(0, 0, 0, 0)
we get λ2 =
(cr−s−δc)(1−α)
δ(1−δ) . The conditions pn1 < pn2 and λ2 ≥ 0 can be simplified to
pn1 <
(1−αs)+c(1−α)
2−α and c ≤ c1 respectively, where c1=̇
cr−s
δ . Also, the conditions pn2 <




Case 4 δpn1 = pr = δpn2 and pn1 = pn2 < 1 − δ + pr: In this case, (39) is not binding
and (36), (37) & (38) are binding, so we have λ4 = λ1 = 0 and λ2, λ3 ≥ 0. In this case, we
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have pr = δpn1, pn1 = pn2 and solving pn2(0, λ3, 0, 0) = pn1 and pr(0, λ2, λ3, 0, 0) = δpn1, we
get λ2 = cr − s− δc and λ3 = −(1−αs)− c(1−α) + pn1(2−α). The conditions λ2, λ3 ≥ 0
are given by c ≤ c1 and (1−αs)+c(1−α)2−α ≤ pn1 respectively. Condition pn2 < 1− δ+ pr can be
simplified as −(1− δ)(1− pn1) < 0 which always holds true.
Group C: pr < δpn2 and pn2 < 1− δ + pr, i.e. qn2,1−α > 0 and qr > 0.
In this group, since δpn1 ≤ pr we always have pn1 < pn2. We have four candidate solutions
which are as follows:
Case 5a δpn1 < pr < δpn2, pn1 < pn2 < 1 − δ + pr and qr(pn2, pr) < q̂(pn2, pn1): In
this case, (36), (37), (38), (39) & (40) are not binding, so we have λ1 = λ2 = λ3 = λ4 =
λ5 = 0. The optimal prices are given by pn2 = pn2(0, 0, 0, 0) =
1−αs+c(1−α)
2−α and pr =
pr(0, 0, 0, 0, 0) =
(cr−s)(2−α)+2δ(1−αs)−αδc
2(2−α) . The conditions δpn1 < pr, pn1 < pn2, pr < δpn2,
pn2 < 1 − δ + pr and qr(pn2, pr) < q̂(pn2, pn1) are given by pn1 ≤ (cr−s)(2−α)+2δ(1−αs)−αδc2δ(2−α) ,
pn1 <
(1−αs)+c(1−α)






Case 5b δpn1 < pr < δpn2, pn1 < pn2 < 1− δ + pr and qr(pn2, pr) = q̂(pn2, pn1): In this
case, (40) is binding and (36), (37), (38) & (39) are not binding, so we have λ1 = λ2 =
λ3 = λ4 = 0 and λ5 ≥ 0. If we solve qr(pn2, pr) = q̂(pn2, pn1), pn2(0, 0, 0, λ5) = pn2 and





(1−α)(2−α−αδ) and λ5 = 2αδ(1−δ)(2−
α)pn1−(cr−s)(2−α)(1−α)+δc(1−α)(2−3α+2αδ)−2αδ(1−δ)(1+αs)+4s. The conditions
λ5 ≥ 0 & qr(pn2, pr) < q̂(·) are given by (cr+s)(2−α)(1−α)−δc(1−α)(2−3α+2αδ)+2αδ(1−δ)(1+αs)−4s2αδ(1−δ)(2−α) ≤
pn1 and
(cr−s)(2−α)(1−α)−2αδcr(1−α)+αδc(1−α)+2δ(1−αδ)−2α2δs(2−δ)
2δ(1−α)(2−α) < pn1 respectively.
Case 6a δpn1 = pr < δpn2, pn1 < pn2 < 1 − δ + pr and qr(pn2, pr) < q̂(pn2, pn1): In
this case, (36) is binding and (37), (38), (39) & (40) are not binding, so we have λ2 =
λ3 = λ4 = λ5 = 0 and λ1 ≥ 0. Solving pn2(λ1, 0, 0, 0) = pn2 and pr(λ1, 0, 0, 0, 0) = δpn1
together we get, pn2 =
(1−α)(c+s−cr)+(1−δ)(1−αs)+2δpn1(1−α)
2−α−αδ and λ1 = −(cr − s)(2 − α) −
δ(2 − 2pn1(2 − α) − αc − 2αs). The conditions pn1 < pn2, pr < δpn2, pn2 < 1 − δ + pr








Case 6b δpn1 = pr < δpn2, pn1 < pn2 < 1 − δ + pr and qr(pn2, pr) = q̂(pn2, pn1):
In this case (36) & (40) are binding and (37), (38) & (39) are not binding, so we have
λ2 = λ3 = λ4 = 0 and λ1, λ5 ≥ 0. Solving qr(pn2, δpn1) = q̂(pn2, pn1), we get pn2 = pn1
which contradicts pn1 < pn2 and this case is ruled out.
Group D: pr < δpn2 and pn2 = 1− δ + pr, i.e. qn2,1−α = 0 and qr > 0.
In this group, since δpn1 ≤ pr we always have pn1 < pn2. We have four candidate solutions
which are as follows:
Case 7a δpn1 < pr < δpn2, pn1 < pn2 = 1− δ + pr and qr(pn2, pr) < q̂(pn2, pn1): In this
case, (39) is binding and (36), (37), (38) & (40) are not binding, so we have λ1 = λ2 = λ3 =
λ5 = 0 and λ4 ≥ 0. Solving pn2(0, 0, λ4, 0) = 1−δ+pr(0, 0, 0, λ4, 0) and pr(0, 0, 0, λ4, 0) = pr
together, we get pr =
(1−α)(cr−s+δ)+αδ(δ−s)
2−2α+αδ and λ4 = c(2 − 2α + αδ) − 2αδ(1 − s) − 2(1 −
s− α− δ)− 3αs− cr(2− α). The conditions δpn1 < pr, pn1 < pn2, qr(pn2, pr) < q̂(pn2, pn1)
and λ4 ≥ 0 are given by pn1 < (1−α)(cr−s+δ)+αδ(δ−s)δ(2−2α+αδ) , pn1 <
(1−α)(2+cr−s)−δ(1−2α+αs)
2−2α+αδ , pn1 <
(cr−s)(1−α)2+α2δ2(1−s)−δ(1−α)(1−αcr)+αδ(1−α)(3−2s−δ)
αδ(2−2α+αδ) and c2 ≤ c.
Case 7b δpn1 < pr < δpn2, pn1 < pn2 = 1 − δ + pr and qr(pn2, pr) = q̂(pn2, pn1):
In this case, (39) & (40) is binding and (36), (37) & (38) are not binding, so we have
λ1 = λ2 = λ3 = 0 and λ4, λ5 ≥ 0. If we solve qr = q̂(pn2, pn1) and pn2 = 1 − δ + pr we
get pn2 = 1−α+αδpn11−α+αδ and pr =
δ−2αδ+αδpn1+αδ
1−α+αδ . By solving pn2(0, 0, λ4, λ5) =
1−α+αδpn1
1−α+αδ and
pr(0, 0, 0, λ4, λ5) = δ−2αδ+αδpn1+αδ1−α+αδ together, we get λ4 = −1+c(1+α(1−δ))
2−α(−2+cr+
α− crα+ (−1 + pn1(2− 3α) +α(2 + cr))δ− 2αδ2(1− pn1)) and λ5 = αδ (2− 2α+ αδ) pn1−
(cr − s)(1− α)2 − α2δ2(1− s) + δ(1− α)(1− αcr)− αδ(1− α)(3− 2s− δ). The condition
λ5 ≥ 0 gives us (cr−s)(1−α)
2+α2δ2(1−s)−δ(1−α)(1−αcr)+αδ(1−α)(3−2s−δ)
αδ(2−2α+αδ) ≤ pn1.
Case 8a δpn1 = pr < δpn2, pn1 < pn2 = 1 − δ + pr and qr(pn2, pr) < q̂(pn2, pn1):
In this case, (36) & (39) are binding and (37), (38) & (40) are not binding, so we have
λ2 = λ3 = λ5 = 0 and λ1, λ4 ≥ 0. In this case, we have pr = δpn1, pn2 = 1 − δ + pr =
1− δ+ δpn1 and solving pn2(λ1, 0, λ4, 0) = 1− δ+ δpn1 and pr(λ1, 0, 0, λ4, 0) = δpn1, we get
λ1 = (1−α)(s−cr−δ)+δpn1(2−2α+αδ)+αδ(s−δ) and λ4 = δ(1−αδ)−αs(1−δ)− (1−
α)(1−c+cr−s)−αδ(1−δ)pn1. The conditions λ1, λ4 ≥ 0 give us (1−α)(cr−s+δ)+αδ(δ−s)δ(2−2α+αδ) ≤ pn1
and pn1 ≤ δ(1−αδ)−αs(1−δ)−(1−α)(1−c+cr−s)αδ(1−δ) . Simplifying these two conditions together, we
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get c2 ≤ c. Also, both pr < δpn2 and pn1 < pn2 simplify to −(1 − δ)(1 − pn1) < 0 which
always holds true.
Case 8b δpn1 = pr < δpn2, pn1 < pn2 = 1 − δ + pr and qr(pn2, pr) = q̂(pn2, pn1):
In this case (36) & (39) are binding and (37), (38) & (40) are not binding, so we have
λ2 = λ3 = λ5 = 0 and λ1, λ4 ≥ 0. Solving pr = δpn1, pn2 = 1−δ+δpn1 and qr = q̂(pn2, pn1),
we get pn1 = 1, pn2 = 1 and pr = δ. However, since we need pn1 < 1, this cannot hold and
is ruled out.
Scenario II. If pn1 < c+ s, then we have k = c+ s and there are four main groups of cases
to be analyzed, depending on whether the constraints pr ≤ δpn2 and pn2 ≤ 1 − δ + pr are
binding or slack.
Group A: pr = δpn2 and pn2 = 1− δ + pr, i.e. qn2,1−α = 0 and qr = 0.
In this group we have qr = 0 and (40) is not binding, which implies that qr(pn2, pr) <
q̂(pn2, c+s) and λ5 = 0. Note that we cannot have δpn1 = pr since it implies pn1 = pn2. We
also require c + s ≤ pn2 which gives us c + s ≤ pn1 and contradicts the defining condition.
We have two candidate cases; 1). δpn1 < pr = δpn2 and c + s < pn2 = 1 − δ + pr and 2).
δpn1 < pr = δpn2 and c+ s = pn2 = 1− δ + pr.
Case 9 δpn1 < pr = δpn2 and c + s < pn2 = 1 − δ + pr: In this case, (37) & (39)
are binding and (36) & (38) are not binding, so we have λ1 = λ3 = 0 and λ2, λ4 ≥ 0.
Solving pr = δpn2 and pn2 = 1 − δ + pr, we get pn2 = 1 and pr = δ. We can now solve
pn2(0, 0, λ4, 0) = 1 and pr(0, λ2, 0, λ4, 0) = δ and we have λ2 = − (1−c)(1−α)+αs1−δ < 0 and
λ4 =
(cr−s)(1−α)+αδ(1−s)−δ
δ(1−δ) . However, this contradicts λ2 ≥ 0 and this case is ruled out.
Case 10 δpn1 < pr = δpn2 and c+ s = pn2 = 1− δ + pr: In this case, (37), (38) & (39)
are binding, so we have λ1 = λ2 = λ3 = λ4 = 0. Thus, we have pr = δ(c+s) and pn2 = c+s
and pn2 = 1 − δ + pr requires c + s = 1 which contradicts c + s < 1 and this case is ruled
out.
Group B: pr = δpn2 and pn2 < 1− δ + pr, i.e. qn2,1−α > 0 and qr = 0.
In this group we have qr = 0 and (40) is not binding, which implies that qr(pn2, pr) <
q̂(pn2, c + s) and λ5 = 0. In this group, we cannot have δpn1 = pr which leads to pn1 =
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pn2 ≥ c+ s and contradicts pn1 < c+ s. Thus, we have two candidate solutions; c+ s < pn2
and c+ s = pn2.
Case 11 δpn1 < pr = δpn2 and c + s < pn2 < 1 − δ + pr: In this case, (36), (38)
& (39) are not binding and (37) is binding, so we have λ1 = λ3 = λ4 = λ5 = 0 and
λ2 ≥ 0. The optimal value of list price is given by pn2 = (1−αs)+c(1−α)2−α and by solving
pr(0, λ2, 0, 0, 0) = δpn2(0, 0, 0, 0) we get λ2 =
(cr−s−δc)(1−α)
δ(1−δ) . The conditions c + s < pn2
and λ2 ≥ 0 can be simplified to c < c0 and c ≤ c1 respectively. Also, the conditions
pn2 < 1 − δ + pr and qr(pn2, pr) < q̂(pn2, c + s) give us pn2 < 1 (which is always true) and
c < c0 respectively.
Case 12 δpn1 < pr = δpn2 and c + s = pn2 < 1 − δ + pr: In this case, (39) & (36) are
not binding and (37) & (38) are binding, so we have λ4 = λ1 = λ5 = 0 and λ2, λ3 ≥ 0.
In this case, we have pr = δ(c + s), pn2 = c + s and solving pn2(0, λ3, 0, 0) = c + s and
pr(0, λ2, λ3, 0, 0) = δ(c+ s), we get λ2 = cr − s− δc and λ3 = −1 + c+ 2s. The conditions
λ2, λ3 ≥ 0 give us c ≤ c1 and c0 ≤ c respectively. Condition pn2 < 1 − δ + pr can be
simplified as c+ s < 1 which always holds true.
Group C: pr < δpn2 and pn2 < 1− δ + pr, i.e. qn2,1−α > 0 and qr > 0.
In this group, we have qr(pn2, pr) > 0 and since q̂(pn2, c+ s) = pn2 − c+ s, we cannot have
pn2 = c+ s as it leads to qr(pn2, pr) ≤ 0 which is not feasible. Thus, we have four candidate
solutions which are as follows:
Case 13a δpn1 < pr < δpn2, c + s < pn2 < 1 − δ + pr and qr(pn2, pr) < q̂(pn2, c + s):
In this case, (36), (37), (38), (39) & (40) are not binding, so we have λ1 = λ2 = λ3 =
λ4 = λ5 = 0. The optimal prices are given by pn2 = pn2(0, 0, 0, 0) =
1−αs+c(1−α)
2−α and
pr = pr(0, 0, 0, 0, 0) =
(cr−s)(2−α)+2δ(1−αs)−αδc
2(2−α) . The conditions δpn1 < pr, c + s < pn2,
pr < δpn2 and pn2 < 1 − δ + pr are given by (cr−s)(2−α)+2δ(1−αs)−αδc2(2−α) , c < c0, c1 < c and
c < c2 respectively.
Case 13b δpn1 < pr < δpn2, c+ s < pn2 < 1− δ + pr and qr(pn2, pr) = q̂(pn2, c+ s): In
this case, (40) is binding and (36), (37), (38) & (39) are not binding, so we have λ1 = λ2 =
λ3 = λ4 = 0 and λ5 ≥ 0. If we solve qr(pn2, pr) = q̂(pn2, c + s), pn2(0, 0, 0, λ5) = pn2 and






(1−α)(2−α−δ) & λ5 =
2αδ(1−δ)(2−α)pn1−(cr−s)(2−α)(1−α)+δc(1−α)(2−3α+2αδ)−2αδ(1−δ)(1+αs)+4s.
The conditions λ5 ≥ 0 is given by (cr+s)(2−α)(1−α)−δc(1−α)(2−3α+2αδ)+2αδ(1−δ)(1+αs)−4s2αδ(1−δ)(2−α) ≤ pn1.
Case 14a δpn1 = pr < δpn2, c + s < pn2 < 1 − δ + pr and qr(pn2, pr) < q̂(pn2, c + s):
In this case, (36) is binding and (37), (38), (39) & (40) are not binding, so we have λ2 =
λ3 = λ4 = λ5 = 0 and λ1 ≥ 0. Solving pn2(λ1, 0, 0, 0) = pn2 and pr(λ1, 0, 0, 0, 0) = δpn1
together we get, pn2 =
(1−α)(c+s−cr)+(1−δ)(1−αs)+2δpn1(1−α)
2−α−αδ and λ1 = −(cr − s)(2 − α) −
δ(2 − 2pn1(2 − α) − αc − 2αs). The conditions pn1 < pn2, c + s < pn2, pn2 < 1 − δ +




αδ(1−α) < pn1 and
−(cr−s)(1−α)(1−2α+αδ)+(1−α)(1+c)(1−δ)−α(1−δ)(1−αs)(1−δ−s)+αc(1−δ)(1−αδ)
(1−α)(1−δ)(2−α+2αδ) ≤ pn1.
Case 14b δpn1 = pr < δpn2, c + s < pn2 < 1 − δ + pr and qr(pn2, pr) = q̂(pn2, c + s):
In this case (36) & (40) are binding and (37), (38) & (39) are not binding, so we have
λ2 = λ3 = λ4 = 0 and λ1, λ5 ≥ 0. Solving qr(pn2, δpn1) = q̂(pn2, c + s) and pr = δpn1,
we get pn2 =
pn1(1−α)−α(1−δ)(c+s)
1−2α+αδ . We can now solve pn2(λ1, 0, 0, λ5) =
pn1(1−α)−α(1−δ)(c+s)
1−2α+αδ
and pr(λ1, 0, 0, 0, λ5) = δpn1 to get λ1 = pn1((2− α)(1− α) + 2α2δ(1− δ))− αs(1− α)(1−
δ) − (1 − α)(1 + c) + α(1 − s)(1 − δ) − α2c(1 − δ2) − 2α2δs(1 − δ) + αcr(1 − 2α + αδ)
and λ5 = c(1 − α + α2 − αδ − α2δ(1 − δ)) + (1 − δ) − α(2 − 3δ + αδ) − cr(1 − α)(1 −
2α + αδ) + s(1 − 2α − 3α2 − 4α2δ + 2α2δ2) − pn1(1 − α)(1 − δ)(2 − α + 2αδ). The





and pn1 ≤ c(1−α+α
2−αδ−α2δ(1−δ))+(1−δ)−α(2−3δ+αδ)−cr(1−α)(1−2α+αδ)+s(1−2α−3α2−4α2δ+2α2δ2)
(1−α)(1−δ)(2−α+2αδ) .
Group D: pr < δpn2 and pn2 = 1− δ + pr, i.e. qn2,1−α = 0 and qr > 0.
In this group, we have qr(pn2, pr) > 0 and since q̂(pn2, c+ s) = pn2 − c+ s, we cannot have
pn2 = c+s as it leads to qr(pn2, pr) ≤ 0 which is not feasible. Thus, we have three candidate
solutions which are as follows:
Case 15a δpn1 < pr < δpn2, c+s < pn2 = 1−δ+pr and qr(pn2, pr) < q̂(pn2, c+s): In this
case, (39) is binding and (36), (37), (38) & (40) are not binding, so we have λ1 = λ2 = λ3 =
λ5 = 0 and λ4 ≥ 0. Solving pn2(0, 0, λ4, 0) = 1−δ+pr(0, 0, 0, λ4, 0) and pr(0, 0, 0, λ4, 0) = pr
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together, we get pr =
(1−α)(cr−s+δ)+αδ(δ−s)
2−2α+αδ , pn2 =
(1−α)(2+cr−s)−δ(1−2α+αs)
2(1−α)+αδ and λ4 = c(2−
2α + αδ) − 2αδ(1 − s) − 2(1 − s − α − δ) − 3αs − cr(2 − α). The conditions δpn1 < pr,
c+ s < pn2, qr(pn2, pr) < q̂(pn2, c+ s) and λ4 ≥ 0 are given by pn1 < (1−α)(cr−s+δ)+αδ(δ−s)δ(2−2α+αδ) ,
c < (1−α)(cr−3s+2−δ)+αδ(1−2s)2−2α+αδ , c <
(cr−s)(1−α)2−δ(1−α)(1−3α−αcr+4αs)−αδ2+2α2δ2(1−s)
αδ(2(1−α)+αδ) & c2 ≤ c.
Case 15b δpn1 < pr < δpn2, c + s < pn2 = 1 − δ + pr and qr(pn2, pr) = q̂(pn2, c + s):
In this case, (39) & (40) is binding and (36), (37) & (38) are not binding, so we have
λ1 = λ2 = λ3 = 0 and λ4, λ5 ≥ 0. If we solve qr = q̂(pn2, c + s) and pn2 = 1 − δ + pr
we get pn2 =
1−α+αδ2(c+s)
(1−α)(1+δ)+αδ2 and pr =
δ(1−2α+αδ)+αδ(c+s)
(1−α)(1+δ)+αδ2 . By solving pn2(0, 0, λ4, λ5) =
1−α+αδ2(c+s)
(1−α)(1+δ)+αδ2 and pr(0, 0, 0, λ4, λ5) =
δ(1−2α+αδ)+αδ(c+s)
(1−α)(1+δ)+αδ2 together, we get λ4 = c((1 −
α)(1 − α + δ) + α2δ(1 − δ)(2 + δ)) − (1 − α)2 + δ(1 − α) − 2α2δ(1 − s) + α2δ2(2 + s) −
cr(α(1−α) +αδ(1−α+αδ)) and λ5 = −(cr − s)(1−α)2 + δ(1−α)(1− 3α−αcr + 4αs) +
αδ2 − 2α2δ2(1− s) + c(αδ(2(1− α) + αδ)). The conditions λ4 ≥ 0 and λ5 ≥ 0 are given by
(1−α)2−δ(1−α)+2α2δ(1−s)−α2δ2(2+s)+cr(α(1−α)+αδ(1−α+αδ))
(1−α)(1−α+δ)+α2δ(1−δ)(2+δ) ≤ c and
(cr−s)(1−α)2−δ(1−α)(1−3α−αcr+4αs)−αδ2+2α2δ2(1−s)
αδ(2(1−α)+αδ) ≤ c.
Case 16 δpn1 = pr < δpn2, c + s < pn2 = 1 − δ + pr and qr(pn2, pr) < q̂(pn2, c + s):
In this case, (36) & (39) are binding and (37), (38) & (40) are not binding, so we have
λ2 = λ3 = λ5 = 0 and λ1, λ4 ≥ 0. In this case, we have pr = δpn1, pn2 = 1 − δ + pr =
1− δ+ δpn1 and solving pn2(λ1, 0, λ4, 0) = 1− δ+ δpn1 and pr(λ1, 0, 0, λ4, 0) = δpn1, we get
λ1 = (1−α)(s−cr−δ)+δpn1(2−2α+αδ)+αδ(s−δ) and λ4 = δ(1−αδ)−αs(1−δ)− (1−
α)(1−c+cr−s)−αδ(1−δ)pn1. The conditions λ1, λ4 ≥ 0 give us (1−α)(cr−s+δ)+αδ(δ−s)δ(2−2α+αδ) ≤ pn1
and pn1 ≤ δ(1−αδ)−αs(1−δ)−(1−α)(1−c+cr−s)αδ(1−δ) . Simplifying these two conditions together, we
get c2 ≤ c. Also, pr < δpn2, c + s < pn2 and qr(pn2, pr) < q̂(pn2, c + s) are given by
−(1− δ)(1− pn1) < 0 (which is always true), δ+c+s−1δ < pn1 and
1−2α+αc+αs+αδ
1−α+αδ < pn1.
Thus, there are 17 candidate solutions which can be summarized by three conditions, with
mutually exclusive and collective exhaustive regions:
Condition 1 (Low c) If c ≤ c1, Cases 3, 4, 11 and 12 hold.
Condition 2 (Medium c) If c1 < c < c2, Cases 5a, 5b, 6a, 6b, 13a, 13b, 14a and 14b hold.
Condition 3 (High c) If c2 ≤ c, Cases 7a, 7b, 8a, 8b, 15a, 15b, 16 hold. We can tabulate
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the above cases as follows:
Condition 1: If c ≤ c1, the optimal cases can be summarized as pn1 < c + s & c < c0,
pn1 < c+ s & c0 ≤ c and c+ s ≤ pn1 < p̄a and p̄a ≤ pn1.
Condition 2: If c1 < c < c2, the optimal cases can be summarized as pn1 < min(c + s, p̄i)
& c < cg, pn1 < min(c + s, p̄i) & cg ≤ c, p̄i ≤ pn1 < min(c + s, p̄j), p̄j ≤ pn1 < c + s,
c+ s ≤ pn1 < min(p̄b, p̄c), p̄b ≤ c < p̄c, and p̄c ≤ c.
Condition 3: If c2 ≤ c, the optimal cases can be summarized as pn1 < min(c + s, p̄k) &
c < ch, pn1 < min(c + s, p̄k)& ch ≤ c, p̄k ≤ pn1 < c + s, c + s ≤ pn1 < min(p̄d, p̄e),
p̄d ≤ pn1 < p̄e, and p̄e ≤ pn1,





























First Period Analysis: After characterizing the OEM’s optimal second-period list price, we
now solve for the optimal first-period list price decision. We maximize the total two-period
profit ΠMR(pn1) = (1− pn1)(pn1 − c) + ΠMR2 (pn1) to determine pn1 and ΠMR∗=̇ΠMR(pn1).
First, we need to check whether the optimum lies in pn1 < c+ s or c+ s ≤ pn1. Cases 11,
12, 13a, 13b, 14a, 14b, 15a, 15b and 16 lie under the condition pn1 < c+ s and Cases 3, 4,
5a, 5b, 6a, 6b, 7a, 7b, 8a and 8b lie under the condition c + s ≤ pn1. As discussed earlier,
the optimal solutions are summarized by the following three conditions on c:
Condition 1 (Low c) c ≤ c1: First, we need to check whether the optimum lies in Case 3
(c+ s ≤ pn1) or Case 12 (pn1 < c+ s). The derivative of the two-period profit under Case
3, evaluated at c+ s is given by 1− c− 2s. If this is positive [c < c0=̇1− 2s or c < 1/3], the
optimum is reached at c+ s ≤ p∗n1 and cases from Scenario II are ruled out; if it is negative
[c0 ≤ c or 1/3 ≤ c] , it is reached at p∗n1 ≤ c+ s and cases from Scenario I are ruled out. For
cases under Scenario I, we first check whether the optimal p∗n1 lies under p
∗
n1 < p̄a, i.e. Case
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3 or Case 4 which is defined by p̄a ≤ p∗n1. The derivative of the two-period profit under
Case 3 evaluated at p̄a is given by −1 + c+ 2s. If this is negative [c < c0 or c < 1/3], then
the optimum lies in Case 3 and is given by 1+αs+c(1+α)2+α ; if it is positive, [c0 ≤ c or 1/3 ≤ c],
the optimum lies under Case 4 and is given by 1+c2 . However, c < c0 defines the cases in
this scenario and hence the optimum always lies under Case 3 and Case 4 is ruled out. For
cases under Scenario II, Case 11 requires c < c0 which contradicts the condition [c0 ≤ c]
required for the optimum to lie under pn1 < c + s and is ruled out. Thus, if c0 ≤ c, only
Case 12 holds and the optimum is given by p∗n1 =
1+c
2 .
Condition 2 (Medium c) c1 < c < c2: First, we need to check whether the optimum lies in
Case 5a (c + s ≤ pn1) or Case 14b (pn1 < c + s). The derivative of the two-period profit
under Case 5a, evaluated at c+ s is given by 1− c− 2s. If this is positive [c < c0=̇1− 2s or
c < 1/3], the optimum is reached at c+s ≤ p∗n1 and cases from Scenario II are ruled out; if it
is negative [c0 ≤ c or 1/3 ≤ c] , it is reached at p∗n1 ≤ c+s and cases from Scenario I are ruled
out. For cases under Scenario I, we now check whether the optimal p∗n1 lies under p
∗
n1 < p̄b,
i.e. Case 5a or Case 6a which is defined by p̄b ≤ p∗n1. The derivative of the two-period profit
under Case 5a evaluated at p̄b is given by 2δ(1−α)c−(cr−s)(2−α)−αδ(1+2s)+4δ. If this
is negative [c < (cr−s)(2−α)+αδ(1+2s)−4δ2δ(1−α) =̇ca], then the optimum lies in Case 5a and is given
by 1+c2
1+αs+c(1+α)
2+α ; if it is positive, [ca ≤ c], the optimum lies under Case 6a and is given by
c(2+α−α2−2αδ)+cr(2−α)(1−α)+(2−α)+2αs(1−α)−2s(1+αδ)−αδ(3−αs)+3αs+2δ
4−α2+4δ−8αδ+α2δ . Now we check whether
the optimal decisions are constrained by the supply of recovered products, i.e. whether the
optimum lies in Case 5b. The derivative of the two-period profit under Case 5b (which is
defined by p̄c ≤ pn1) evaluated at p̄c is given by δ(4 − 8α + 5α2 + 3α3 − 4α2δ)c − (cr +
s)(4− α2)(1− α) + 8δ + 4α2δ2(1− 2s)− 4αδ(1 + 2s + 2α − 3αs− α2s). If this is positive
[ (cr+s)(4−α
2)(1−α)−8δ−4α2δ2(1−2s)+4αδ(1+2s+2α−3αs−α2s)
δ(4−8α+5α2+3α3−4α2δ) =̇cb ≤ c], the optimum lies under Case
5b and is given by p2n1 which is provided at the end of the appendix; if this is negative then
the optimum lies under Case 5a or 6a (based on ca).
For cases under Scenario II, which require pn1 < p̄i, if c < cg, then the optimum lies
under Case 13a and is given by 1+c2 and if cg ≤ c, then the optimum lies under Case 13b




4−α2−2αδ(1−2δ)−δ(4+δ) . Now we check whether the optimal
p∗n1 lies under p
∗
n1 < p̄i (Case 13a & 13b) or p̄i ≤ p∗n1 (Case 14a & 14b). The derivative of
the total profit under Case 13a evaluated at p̄i is given by −(cr−s)(2−α)+αδ(1−2s)+2δc.
If this is negative [c < ck=̇
(cr−s)(2−α)−αδ(1−2s)
2δ ], the optimum lies under Case 13a or Case
13b (depending on value of cg); if it is positive [ck ≤ c], then the optimum lies under Case
14a or Case 14b. Note that Case 14a is defined by p∗n1 < p̄j and Case 14b is defined
by p̄j ≤ p∗n1. The derivative of the total profit under Case 14a evaluated at p̄j is given
by cr(1 − α) + s(1 + α) − (1 + δ) + 2δs + 2αδ − 4αδs + c(1 − αδ). If this is negative
[c < cl=̇
1+δ−(2δs+cr)(1−α)−2αδ(1−s)−s(1+α)
1−αδ ], the optimum lies in Case 14a and is given by
p71=̇
(2−α)(1+c)+(2−α)(1−α)(cr−s)−αδc(2−α)−2αδs(1−α)+δ(2−3α)
4(1+δ)−2α(1+4δ−αδ) ; if it is positive [cl ≤ c], it lies in




Condition 3 (High c) c2 ≤ c: First, we need to check whether the optimum lies in Case 7a
(c+ s ≤ pn1) or Case 16 (pn1 < c+ s). The derivative of the two-period profit under Case
7a, evaluated at c+s is given by 1− c−2s. If this is positive [c < c0=̇1−2s or c < 1/3], the
optimum is reached at c+ s ≤ p∗n1 and cases from Scenario II are ruled out; if it is negative
[c0 ≤ c or 1/3 ≤ c] , it is reached at p∗n1 ≤ c+ s and cases from Scenario I are ruled out.
For cases under Scenario I, we first check whether the optimal p∗n1 lies under p
∗
n1 < p̄d,
i.e. Case 7a or Case 8a which is defined by p̄d ≤ p∗n1. The derivative of the two-period profit
under Case 7a evaluated at p̄d is given by cδ(2−2α2+αδ+αδ2)−(cr−s)(2−α−α2)+α2δ(1−
δ)(1−s)−αδ(1−4s−δ). If this is negative [c < (cr−s)(2−α−α
2)−α2δ(1−δ)(1−s)+αδ(1−4s−δ)
δ(2−2α2+αδ+αδ2) =̇cc],
then the optimum lies in Case 7a and is given by 1+αs+c(1+α)2+α ; if it is positive, [cc ≤ c], the
optimum lies under Case 8a and is given by (cr−s)(1−α)+αs(1−δ)+c(1+α)+δ(1−α)+(1+αδ
2)
α(1−δ)2+2(1+δ) . Now
we check whether the optimal decisions are constrained by the supply of recovered products,
i.e. whether the optimum lies in Case 7b. The derivative of the two-period profit under Case
7b (which is defined by p̄e ≤ pn1) evaluated at p̄e is given by cαδ(1+α)(2−2α+αδ)−(1+α+
αδ)(cr(2−α)(1−α)−2δ)−αδ(1−α2)(3−4s)−2α2δ2(1+α)(1−s)+s(1−α2)(2+α). If this
is positive [ (1−α+αδ)(cr(2−α)(1−α)−2δ)+αδ(1−α
2)(3−4s)+2α2δ2(1+α)(1−s)−s(1−α2)(2+α)
αδ(1+α)(2−2α+αδ) =̇cd ≤ c], the




if this is negative then the optimum lies under Case 7a or 8a (based on cc).
For cases under Scenario II, which require pn1 < p̄k, if c < ch, then the optimum lies
under Case 15a and is given by 1+c2 and if ch ≤ c, then the optimum lies under Case 15b and
is given by 1+c2 . Now we check whether the optimal p
∗
n1 lies under pn1 < p̄k (Case 15a & Case
15b) or p̄k ≤ pn1 (Case 16). The derivative of the total profit under Case 15a evaluated at p̄k
is given by cαδ(2−2α+αδ)−(cr−s)(1−α)2+δ(1−α)(1−3α−αcr+4αs)+αδ2−2α2δ2(1−s).
If this is negative [c < cm=̇
(cr−s)(1−α)2−δ(1−α)(1−3α−αcr+4αs)−αδ2+2α2δ2(1−s)
αδ(2−2α+αδ) ], the optimum
lies under Case 15a and 15b (based on the value of ch); if it is positive [cm ≤ c], the optimum
lies under Case 16 and is given by 1+(cr−s+δ)(1−α)−αδ(s−δ)+c
2+2δ(1−α)+αδ2 .
The two-period optimal decisions under c < c0 or c < 1/3 are summarized in Proposition 2
and those under c0 ≤ c or 1/3 ≤ c are summarized below:
If the monopolist markets a trade-in rebate program for new products along with a reman-
ufactured version of the product, then the monopolist’s optimal strategy is dependent on
its per-unit production cost c relative to other parameters as follows:
Condition 1 : If c ≤ c1, then the optimal prices are given by pMR∗1 = 1+c2 , p
MR∗
n2 = c+ s and
pMR∗r = δ(c + s). In this case, the monopolist does not market remanufactured products
(qMR∗r = 0), and consumers in both segments buy the new product (q
MR∗
n2,1−α > 0, q
MR∗
n2,α > 0).
Condition 2 If c1 < c < c2, then the optimal prices are given in the table below. In this
case, the monopolist sells remanufactured products (qMR∗r > 0), and consumers in both
segments buy new products (qMR∗n2,1−α > 0 and q
MR∗
n2,α > 0).
Condition 3 : (High c) If c2 ≤ c, then the optimal prices are given in the table below. In
this case, the monopolist sells remanufactured products (qMR∗r > 0), and the new product
is only chosen by consumers in the α segment (qMR∗n2,1−α = 0, q
MR∗
n2,α > 0).
Proof of Proposition 3. We can write the third-party remanufacturer’s second-period
problem is given by
max
pr




s.t. δpn1 ≤ pr (42)





= −2(1−α)δ(1−δ) < 0, the third-party remanufacturer’s profit function is concave in

















s.t. k=̇ max(pn1, c+ s) ≤ pn2 (44)




= −α − 2(1−α)1−δ < 0 the OEM’s profit function is concave in pn2. If λi ≥
0 ∀ i{1, 2, 3, 4}, the Lagrangian function for the third-party and OEM are given by
LR(pn2, pr, λ1, λ2) = (1− α)
(δpn2 − pr)
δ(1− δ)
(pr − cr)− λ1(δpn1 − pr)− λ2(pn1 − δpn2)
L(pn2, pr, λ3, λ4) = α
[












− λ3(k − pn2)− λ4(pn2 − 1 + δ − pr) (46)
The KKT conditions which are necessary and sufficient for optimality are given by ∂LR∂pr = 0,
∂L
∂pn2
= 0, λ1(δpn1 − pr) = 0, λ2(pn1 − δpn2) = 0, λ3(k − pn2), λ4(pn2 − 1 + δ − pr) and
λi ≥ 0 ∀ i{1, 2, 3, 4}.
Solving ∂LR∂pr = 0 and
∂L
∂pn2
= 0 together we get,
pn2(λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4) =
(1− α)(2c+ cr) + (1− δ)(2(1− αs) + 2(λ3 − λ4) + δ(λ1 − λ2))
4− δ − 2α− αδ
pr(λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4) = ((2− α− αδ)(cr(1− α) + δ(1− δ)
(λ1 − λ2)) + δc(1− α)2 + δ(1− δ)(1− α)(1− αs+ λ3 − λ4))/((1− α)(4− δ − 2α− αδ))
There are two main scenarios to be analyzed based on whether max(pn1, c + s) = pn1
(Scenario I ) or max(pn1, c+ s) = c+ s (Scenario II ).
Scenario I. If c+ s ≤ pn1, then we have k = pn1 and there are four main groups of cases to
be analyzed based on whether the constraints pr ≤ δpn2 and pn2 ≤ 1 − δ + pr are binding
or slack.
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Group A: pr = δpn2 and pn2 = 1− δ + pr, i.e. qn2,1−α = 0 and qr = 0.
In this group we have qr = 0 and we have two candidate cases; if δpn1 < pr = δpn2, then
pn1 < pn2 has to hold true and if δpn1 = pr = δpn2, then only pn1 = pn2 is feasible.
Case 1 δpn1 < pr = δpn2 and pn1 < pn2 = 1−δ+pr: In this case, (43) & (45) are binding
and (42) & (44) are not binding, so we have λ1 = λ3 = 0 and λ2, λ4 ≥ 0. Solving pr = δpn2
and pn2 = 1− δ + pr, we get pn2 = 1 and pr = δ. We can now solve pn2(0, 0, 0, λ4) = 1 and
pr(0, λ2, 0, λ4) = δ and we have λ2 = − (1−c)(1−α)+αs(1−δ)1−δ < 0. However, this contradicts
λ2 ≥ 0 and this case is ruled out.
Case 2 δpn1 = pr = δpn2 and pn1 = pn2 = 1 − δ + pr: In this case, (42), (43), (44) &
(45) are binding. Solving pn1 = pr = δpn2 and pn1 = pn2 = 1 − δ + pr, we get pn2 = 1,
pr = δ and pn1 = 1. However, this contradicts pn1 < 1 and this case is ruled out.
Group B: pr = δpn2 and pn2 < 1− δ + pr, i.e. qn2,1−α > 0 and qr = 0.
In this group we have qr = 0 and we have two candidate solutions; if δpn1 < pr = δpn2,
then pn1 < pn2 has to hold true and if δpn1 = pr = δpn2, then pn1 = pn2.
Case 3 δpn1 < pr = δpn2 and pn1 < pn2 < 1−δ+pr: In this case, (42), (44) & (45) are not
binding and (43) is binding, so we have λ1 = λ3 = λ4 = 0 and λ2 ≥ 0. The optimal value of
list price is given by pn2 =
(1−αs)(1−δ)+c(1−α)
2−α−δ and by solving pr(0, λ2, 0, 0, 0) = δpn2(0, 0, 0, 0)
we get λ2 = cr(2 − α − δ) − δ(1 − αs)(1 − δ) − cδ(1 − α). The conditions pn1 < pn2
and λ2 ≥ 0 can be simplified to pn1 < (1−αs)(1−δ)+c(1−α)2−α−δ and c ≤ c3 respectively, where
c3=̇
cr(2−α−δ)−δ(1−αs)(1−δ)
δ(1−α) . Also, the conditions pn2 < 1− δ + pr gives us pn2 < 1 (which is
always true).
Case 4 δpn1 = pr = δpn2 and pn1 = pn2 < 1 − δ + pr: In this case, (45) is not
binding and (42), (43) & (44) are binding. Thus, we have pr = δpn1, pn1 = pn2 and
solving pn2(0, 0, λ3, 0) = pn1 and pr(0, λ2, λ3, 0) = δpn1, we get λ2 = cr − δpn1 and λ3 =
pn1(2− α− δ)− (1− δ)(1− αs) + c(1− α). The conditions λ2, λ3 ≥ 0 give us pn1 ≤ crδ and
(1−δ)(1−αs)+c(1−α)
2−α−δ ≤ pn1 respectively. Both of these conditions can be simplified together
to c ≤ c3.
Group C: pr < δpn2 and pn2 < 1− δ + pr, i.e. qn2,1−α > 0 and qr > 0. In this group, since
δpn1 ≤ pr we always have pn1 < pn2. We have two candidate solutions; δpn1 < pr < δpn2
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and δpn1 = pr < δpn2.
Case 5 δpn1 < pr < δpn2 and pn1 < pn2 < 1 − δ + pr: In this case, (42), (43),
(44) & (45) are not binding, so we have λ1 = λ2 = λ3 = λ4 = 0. The optimal prices
are given by pn2 = pn2(0, 0, 0, 0) =
(1−α)(2c+cr)+2(1−αs)(1−δ)
4−δ−2α−αδ and pr = pr(0, 0, 0, 0, 0) =
cr(2−α−αδ)+δ(1−δ)(1−αs)+δc(1−α)
4−δ−2α−αδ . The conditions δpn1 < pr, pn1 < pn2, pr < δpn2 and pn2 <
1−δ+pr are given by pn1 ≤ cr(2−α−αδ)+δ(1−δ)(1−αs)+δc(1−α)δ(4−δ−2α−αδ) , pn1 <
(1−α)(2c+cr)+2(1−αs)(1−δ)
4−δ−2α−αδ ,
c3 < c, and c < c4=̇
cr(1−αδ)+αs(1−δ)2+2(1−α)(1−δ)+α(1−δ)(s−δ)
(1−α)(2−δ) respectively.
Case 6 δpn1 = pr < δpn2 and pn1 < pn2 < 1 − δ + pr: In this case, (42) is binding
and (43), (44) & (45) are not binding, so we have λ2 = λ3 = λ4 = 0 and λ1 ≥ 0. Solving
pn2(λ1, 0, 0, 0) = pn2 & pr(λ1, 0, 0, 0) = δpn1 we get, pn2 =
(1−αs)(1−δ)+c(1−α)+δpn1(1−α)
2−α−αδ and
λ1 = δpn1(4−δ−2α−αδ)−cr(2−α−αδ)−δ(1−δ)(1−αs)−δc(1−α). The conditions pn1 <
pn2 and pr < δpn2 are both given by pn1 <
c(1−α)+(1−δ)(1−αs)
2−α−δ . However, pn2 < 1−δ+pr and
λ1 ≥ 0 are given by δ(1−αδ)+αs(1−δ)−(1−α)(1−c)δ(1−αδ) < pn1 and
cr(2−α−αδ)+δ(1−δ)(1−αs)+δc(1−α)
δpn1(4−δ−2α−αδ) ≤
pn1. Simplifying the above conditions we get c < c4.
Group D: pr < δpn2 and pn2 = 1− δ + pr, i.e. qn2,1−α = 0 and qr > 0. In this group, since
δpn1 ≤ pr we always have pn1 < pn2. We have two candidate solutions; δpn1 < pr < δpn2
and δpn1 = pr < δpn2.
Case 7 δpn1 < pr < δpn2 and pn1 < pn2 = 1 − δ + pr: In this case, (45) is binding
and (42), (43) & (44) are not binding, so we have λ1 = λ2 = λ3 = 0 and λ4 ≥ 0. Solving
pn2(0, 0, 0, λ4) = 1−δ+pr(0, 0, 0, λ4) and pr(0, 0, 0, λ4) = pr together, we get pr = cr+δ(1−δ)2−δ
and λ4 = c(1−α)(2− δ)− cr(1−αδ)−αs(1− δ)2 − 2(1−α)(1− δ)−α(1− δ)(s− δ). The
conditions δpn1 < pr, pn1 < pn2 and λ4 ≥ 0 are given by pn1 < cr+δ(1−δ)δ(2−δ) , pn1 <
cr+2(1−δ)
2−δ ,
and c4 ≤ c.
Case 8 δpn1 = pr < δpn2 and pn1 < pn2 = 1 − δ + pr: In this case, (42) & (45) are
binding and (43) & (44) are not binding, so we have λ2 = λ3 = 0 and λ1, λ4 ≥ 0. In this
case, we have pr = δpn1, pn2 = 1 − δ + pr = 1 − δ + δpn1 and solving pn2(λ1, 0, 0, λ4) =
1 − δ + δpn1 and pr(λ1, 0, 0, λ4) = δpn1, we get λ1 = pn1δ(2 − δ) − cr − δ(1 − δ) and
λ4 = δ(1− αδ)− αs(1− δ)− (1− α)(1− c)− δpn1(1− αδ). The conditions λ1, λ4 ≥ 0 give
us cr+δ(1−δ)δ(2−δ) ≤ pn1 and pn1 ≤
δ(1−αδ)−αs(1−δ)−(1−α)(1−c)
δ(1−αδ) . Simplifying these two conditions
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together, we get c4 ≤ c.
Scenario II. If pn1 < c+ s, then we have k = c+ s and there are four main groups of cases
to be analyzed, depending on whether the constraints pr ≤ δpn2 and pn2 ≤ 1 − δ + pr are
binding or slack.
Group A: pr = δpn2 and pn2 = 1− δ + pr, i.e. qn2,1−α = 0 and qr = 0.
In this group we have qr = 0 and since δpn1 = pr leads to pn1 = pn2 which is infeasible
under this scenario, we can only have δpn1 < pr. Thus, we have two candidate solutions;
c+ s < pn2 and c+ s = pn2.
Case 9 δpn1 < pr = δpn2 and c + s < pn2 = 1 − δ + pr: In this case, (43) & (45)
are binding and (42) & (44) are not binding, so we have λ1 = λ3 = 0 and λ2, λ4 ≥ 0.
Solving pr = δpn2 and pn2 = 1 − δ + pr, we get pn2 = 1 and pr = δ. We can now solve
pn2(0, 0, 0, λ4) = 1 and pr(0, λ2, 0, λ4) = δ and we get λ4 = − (1−c)(1−α)+(1−αs)(1−δ)1−δ < 0.
However, this contradicts λ4 ≥ 0 and this case is ruled out.
Case 10 δpn1 < pr = δpn2 and c+ s = pn2 = 1− δ + pr: In this case, (43), (44) & (45)
are binding and (42) is not binding. Solving pn1 < pr = δpn2 and c+ s = pn2 = 1− δ + pr,
we get pn2 = 1 = c+ s. However, this contradicts c+ s < 1 and this case is ruled out.
Group B: pr = δpn2 and pn2 < 1− δ + pr, i.e. qn2,1−α > 0 and qr = 0.
In this group we have qr = 0 and since δpn1 = pr leads to pn1 = pn2 which is infeasible
under this scenario, we can only have δpn1 < pr. Thus, we have two candidate solutions;
c+ s < pn2 and c+ s = pn2.
Case 11 δpn1 < pr = δpn2 and c+ s < pn2 < 1− δ + pr: In this case, (42), (44) & (45)
are not binding and (43) is binding, so we have λ1 = λ3 = λ4 = 0 and λ2 ≥ 0. The optimal
value of list price is given by pn2 =
(1−αs)(1−δ)+c(1−α)
2−α−δ and by solving pr(0, λ2, 0, 0, 0) =
δpn2(0, 0, 0, 0) we get λ2 = cr(2 − α − δ) − δ(1 − αs)(1 − δ) − cδ(1 − α). The conditions
c+ s < pn2 and λ2 ≥ 0 can be simplified to c < (1−δ)(1−s)−s(1−αδ)(1−δ) and c ≤ c3 respectively.
Case 12 δpn1 < pr = δpn2 and c + s = pn2 < 1 − δ + pr: In this case, (45) & (42) are
not binding and (43) & (44) are binding. Thus, we have pr = δ(c + s), pn2 = c + s and
solving pn2(0, 0, λ3, 0) = c+ s and pr(0, λ2, λ3, 0) = δ(c+ s), we get λ2 = cr − δ(c+ s) and
λ3 = c(1− δ) + s(1− αδ)− (1− δ)(1− s). The conditions λ2, λ3 ≥ 0 give us δ(c+ s) ≤ cr
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and (1−δ)(1−s)−s(1−αδ)(1−δ) ≤ c respectively.
Group C: pr < δpn2 and pn2 < 1 − δ + pr, i.e. qn2,1−α > 0 and qr > 0. In this group,
we have four candidate solutions based on whether δpn1 < pr or δpn1 = pr and whether
c+ s < pn2 or c+ s = pn2.
Case 13 δpn1 < pr < δpn2 and c + s < pn2 < 1 − δ + pr: In this case, (42), (43),
(44) & (45) are not binding, so we have λ1 = λ2 = λ3 = λ4 = 0. The optimal prices
are given by pn2 = pn2(0, 0, 0, 0) =
(1−α)(2c+cr)+2(1−αs)(1−δ)
4−δ−2α−αδ and pr = pr(0, 0, 0, 0, 0) =
cr(2−α−αδ)+δ(1−δ)(1−αs)+δc(1−α)
4−δ−2α−αδ . The conditions δpn1 < pr, c+ s < pn2, pr < δpn2 and pn2 <
1−δ+pr are given by pn1 ≤ cr(2−α−αδ)+δ(1−δ)(1−αs)+δc(1−α)δ(4−δ−2α−αδ) , c <
cr(1−α)+2(1−s)−δ(2−s)+3αδs
2−δ−αδ ,
c3 < c, and c < c4=̇
cr(1−αδ)+αs(1−δ)2+2(1−α)(1−δ)+α(1−δ)(s−δ)
(1−α)(2−δ) respectively.
Case 14 δpn1 < pr < δpn2 and c+ s = pn2 < 1− δ + pr: In this case, (42), (43) & (45)
are not binding and (44) is binding so we have λ1 = λ2 = λ4 = 0. We have pn2 = c + s
and solving c+ s = pn2(0, 0, λ3, 0) and pr = pr(0, 0, λ3, 0) together we get pr = cr+δc+δs2 and
λ3 = c(2− δ−αδ)− cr(1−α)−2(1− s) + δ(2− s)−3αδs. The conditions λ3 ≥ 0, δpn1 < pr
and pr < δpn2 are given by
cr(1−αδ)+αs(1−δ)2+2(1−α)(1−δ)+α(1−δ)(s−δ)
(1−α)(2−δ) ≤ c, pn1 <
cr+δc+δs
2δ and
cr < δ(c+ s) respectively.
Case 15 δpn1 = pr < δpn2 and c + s < pn2 < 1 − δ + pr: In this case, (42) is
binding and (43), (44) & (45) are not binding, so we have λ2 = λ3 = λ4 = 0 and
λ1 ≥ 0. Solving pn2(λ1, 0, 0, 0) = pn2 and pr(λ1, 0, 0, 0) = δpn1 together we get, pn2 =
(1−αs)(1−δ)+c(1−α)+δpn1(1−α)
2−α−αδ and λ1 = δpn1(4−δ−2α−αδ)−cr(2−α−αδ)−δ(1−δ)(1−αs)−
δc(1 − α). The conditions c + s < pn2 and pr < δpn2 are given by (1−αδ)(c+2s)+(1−δ)δ(1−α) < pn1
and pn1 <
c(1−α)+(1−δ)(1−αs)
2−α−δ . However, pn2 < 1 − δ + pr and λ1 ≥ 0 are given by
δ(1−αδ)+αs(1−δ)−(1−α)(1−c)
δ(1−αδ) < pn1 and
cr(2−α−αδ)+δ(1−δ)(1−αs)+δc(1−α)
δpn1(4−δ−2α−αδ) ≤ pn1. Simplifying
the above conditions we get c < c4.
Case 16 δpn1 = pr < δpn2 and c + s = pn2 < 1 − δ + pr: In this case, (42) & (44) are
binding and (43) & (45) are not binding, so we have λ2 = λ4 = 0 and λ1, λ3 ≥ 0. Solving
pn2(λ1, 0, λ3, 0) = c + s and pr(λ1, 0, λ3, 0) = δpn1, we get λ1 = 2δpn1 − cr − δc − δs and
λ3 = (1 − αδ)(c + 2s) + (1 − δ) − δ(1 − α)pn1. The conditions λ1 ≥ 0 and λ3 ≥ 0 give us
cr+δc+δs
2δ ≤ pn1 and pn1 ≤
(1−αδ)(c+2s)+(1−δ)




Group D: pr < δpn2 and pn2 = 1 − δ + pr, i.e. qn2,1−α = 0 and qr > 0. In this group,
we have four candidate solutions based on whether δpn1 < pr or δpn1 = pr and whether
c+ s < pn2 or c+ s = pn2.
Case 17 δpn1 < pr < δpn2 and c + s < pn2 = 1 − δ + pr: In this case, (45) is binding
and (42), (43) & (44) are not binding, so we have λ1 = λ2 = λ3 = 0 and λ4 ≥ 0. Solving
pn2(0, 0, 0, λ4) = 1−δ+pr(0, 0, 0, λ4) and pr(0, 0, 0, λ4) = pr together, we get pr = cr+δ(1−δ)2−δ
and λ4 = c(1−α)(2−δ)−cr(1−αδ)−αs(1−δ)2−2(1−α)(1−δ)−α(1−δ)(s−δ). The conditions




Case 18 δpn1 < pr < δpn2 and c + s = pn2 = 1 − δ + pr: In this case, (45) & (44) are
binding and (42) & (43) are not binding, so we have λ1 = λ2 = 0 and λ3, λ4 ≥ 0. Thus, we
have pn2 = c+ s and pr = c+ s− 1 + δ and λ3 = c(2− δ)− 2(1− δ)− c− r+ s(2− δ). Thus,
the conditions δpn1 < pr and λ3 ≥ 0 are given by pn1 < c+s−1+δδ and
2(1−δ)+cr−s(2−δ)
2−δ ≤ c.
Case 19 δpn1 = pr < δpn2 and c + s < pn2 = 1 − δ + pr: In this case, (42) & (45) are
binding and (43) & (44) are not binding, so we have λ2 = λ3 = 0 and λ1, λ4 ≥ 0. In this
case, we have pr = δpn1, pn2 = 1 − δ + pr = 1 − δ + δpn1 and solving pn2(λ1, 0, 0, λ4) =
1 − δ + δpn1 and pr(λ1, 0, 0, λ4) = δpn1, we get λ1 = pn1δ(2 − δ) − cr − δ(1 − δ) and
λ4 = δ(1− αδ)− αs(1− δ)− (1− α)(1− c)− δpn1(1− αδ). The conditions λ1, λ4 ≥ 0 give
us cr+δ(1−δ)δ(2−δ) ≤ pn1 and pn1 ≤
δ(1−αδ)−αs(1−δ)−(1−α)(1−c)
δ(1−αδ) . Simplifying these two conditions
together, we get c4 ≤ c. Also, c+ s < pn2 gives us c+s−1+δδ < pn1.
Case 20 δpn1 = pr < δpn2 and c + s = pn2 = 1 − δ + pr: In this case, (42), (44)
& (45) are binding and (43) is not binding, so we have λ2 = 0 and λ1, λ3, λ4 ≥ 0. In
this case, we have pn2 = c + s, pr = c + s − 1 + δ and the following two conditions are re-
quired pn1 ≤ c+s−1+δδ and
c+s−1+δ
< pn1 which cannot hold together and this case is ruled out.
Thus, there are 20 candidate solutions which can be summarized by three conditions, with
mutually exclusive and collective exhaustive regions:
Condition 1 (Low c) If c ≤ c3, Cases 3, 4, 11 and 12 hold.
Condition 2 (Medium c) If c3 < c < c4, Cases 5, 6, 13, 14, 15 and 16 hold.
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Condition 3 (High c) If c4 ≤ c, Cases 7, 8, 17, 18 and 19 hold.
First Period Analysis: After characterizing the OEM’s and third-party’s optimal second-
period decisions, we now move to the first-period decisions. The OEM maximizes her
total two-period profit ΠDR(pn1) = (1 − pn1)(pn1 − c) + ΠDR2 (pn1) to determine pDR∗n1 and
ΠDR∗=̇ΠDR(pDR∗n1 ). First, we need to check whether the optimum lies in pn1 < c + s or
c+ s ≤ pn1. Cases 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 15, 17, 18 and 19 have the condition pn1 < c+ s and
Cases 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 lie under the condition c + s ≤ pn1. The optimal solutions are
summarized by the following three conditions on c:
Condition 1 (Low c) c ≤ c3: First, we need to check whether the optimum lies in Case 12
or Case 3. The derivative of the two-period profit under Case 3, evaluated at c+ s is given
by 1 − c − 2s. If this is positive [c < c0=̇1 − 2s or c < 1/3], the optimum is reached at
c+ s ≤ p∗n1 and cases from Scenario II are ruled out; if it is negative [c0 ≤ c or 1/3 ≤ c] , it
is reached at p∗n1 ≤ c+ s and cases from Scenario I are ruled out. For cases under Scenario
I, we check whether the optimal p∗n1 lies under p
∗
n1 < p̄f , i.e. Case 3 or Case 4 which is
defined by p̄f ≤ p∗n1. The derivative of the two-period profit under Case 3 evaluated at p̄a is
given by 2α(1− c− 2s) + δ(1 + c)(1 + α), which is always positive. Thus, the optimum lies
in Case 3 and is given by 1+αs+c(1+α)2+α . We now focus on cases under Scenario II, if c < cn
then the optimum lies in Case 11 and is given by 1+c2 and if cn ≤ c, then it lies in Case 12
and is given by 1+c2 .
Condition 2 (Medium c) c3 < c < c4: First, we need to check whether the optimum lies in
Case 16 or Case 5. The derivative of the two-period profit under Case 5, evaluated at c+ s
is given by 1−c−2s. If this is positive [c < c0=̇1−2s or c < 1/3], the optimum is reached at
c+s ≤ p∗n1 and cases from Scenario II are ruled out; if it is negative [c0 ≤ c or 1/3 ≤ c] , it is
reached at p∗n1 ≤ c+ s and cases from Scenario I are ruled out. For cases under Scenario I,
we check whether the optimal p∗n1 lies under p
∗
n1 < p̄g, i.e. Case 5 or Case 6 which is defined
by p̄g ≤ p∗n1. The derivative of the two-period profit under Case 5 evaluated at p̄b is given
by δc(2−δ+3α−α2−2αδ−α2δ)−cr(2+α)(2−α−αδ)+δ(2+δ−α(3−s(6−α−3δ−2αδ))).
If this is negative [c < cr(2+α)(2−α−αδ)−δ(2+δ−α(3−s(6−α−3δ−2αδ)))
δ(2−δ+3α−α2−2αδ−α2δ) =̇ce], then the optimum lies
in Case 5 and is given by 1+c(1+α)+αs2+α ; if it is positive, [ce ≤ c], the optimum lies under Case
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6 and is given by (1−δ)((2−α)(1+αs)+δ(1−2α−αs))+c(2−3δ+α(1−α−δ+2δ
2))
4−α2−2αδ(1−2δ)−δ(4+δ) . However, under Case
6 for pn1 > 0, we need ∆a=̇− (1− c)(α− δ) + 2αs(1− δ) ≤ 0. This implies that if ∆a > 0,
then the optimum lies in Case 5. Thus, if c < ce or ce ≤ c and ∆a > 0, then the optimum
lies in Case 5 and if ce ≤ c and ∆a ≤ 0, then the optimum lies in Case 6.
As discussed above cases under scenario II, Cases 13, 14, 15 and 16 require c0 ≤ cq and
Case 14 also requires c0 +
δs(1−α)
1−δ < c. If c0 ≤ c ≤ c0 +
δs(1−α)
1−δ , only Cases 13, 15 and 16
hold. First, we check whether the optimal p∗n1 lies under pn1 < p̄g, i.e. Case 13 & 14 or
p̄g ≤ pn1, i.e. Case 15 & 16. The derivative of the total profit under Case 15 evaluated at
p̄g is given by −2cr(2− α− αδ) + δ(1− α)(2 + δ) + 2αδs(1− δ) + cδ(2− δ − αδ). If this is
positive [2cr(2−α−αδ)−δ(1−α)(2+δ)−2αδs(1−δ)δ(2−δ−αδ) =̇cs ≤ c], the optimum lies under either Case 15
or Case 16 and if it is negative [c < cs], it lies under Case 14 or Case 13. If c < cs and
c < cp, the optimum lies under 13 and is given by 1+c2 and if cp ≤ c it lies under 14 and
is given by 1+c2 . If cs ≤ c holds and suppose that c ≤ c0 +
δs(1−α)
1−δ holds, the optimum lies





1−δ < c, then we need to check whether the optimal p
∗
n1 lies under p
∗
n1 < p̄l (Case
15) or p̄l ≤ p∗n1 (Case 16). The derivative of the total profit under Case 16 evaluated at p̄l
is given by c((2− δ−αδ)(1− δ))− δ2s(1−α)2 + 4s(1− δ)(1−αδ) + (1− δ)(2− 3δ+αδ). If
this is positive [ δ
2s(1−α)2−4s(1−δ)(1−αδ)−(1−δ)(2−3δ+αδ)
(2−δ−αδ)(1−δ) =̇ct ≤ c], the optimum lies under Case
16 and is given by (1−δ)(1+c)+δs(1−α)2(1−δ) and if this is negative [c < ct], the optimum lies under
Case 15.
Condition 3 (High c) c4 ≤ c: First, we need to check whether the optimum lies in Case
19 or Case 7. The derivative of the two-period profit under Case 7, evaluated at c + s
is given by 1 − c − 2s. If this is positive [c < c0=̇1 − 2s or c < 1/3], the optimum is
reached at c+ s ≤ p∗n1 and cases from Scenario II are ruled out; if it is negative [c0 ≤ c or
1/3 ≤ c] , it is reached at p∗n1 ≤ c + s and cases from Scenario I are ruled out. For cases
under Scenario I, we check whether the optimal p∗n1 lies under p
∗
n1 < p̄h, i.e. Case 7 or
Case 8 which is defined by p̄h ≤ p∗n1. The derivative of the two-period profit under Case 7
evaluated at p̄d is given by δc(1 + α)(2 − δ) − cr(2 + α) − αδ(1 − s)(1 − δ) + δ2 + αδs. If
this is negative [c < cr(2+α)+αδ(1−s)(1−δ)−δ
2−αδs
δ(1+α)(2−δ) =̇cf ], then the optimum lies in Case 7 and is
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For cases under Scenario II, we first need to check whether the optimum lies under
p∗n1 < p̄h (Case 17 & Case 18) or p̄h ≤ p∗n1 (Case 19). The derivative of the total profit
under the case 19 evaluated at p̄h is given by cδ(2 − δ) − 2cr + δ2. If this is positive
[2cr−δ
2
δ(2−δ) =̇cu ≤ c], the optimum lies under Case 19 and is given by 1 −
(1−c+αδs)
2+αδ2
and if is it
negative [c < cu], the optimum lies under either Case 17 or Case 18 (based on cq). If c < cu
and c < cq, the optimum lies under Case 17 and is given by 1+c2 and if cq ≤ c, it lies under
Case 18 and is given by 1+c2 .
The two-period optimal decisions under c < c0 or c < 1/3 are summarized in Proposition 3
and those under c0 ≤ c or 1/3 ≤ c are summarized below:
If the OEM offers a trade-in rebate program for new products and faces competition from a
third-party remanufacturer, then the OEM’s optimal strategy is dependent on its per-unit
production cost c relative to other parameters as follows:
Condition 1 : If c ≤ c3, then the optimal prices are given in the table below. In this case,
the OEM prices its new product low enough such that the third party does not enter the
market (qDR∗r = 0).
Condition 2 : If c3 < c < c4, then the optimal prices are given in the table below. In this
case, the OEM chooses its list price in a way that some customers in the 1 − α segment
buy remanufactured products offered by the third party, whereas others buy new products
(qDR∗r > 0, q
DR∗
n2,1−α > 0).
Condition 3 : If c4 ≤ c, then the optimal prices are given in the table below. In this case,
the OEM chooses its list price in a way that customers in the 1 − α segment only buy




We now perform an extensive numerical study to show that the results from the numer-
ical study in §4.5 (which was over a limited and realistic range of values for the parameters)
hold for an extensive range of model parameters. For the parameters α and δ we choose
a full-factorial experimental design and vary each of them over their theoretical range [0,1]
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with values at 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7 and 0.9. From the model formulation, we need the following
conditions to hold; c+s < 1, cr < c and s < c. For the parameters c, cr/c and s/c we choose
a full-factorial experimental design and vary each of them over their feasible range; c takes
values at 0.1, 0.2, 0.3 & 0.4 and cr/c & s/c take values at 0.1, 0.3, 0.5 and 0.7. Thus, there
are a total of 52 · 43 = 1,600 experimental cells. For each experimental cell, we compute
the prices, quantities and profits for the OEM for each of the three scenarios studied: the
OEM has a monopoly with only the new product (MN ), the OEM has a monopoly but
offers new and remanufactured products (MR), the OEM is in a duopoly where the entrant
offers a remanufactured product (DR). We compare the OEM’s profit for cases MR and
DR, relative to MN. For the MN case, the OEM’s profit ranges between 0.18 and 0.49, with
a median value of 0.32; for the MR case, the OEM’s profit ranges between 0.12 and 0.52,
with a median value of 0.31; finally, for the DR case, the OEM’s profit ranges between 0.09
and 0.49, with a median value of 0.25. We offer a more detailed comparison between these
cases below.
Case MR: OEM Offers Remanufactured Units When the OEM offers a remanufactured
product, her profit increases (relative to the case MN ) in only 616 out of 1,600 cells, or
38.5% of the total, with an average profit increase (100%π
MR∗−πMN∗
πMN∗
) in these cells of
13.51%. Profits decrease in 984 cells (61.5% of the cells), with an average profit decrease
of 12.1%. Overall, her average profit across all cells decreases by 2.2%, with a maximum
decrease of 44.8% and a maximum increase of 82.5%. Thus, the OEM may be worse off by
offering a remanufactured product. To analyze which model parameters most contribute
to this profit decrease, we averaged, for each factor level, the profit decrease across all
corresponding cells. We then plotted the results, which are shown in Figure 10.
Figure 10 clearly shows that the parameters that most influence profit decrease are
α, c and s/c. To provide a clearer picture, we performed individual regressions, one for
each experimental factor. For each regression, the dependent variable is the percent profit
decrease, the independent variable is the corresponding experimental factor, and there are
1,600 observations. The magnitude of R2 for each regression provides a metric for the

































Figure 10: Average Profit Decrease when OEM Offers Remanufactured Product







The factors that most impact the decrease in the OEM’s profit are, in order: α (-), c
(-), s/c (-), and to a less extent cr/c and δ, with R2 values of 0.359, 0.130, 0.137, 0.005,
and 0.004, respectively. In particular, the factors α and s/c account for 35.9% and 13.0%,
respectively, of the variation in profit decrease.
Case DR: Third Party Offers Remanufactured Units When the entrant offers a re-
manufactured product, the OEM’s profit decreases (relative to the case MN ) in all 1,600
experimental cells, as one would expect. Overall, the average profit decrease is 21.2%, with
a maximum decrease of 57.6% and a minimum decrease of 0% (in 10.0% of the cells). Thus,
the entry by a third-party remanufacturer significantly worsens the OEM’s profits. Again,
to analyze which model parameters most contribute to this profit decrease, we have aver-
aged, for each factor level, the profit decrease across all corresponding cells. The results are
shown in Figure 11.































Figure 11: Average Profit Decrease when Entrant Offers Remanufactured Product







δ, α and c. Again, we performed individual regressions, one for each experimental factor.
For each regression, the dependent variable is the percent profit decrease, the independent
variable is the corresponding experimental factor, and there are 1,600 observations. The
results are listed in Table 7. Thus, the factors that most impact the profit decrease are, in
order: δ (-) & α (-) and to a lesser extent c (-), s/c (-) and cr/c (-) with R2 values of 0.333,
0.210, 0.052, 0.030 and 0.002 respectively. In particular, the factors δ and α account for
32.3% and 21.0%, respectively, of the variation in the profit decrease.
We now compare the DR case relative to MR case. That is, how much worse off
is the OEM if she does not offer a remanufactured product but the third-party entrant
does (DR), compared to the case where the OEM can preempt the entrant by offering




) from remanufacturing herself versus allowing an entrant to offer
remanufactured products is 34.2% on average, with a minimum decrease of 0% (in 10.0% of
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cells), a maximum decrease of 55.82%, and a median decrease of 16.9%. Although offering a
remanufactured product (typically) cannibalizes sales for the new product (and consequently
decreases profit by an average of 2.2%), the OEM is still better off than in the case where
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